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Abstract 
 
 
 
In order to harness globalisation various international institutions and instruments have 
emerged.  In the international trade field, the multilateral trading system, that is the WTO 
materialized as a global platform for trade liberalisation and related issues.  Along the 
same time and with similar objectives a myriad of PTAs also developed and have now 
become a prominent feature of international trade policy.  It is not only the number and 
geographical spread of PTAs that has increased dramatically over the years, but the scope 
of these agreements has also extended well beyond trade into non-trade provisions such as 
foreign investment, labor market, intellectual property rights and dispute settlement 
mechanisms.   
Such developments bring several issues to the forefront.  As the geographical spread 
widens, more and more countries are faced with the costly process of successfully 
negotiating these agreements to their benefit.  The central question that arises in this 
context is that, aside from the potential benefits, what are the associated costs?  These 
approximations (such as trade diversion, tariff revenue loss, impact on domestic 
production) facilitate the negotiating process of the proposed agreement.  Motivated by 
this, chapter 1 of this dissertation estimates the consequences of the European Union 
Economic Partnership Agreement (EU-EPA) on a set of economic indicators for the 
Fijian economy.  The EU-EPAs are a set of proposed reciprocal free trade agreements 
between the EU and the African Caribbean Pacific (ACP) group of countries, designed 
specifically to replace the previous non-reciprocal and WTO incompatible trading 
arrangements between the two parties.  The EU-EPA makes an interesting case to be 
evaluated since for many of the signatory countries from the ACP group, this will be their 
first comprehensive reciprocal agreement with a developed country which perhaps 
explains the prolonged negotiation process, with many of the involved ACP countries yet 
to sign a full EPA.   
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Several researchers have studied the likely consequences of the EU-EPA on the ACP 
countries.  The African and Caribbean countries have attracted larger research interest 
than the Pacific group.  Fiji and Papua New Guinea, as part of the ACP region signed an 
interim EU-EPA in 2007.  However, there is no empirical investigation on the 
consequences of the EPA on either of these countries.  On this note, this study contributes 
to the existing litersature by investigating the consequences of this agreement on Fiji’s 
imports, tariff revenue, (selected) production, consumption, prices and exports under a 
full and partial liberalisation scenario, using a partial equilibrium framework.  Our 
findings reveal that the potential import substitution and tariff revenue losses are 
considerably lessened under a partial liberalisation scenario.  Moreover, while the EU-
EPA will produce tariff revenue losses for Fiji, the losses are estimated to be much 
smaller than those concluded for other ACP member countries.  Likewise, our results also 
indicate very negligible effect on Fiji’s imports from the region and on domestic 
production. 
The latter two studies are motivated by the changing nature of PTAs and therefore extend 
the debate into two of its non-trade impacts - namely Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
and international labor mobility.  Traditionally, goods trade had a central role in PTAs 
and this attracted research interest on its trade effects.  The more recent PTAs have 
extended into non-trade provisions such as foreign investment, labor market, intellectual 
property rights and hence effects on motivations beyond trade are pragmatic.  In light of 
these developments, the PTA-FDI relationship for a group of ACP countries was 
investigated in the second study.  While the existing literature on the PTA-FDI nexus has 
focused on a number of regional agreements, the coverage of the ACP states is limited.  
Moreover, studies that do exist on individual ACP countries or sub-regional groups have 
explored the traditional determinants of FDI but research that explains if PTAs matter for 
FDI is still in its infancy.  Hence, this chapter contributes to the existing literature by 
focusing on the role of PTAs in attracting FDI in the ACP group, along with the inclusion 
of other important determinants like Bilateral Investment Treaties (BIT), Double Taxation 
Treaties (DTT), office hours overlap and surrounding market potential.  With the use of a 
gravity specification, we conclude the prevalence of market seeking FDI in the ACP 
group, with an important role played by regional integration to unlock this market 
potential in this otherwise fragmented group of countries.  Moreover, results also indicate 
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that trade and FDI act as substitutes, supported by the negative coefficients on the trade 
openness and number of PTAs variables.  Greater bilateral distance and smaller office 
hours overlap discourages FDI.  The presence of a double taxation treaty encourages FDI.  
We find that aggregation of countries in our sample masks regional differences.  A 
decomposition of the ACP group into its regional subsamples reveals that a bilateral PTA 
with investment provisions, with or without a BIT, reduces FDI in Africa.  A bilateral 
PTA without investment provisions does the same, unless a bilateral BIT is in place, in 
which case, FDI increases.  For the Caribbean, we find no significant link between a PTA, 
with or without investment provisions, and FDI.  Additionally, we find a possible 
signalling role for BITs, specifically for BITs signed with OECD countries.  We do not 
find any significant role for BITs in the natural resources sector.   
Chapter 3 empirically investigated the consequences of PTAs on international labor 
mobility.  While the flow of goods, services and financial capital has been liberalised over 
the years, the movement of labor across borders has remained restricted.  Undoubtedly, 
the extent to which labor can be liberalised is not purely within the frameworks of trade 
policy.  Moreover, the movement of people has broader economic, social and political 
implications.  Given this complex nature of migration and the fact that a nation’s border 
security and immigration laws will always have greater control over the cross-border 
movement of workers indicates that labor as a factor of production will not experience the 
extent of liberalisation as in other factor markets such as goods, services and financial 
capital.  Moreover, the potential risks from migration, current global tensions such as 
drugs, human trafficking, and terrorism along with governments’ concerns of potential 
welfare burdens has resulted in tighter immigration policies across many countries.  
Despite these however, the existing literature and international organisations have 
emphasised on the positive attributes of the temporary movement of workers.  There are 
no global organisations that facilitate the cross-border flow of workers which is in 
contrast to the existence of such frameworks for the international flow of other productive 
factors such as goods, services and capital.  The World Trade Organisation (WTO) has a 
very narrow provision for skilled labor movement only, but the developing and less 
developed countries have a greater interest in mobilising their unskilled/semi-skilled 
workers, which they have in abundance.  Given this slow progress, policy makers have 
resorted to alternative options such as Bilateral Labor Agreements (BLAs) and PTAs.  
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However, to the best of our knowledge, there are no empirical investigations on the PTA-
labor mobility nexus in the existing litersture.  Thus, based on the argument that PTAs 
may stimulate labor mobility, we investigated for any such role in the third chapter.  A 
gravity model was adopted to investigate this relationship.  Our findings reveal that a 
common PTA between the labor origin country and labor host country is relevant in 
stimulating cross-border worker movement, and it is the presence of labor provision that 
makes PTAs more influential.  Relatively higher income opportunities, high origin 
country unemployment, host or origin population growth and origin political stability 
positively impacts bilateral worker migration.  While host political stability is not 
significant, lack of job opportunities in the host country is negative and significant.  
Moreover, consistent with the important role of information and social support 
emphasized in the related literature, we find that the presence of previous migrants from 
the same origin country is also relevant in cross-border labor mobility.   
 
Key words: Preferential trade agreements, foreign direct investment, European Union 
Economic Partnership Agreement, labor mobility. 
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Dissertation structure 
 
 
This thesis consists of three chapters.  Each chapter addresses a research question, all of 
which are related to the phenomenon of preferential trade agreements.  The central 
motivation for this research stems from the prolonged negotiation of the European Union’s 
Economic Partnership Agreement with the African Caribbean Pacific region.  Accordingly, 
chapter 1 examines the potential impact of the European Union Economic Partnership 
agreement on selected economic variables of the Fijian economy.  Chapter 2 and chapter 3 
comprehend the changing nature of Preferential Trade Agreements and extend the debate 
into two of its non-trade impacts - namely Foreign Direct Investment and international 
labor mobility.   
 
Each chapter consists of its own introduction, key stylized facts, literature review, empirical 
framework, results and conclusion.  The introduction lays out the research question, 
motivation, contribution, aim and scope of research for each chapter.  The background 
details and developments of relevant economic indicators relevant to each research question 
are provided in the key stylized facts section of the respective chapter.  Related literature is 
reviewed in the literature review section, following which the empirical framework and 
results are discussed.  Finally, the conclusion section of each chapter summarises the main 
findings, limitations and future research of that respective study.  The references section at 
the end of the thesis includes all the reference materials used in this thesis, while the 
appendix section (divided into three parts) contains the corresponding appendix material for 
each chapter. 
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Chapter 1  
Impact of the European Union-Fiji Economic 
Partnership Agreement (EU-Fiji EPA) on Fiji’s selected 
economic variables 
 
 
 
1.1: Introduction  
 
 
In Chapter 1 of this thesis, we estimate the likely effects of the European Union-Economic 
Partnership Agreement (EU-EPA) on trade, tariff revenue and selected production related 
variables for the Fijian economy.  At this juncture, it must be noted that this study is not a 
comprehensive welfare analysis of the consequences of the EU-Fiji EPA but is focused on 
the implications for a selected set of variables for Fiji only, conducted in a partial 
equilibrium setting.  These include its impact on imports, tariff revenue, (selected) domestic 
production, consumption, export supply and prices.  While the EU will also open its market 
to Fiji products, the consequences for Fiji’s exports into the EU market (or equivalently, 
EU’s imports from Fiji) are not covered in this study.  On this note, this study is equivalent 
to looking at unilateral tariff reduction by Fiji.  Fiji, along with the other African, Caribbean 
& Pacific (ACP) countries has a long colonial history with the EU.  For over four decades, 
Fiji (as part of the ACP group) has benefited from the EU’s preferential trading 
arrangement institutionalised under a series of Lome provisions since the 1970’s.  However, 
due to the incompatibility of the Lome provisions with the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) rules, in the year 2000, the EU and the ACP partner states concluded the Cotonou 
Agreement as a successor to the 25-year-old Lome Convention.  At the same time, it was 
agreed to trigger negotiations for a WTO compatible EPA between the EU and the ACP 
region.   
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Formal negotiations for an EU-EPA were launched in late 2003 and eventuated into years 
of prolonged discussions.  The ACP countries/sub regions involved in these discussions 
have progressed at different rates and are at different stages in terms of the depth and 
degree of their negotiation with the EU.  From the Pacific group, Fiji signed an interim EU-
EPA in 2007.  Most of the negotiating blocks were unable to complete the EPA discussions 
by the deadline of December 2007, and this prompted the EU to resort to interim EPA’s 
designed to serve as a bridge until the conclusion of the EPA discussions.  These interim 
EPA’s contain market access offers that are compatible to the requirements of the WTO, 
with commitments to consult on all pending issues in the proposed EPA’s (Muluvi, 
Onyango, Otieno, & Githuku, 2016).   
 
The EU-EPA makes an interesting case to be evaluated given that for many of the proposed 
signatory countries from the ACP group, this agreement would be their first comprehensive 
reciprocal deal with a developed country.  The transition towards a WTO compatible 
agreement with the EU represents a marked shift in the trade policy of these ACP countries.  
Evidently, policy makers are daunted with the question of the potential consequences of 
entering into this trade agreement (Dodson, 2013; Greenway & Milner, 2006; and others).  
Moreover, there is a strong asymmetry between the two trading partners (ACP and the EU), 
in terms of both the trade relationship and bargaining expertise (Fontagne, Laborde, & 
Mitaritonna, 2010).  Collectively, the ACP depends on the EU for exports and imports 
(although the magnitude of trade relations varies at individual country level).  From 1995 to 
2015, the average percentage share of the EU in total ACP exports and imports was around 
29 percent and 28 percent, respectively.  However, in contrast the ACP is not of significant 
economic value to the EU.  The average percentage share of ACP in total EU exports and 
imports over the period 1995-2015 was only 1.7 percent and 1.6 percent, respectively1.  
Additionally, the ACP group is heavily concentrated on a narrow range of products for 
export, with high rates of protection on imported products.  Hence, information on the trade 
and fiscal related consequences of the EU-EPA may facilitate the EPA negotiation and 
decision process and provide a basis for formulating adjustment policies (such as tax 
reforms, subsidies) that may be required due to this marked shift in international trade 
                                                          
1 These percentage shares (discussed and illustrated in detail in Figure 1-4 and Figure 1-5) have been calculated using trade data from the 
UNCTD stat database.  
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relations (Brenton, Hoppe, & von Uexkull, 2007; Milner, Morrissey, & McKay, 2005; 
Thomy, Tularam, & Siriwardana, 2013).   
 
Since Fiji is not categorised as a Least Developed Country (LDC), it cannot retain duty free 
access to the EU market through the Everything But Arms (EBA) provision, an option for 
the LDC’s that do not plan to sign the EPA.  Hence, to continue with the trading privileges 
similar (to some extent) to the Lome provisions, it is essential for Fiji to negotiate for an 
EPA with the EU.  Over the years, under the umbrella of the various series of Lome 
conventions, Fiji did not have to provide similar preferences to the EU in return.  However, 
the EPA’s are designed to align to the WTO’s requirements and hence will be reciprocal 
and cover substantially all trade.  This implies that the ACP group is now faced with the 
challenge of providing the EU preferential access into their markets as well.  The ACP will 
remove tariffs on their imports from the EU, and this will extend to cover substantially all 
imports from the EU (equivalent to around 80 percent of imports from the EU).  Hence, two 
economic consequences of the EU-EPA that have remained a central concern for the ACP 
member countries are firstly, the fear that the influx of cheaper EU imports will drive out 
local production and secondly, the possible effects on government tariff revenue due to 
import liberalisation.  However, from a more balanced perspective, a move towards trade 
liberalisation also brings its own sets of benefits.  Over time the ACP countries could gain 
from the dynamic effects of the EPA’s in the form of higher domestic and foreign 
investment, economies of scale, the spill-over effects of enhanced credibility of trade policy 
reforms (McQueen, 1998), exposure to global production networks, access to cheaper EU 
products and the EU market for exports (Muluvi et al., 2016).  Amidst these however 
remain the concerns of an influx of competing EU products into the domestic market and 
the consequent challenges for local producers, and the loss of government tariff revenue 
due to removal of import duties (Fontagne et al., 2010; Milner et al., 2005; Muluvi et al., 
2016; Thomy et al., 2013).  Moreover, while the ACP countries will also gain duty free 
access to the EU market for their exports, the extent to which this opportunity can be 
utilised depends on the ability of these economies to overcome their supply side hurdles 
(Berisha-Krasniqi, Bouet, & Mevel, 2008; Muluvi et al., 2016; Perez & Karingi, 2007).  
Many of the ACP countries have over the years depended on the exports of a few selected 
commodities to the EU while export diversification strategies have remained futile.  Hence, 
while there are both possible gains and losses to be realised from these EPA’s, a crucial 
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concern is whether the benefits from such reciprocal deals will outweigh the costs (Milner 
et al., 2005).  The process of negotiating and confirming a PTA can be a costly affair with 
huge adjustment costs on an economy, particularly for relatively smaller economies faced 
with limited resources and bargaining capacity (Dodson, 2013; Fontagne et al., 2010).   
 
Based on the arguments noted above, estimating the likely economic costs (such as trade 
diversion, tariff revenue loss and reduction in domestic production) are important 
ingredients for the bargaining process.  This can be for example in terms of identifying 
sensitive products for exclusion from liberalisation, negotiating on development assistance 
if available, flexibility in implementation and bargaining on additional provisions.  Above 
all, the possible direct consequences on government tariff revenue has created much 
concern given that import duties account for between 20 per cent to 40 per cent of total 
government revenue in most ACP countries (McQueen, 1998).  While highlighting that the 
level of protection applied on EU products varies within the ACP, Fontagne et al. (2010) 
mentioned the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC), Common 
Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the Pacific group as the three most 
protected economies with average tariffs of 13.5 percent, 13.1 percent and 12 percent, 
respectively.  For the case of Fiji, custom duties2 ranked as the third important source of 
government revenue, averaging around 24 percent of total tax income in the period 2000 to 
2015 (Fiji Islands Bureau of Statistics [FIBOS], 2017).  The removal of import duties 
implies surrendering these tax revenues which will impact the fiscal budget and therefore 
may require policy makers to substitute these revenues with alternative sources or 
otherwise cut back on essential expenditure such as health and education.   
 
The onset of the EU-EPA negotiations has attracted research interest from scholars with 
most of the studies focusing on either a sample of ACP countries (such as Dodson, 2013; 
Fontagne et al., 2010; Greenway & Milner, 2006; Mbithi, Gor, & Osoro, 2015; Milner et al., 
2005; Thomy et al., 2013; and others) or on individual ACP member states (including 
Berisha-Krasniqi et al., 2008; Dodson, 2013; Nwali & Arene, 2015).  These studies have 
explored the likely trade and welfare consequences of an EU-EPA using either total imports 
or specific sectoral imports such as agricultural or manufactured goods.  While the African 
and Caribbean countries are included in many of these studies, the Pacific Island members 
                                                          
2 See Figure 1.0 in the Appendix for the distribution of income by source. 
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are not adequately represented.  The two countries from the Pacific region that are involved 
in the EU-ACP EPA negotiations are Papua New Guinea and Fiji.  Hence, this study 
contributes by focusing on the implications of the EU-EPA utilising data on the Fijian 
economy which has a large stake in securing an EU-EPA given that firstly, it is not a LDC 
and hence cannot opt for the EBA provision and secondly and more importantly, it is 
heavily dependent on the EU market for its sugar exports - a key commodity foreign 
exchange earner for Fiji.  A trade agreement is not a totally unfamiliar policy for the Fijian 
economy.  In fact, Fiji is a member of the WTO and is signatory to a few trade agreements 
and hence is not completely alienated from this policy.  However, the EU-EPA is Fiji’s first 
reciprocal and comprehensive agreement with a developed economy, which has triggered 
concerns on the possible consequences.   
 
Motivated by this, we adopt a partial equilibrium approach in this study and assess the 
likely effects of the proposed EU-Fiji EPA on a set of Fiji’s economic indicators.  These 
include Fiji’s imports at a detailed disaggregated level, results from which are then linked 
to possible tariff revenue consequences.  We also analyse the effects on selected exports, 
domestic production, consumption and prices.   
 
The two broad quantitative approaches for this kind of analysis are the Partial Equilibrium 
Analysis (PEA) and the Computable General Equilibrium Analysis (CGE).  While both 
these techniques are utilised for analysing trade policy impacts, they differ in terms of 
coverage and depth.  The PEA analyses the impact of a policy change only on the markets 
that are directly affected while ignoring any consequent effects on all related markets and 
hence the economy wide effects (Dodson, 2013).  It therefore allows a detailed analysis of 
the directly affected market.  The CGE approach considers all related markets and while it 
provides a more comprehensive impact assessment, it lacks the detailed spectrum.  
Admittedly, the EU-EPA is certainly expected to have much wider and deeper impacts than 
just trade, production and tariff revenue implications that this study has focused on.  As 
mentioned earlier, over time, the ACP countries could gain from the dynamic effects of the 
EPA’s such as higher investment, openness to competition, economies of scale and greater 
confidence in their trade policy reforms when anchored through international treaties 
(McQueen, 1998).  However, given that our objective is to conduct a detailed sectoral 
effect on imports, identify the sensitive sectors (that may need special treatment, attention 
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in the negotiation process and immediate adjustment policies) and the consequent effects on 
government revenue, we adopted a PEA approach.  The PEA method provides greater 
insight in line with our objectives.  We conducted our analysis under two different 
scenarios.  These include full liberalisation and partial liberalisation.  Full liberalisation is 
where tariffs are removed on all imports from the EU market whereas under partial 
liberalisation, only 80 percent of the EU goods are imported tariff free.  A PEA enables us 
to specifically discount those items from our analysis that are listed as excluded items in 
Fiji’s interim EPA document.  Additionally, we extended our analysis on imports and tariff 
revenue by assuming an external tariff liberalisation along with the EU-EPA.  As argued in 
Richardson (1993), because of the endogeneity of import protection in a trade agreement 
setting, the welfare losses associated with trade diversion can be reduced with a concurrent 
reduction of external tariffs.  Hinkle and Schiff (2004) also recommended along the same 
line, noting that limiting liberalisation to PTA partners only amidst high MFN tariffs on the 
rest of the world can produce costly trade diversion.  Hence, in this third setup, the tariffs 
applied on the ROW and regional imports are also reduced along with the reduction of 
tariffs on EU imports.   
 
Our empirical framework is developed through manipulation of the Constant Elasticity of 
Substitution (CES) expenditure system.  It allows estimating the impacts on a broader set of 
variables compared to the narrow coverage (mainly impact on imports in a trade diversion 
and trade creation framework) of the existing methods in the literature.  These include the 
impact on domestic production, prices and exports in addition to the impact on imports and 
tariff revenue. 
 
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows: After an introduction of this research in 
section 1.1, we provide some broad stylized facts in section 1.2.  These background details 
establish the economic relationship between the ACP and the EU and the development 
from the initial Lome provisions to the current EPA’s.  Next, the discussion looks at the 
EU-ACP trade relationship and then narrows to focus on Fiji’s economic background and 
economic relationship with the EU.  In section 1.3, we present a review of related 
theoretical and empirical literature.  Section 1.4 explains the research method and data, 
while section 1.5 presents and explains the results.  Finally, in section 1.6, we conclude this 
chapter.   
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1.2: Key stylized facts 
 
 
1.2.1: A brief overview of the EU-ACP relationship 
 
The EU’s relationship with the ACP dates back to the era of colonialism whereby the 
Treaty of Rome (signed in 1957) captured this association and provided preferential market 
access and financial aid to its colonies (Hurt, 2012).  As these colonies gained their 
independence, the two groups maintained their relationship through a series of conventions 
up until the year 2000.  Table 1-1 summarises these conventions and their main provisions.  
The first of these institutional treaties was the Yaounde Convention (signed in 1963) 
between the then 6 members of the European Economic Community (EEC) and a group of 
18 newly independent African countries.  The Yaounde convention continued the economic 
relation between these two groups and was later revised in 1969 (Yaounde II Convention) 
with two more ACP members, Madagascar and Mauritius joining in.  The main premise of 
the Yaounde convention was the provision of commercial and financial support from the 
EEC to this group of 18 African countries.   
 
In 1973, after Ireland, Denmark and the UK joined the EEC3, the former colonies of the UK 
were provided with the opportunity to establish a relationship with the EEC.  This resulted 
in the creation of the ACP group and the first Lome Convention which was signed in 1975.  
The Lome convention defined trade and aid relations between Europe and its former 
colonies, providing preferential market access to ACP products.  The main highlight of 
Lome I was the four lucrative commodity protocols (for bananas, sugar, beef, and rum) 
which offered the eligible ACP countries a guaranteed quota, duty-free access and 
comparatively higher prices than what was offered in other markets (Bishop, Heron, & 
Payne, 2013).  The Lome treaty was revised three times; Lome II (1981), Lome III (1985) 
and Lome IV (1989).  Each series of revision continued the initial provisions with 
additional elements and upgrades.  In the second Lome Convention, the mining sector 
received major attention.  In Lome III, the main upgrade was the shift in the EEC’s 
approach in development assistance to the ACP countries.  They encouraged the ACP 
group to pursue self-reliant development, hence discouraging the dependence on aid.  
                                                          
3 Table 1.0 in the Appendix illustrates the historical timeline of the EEC and the later EU evolution. 
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Major changes were incorporated in Lome IV which ranged from a wider list of goods that 
were granted preferential access into the EU market to broader socio-economic issues such 
as democracy, human rights and the rule of law.  After 25 years of existence, the Cotonou 
agreement replaced the Lome convention in the year 2000.  The Cotonou Agreement laid 
the foundations for the EU-EPA’s which were proposed to redesign the trade and economic 
relation between the EU and the ACP group (Bishop et al., 2013; Girvan, 2010). 
 
 
Table 1-1: Key elements of the EU-ACP conventions. 
Agreement Year Signed Membership & Main provisions 
Yaounde Convention I 
 
1963 Members: EEC (6 members) and 18 African 
countries. 
Commercial and financial aid. 
Yaounde Convention 
II 
 
1971 Members: EEC (6 members) & 20 African states  
(inclusion of Madagascar & Mauritius). 
Commercial and financial aid. 
Lome I 1975 Members: EEC (9) & ACP group (46). 
Reduced tariff and non-tariff barriers on most 
exports from ACP to EEC. 
Founded on the basis of complete equality 
between partners. 
Focused on economic development and social 
progress of the ACP states with EU financial, 
technical and industrial aid. 
Each state was independent in formulating own 
economic policies. 
Preferential and guaranteed prices for 
commodities (cocoa, coffee, groundnuts, tea, 
mining products). 
Separate trading protocols (sugar, beef, banana, 
rum) which provided fixed quota and 
comparatively higher prices. 
Lome II 1981 Members: EEC (9) & ACP group (58). 
Continued with Lome I provisions with few 
revisions. 
Major change: Introduced guaranteed price for 
mining products. 
Lome III 1985 Members: EEC (10) & ACP group (65). 
Continued with Lome II provisions with 
additional provisions. 
Major revision: A shift from industrial 
development focus to encouraging self-reliant 
development in the ACP. 
Lome IV 1989 Members: EEC (12) & ACP group (68). 
Provisions from previous conventions were 
revised with more comprehensive coverage. 
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Broadened in scope to allow almost all ACP 
exports to enter the EEC without quantitative 
restrictions and customs duties.   
Non-reciprocity was maintained. 
Included human rights, democracy, good 
governance, environmental concerns and resource 
management (agriculture, fisheries, services). 
Cotonou Agreement 
& the shift towards 
EPA’s 
2000 Members: EU (15) & ACP group (77). 
Platform for negotiating reciprocal EPAs and 
hence shifting away from the non-reciprocal 
Lome provisions. 
Promote economic growth and development in 
ACP. 
Facilitate the transition of ACP into the world 
economy. 
Improve ACP market access in EU, inclusion of 
WTO+ issues (competition, investment). 
 
(Source: Consolidated from Bishop et al., 2013; Berends, 2016; Heron, 2011; Hurt, 2012; Vaughan, 2000) 
 
 
The three complementary dimensions that the Cotonou framework was planned to operate 
through included political dialogue, economic and trade cooperation and development 
cooperation (Keijzer & Negre, 2014).  While there are controversies on the main motives 
for the departure from the Lome provisions into EPA’s, three main explanations for such 
change are highlighted in Berends (2016).  The first argument in Berends (2016) is that it 
was recognised that the Lome provisions had failed to sustain or increase the ACP groups 
EU market share.  The continued struggle by the ACP states to enter the global economy 
and sluggish economic success despite the years of Lome agreement contributed to its 
ultimate replacement.  This was acknowledged by the EU itself in their Green Paper on 
Relations between the EU and the ACP countries (1996) in which they stated that the EU-
ACP relationship needed an in-depth examination and a major over-haul given the lack of 
success under the past Lome provisions and amidst the changing global environment (some 
of which includes the emergence of the trade principles of the WTO, the enlargement of the 
EU itself, and EU’s growing interest in forming trade agreements with other 
countries/regions).  Secondly, with the formation of the WTO in 1995, the incompatibility 
of the Lome Provisions (zero tariffs on ACP goods and commodity protocols that 
differentiated between ACP states and non-ACP countries) with the Most Favored Nation 
(MFN) principle of the WTO became an issue.  According to the MFN principle, any 
preferential treatment accorded to one WTO member must be extended to all other WTO 
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members, thus preventing any discrimination.  This entered the limelight with the Banana 
protocol dispute lodged in 1993 by Latin American countries and the US, and the Sugar 
Protocol dispute of 2002 led by Australia, Thailand and Brazil.  Both these commodity 
protocols provided preferential arrangements and market share privilege to the ACP 
countries, which fuelled concerns on the unfair advantage granted to ACP producers.  This 
resulted in the EU designing new trading arrangements (proposed as EU-EPA’s) with the 
ACP states.  Finally, the third argument in Berends (2016) for the shift to EPAs is the 
recognition by African leaders themselves and the EU that the region needed to move from 
being aid dependent into trade and investment (with greater openness) as the engine of 
growth.  Moreover, according to Keck and Piermartini (2005), the need for a review of the 
formal link between the EU and ACP also brewed from dissatisfaction by both parties on 
certain aspects of the existing provisions.  The ACP group demanded duty free access for 
products covered by the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), simpler rules of origin, and 
more aid from the EU, while the EU was dissatisfied with issues such as governance, 
human rights, democratisation and the use of development aid by the ACP countries.  The 
Cotonou Agreement therefore paved the way for major changes to the EU-ACP trade 
relations.  Apart from being broader in scope, this agreement also included non-state actors 
and local governments into development cooperation.  The EU commenced negotiations for 
reciprocal and comprehensive EPA’s with the ACP group in late 2003.   
 
 
1.2.2: The European Union’s Economic Partnership Agreement (EU-EPA) 
 
The EU-EPA’s are therefore a set of proposed free trade agreements between the EU and 
the ACP group, with the Cotonou Agreement (2000) being the stepping stone into initiating 
and developing the negotiations on these EPA’s.  These new agreements would be 
reciprocal, liberalise substantially all trade, and also include provisions on investment, 
services, competition, government procurement and trade facilitation (Murray-Evans, 2015).  
The previous Lome convention provisions were non-reciprocal - which implied that the 
ACP countries had their own different level of tariffs imposed on imports from the EU 
(which also contributed to government income) but were able to export most of their 
products to the EU duty free.  The shift towards reciprocity in the EPA’s implies that the 
ACP countries will have to remove the tariffs on imports from the EU as well.  In this 
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section, we provide some background details on the structure of the EPA negotiations, the 
options available to the ACP countries, the negotiation groups, status and outcomes.   
 
 
1.2.2.1: Options, structure and status of the EPA negotiations 
 
The ACP group comprises a very heterogeneous collection of countries.  The economic 
importance of the EU in their trade, the composition of trade, culture, politics and their 
respective development status vary from each other (Fontagne et al., 2010).  The EU’s 
proposal to the ACP group reflected this heterogeneity.  They divided the ACP group by 
development status4 (LDC and non-LDC) and proposed different choice sets based on their 
respective status.  These options are summarised in Figure 1-1 below.   
 
 
Figure 1-1: EPA negotiation options for the ACP countries. 
 
 
(Source: Compiled by author using Fontagne et al., 2010; Mcqueen ,1998; Milner et al.,2005) 
 
 
The LDC’s were granted the option of either (i) joining a sub-regional group and 
negotiating for an EPA or (ii) choosing the EU’s Everything But Arms (EBA) provision 
which offers non-reciprocal Lome type provisions.  The non-LDC’s had the option of either 
(i) negotiating for an EPA as an individual country or as part of a sub-regional group or (ii) 
                                                          
4 See Table 1-2 for the development status of each ACP member. 
ACP
LDC
Join a regional/sub-
regional 
negotiating block 
and opt for an EPA
Choose the EBA 
provision (Special 
GSP arrangement)
Non-LDC
Negotiate for an EPA as 
an indivudal country or 
as part of a regional/sub-
regional block
Eligiblie non-LDC's can 
choose the General 
Arrangement 
Provisions of the GSP 
scheme 
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the eligible non-LDC’s could utilise the general arrangements under the Generalised 
System of Preferences (GSP) scheme.  
 
This proposal (summarised in Figure 1-1) implied that from the African group of countries 
the 33 LDC’s could either choose the EBA provision or join a sub-regional African group 
to negotiate for an EPA.  From the Caribbean group, only Haiti is classified as a LDC while 
in the Pacific, except for Fiji and Papua New Guinea, all others had the option of 
continuing with Lome-type provisions under the EBA umbrella.  For the eligible non-
LDC’s, while the GSP provision was an option, many countries chose to pursue EPA 
negotiations instead.  The problem with the GSP provision was that it reflected a significant 
downgrade from the Lome provisions because it featured less generous tariff preferences 
and rules of origin (Busse & Luehje, 2007).  As outlined in Bishop et al. (2013), the GSP 
offered preferences on approximately 54 percent of tariff lines in comparison to 
approximately 95 percent under Lome.  Moreover, the GSP scheme is also a unilateral 
scheme with the EU granting preferential treatment to developing countries.  This implies 
that the provisions can be withdrawn at any time by the preference-granting country 
(Bishop et al., 2013) and hence does not provide secured and guaranteed preferential 
treatment as would a PTA.  Moreover, the GSP is a provision by the EU for all developing 
countries.  Hence this does not provide any differential treatment for the ACP group from 
the other non-ACP developing countries.  This therefore places the ACP developing 
countries in direct competition with the non-ACP developing countries. 
While initially the ACP had maintained, and the EU had also indicated interest in 
conducting negotiations with the ACP as a group, the negotiation phase later divided the 
ACP countries into seven negotiating blocks.  Table 1-2 shows the countries under each of 
these seven negotiating blocks.  While the Caribbean and the Pacific countries remained 
within their geographical clusters, a few countries from the African continent joined 
negotiating blocks which are different from their otherwise common economic groupings.  
Congo-Democratic Republic falls under the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) but negotiated the EPA as part of Central Africa.  Likewise, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mauritius, Zambia and Zimbabwe are also part of SADC but negotiated for the EPA under 
Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA).   
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The timeframe that these seven groups of countries accorded to the negotiating process of 
the EU-EPA’s clearly varies from each other (see Table 1-2).  The Caribbean countries 
(excluding Haiti) were the first regional group to sign a full EPA with the EU in 2008.  
Other African sub-regional groups and the Pacific group exhibited greater reluctance in 
agreeing to a full EPA, therefore signing interim agreements instead.  Fiji and Papua New 
Guinea were the only two countries from the Pacific group and also the first two countries 
from the whole ACP group to agree to an interim EPA in 2007.  This was followed by the 
Caribbean’s full EPA signed in 2008.  Then in 2009, from the Eastern & Southern Africa 
cohort, all four non-LDC’s (Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles, Zimbabwe) signed an 
interim EPA while the LDC’s did not.  From Central Africa, none of the five LDC’s chose 
the EPA but instead opted for the EBA provision.  Of the three non-LDC’s, only Cameroon 
signed an interim EPA in 2013, while Congo decided to utilise the GSP provision.  Gabon 
remains as a non-signatory and as an upper-middle income country, it is not eligible for the 
GSP scheme either.  Interestingly, the East African Community which comprises of four 
LDC’s and only one non-LDC signed an interim EPA as a group in 2014.  Similarly, the 
mix of LDC’s and non-LDC’s from the West African sub-region also signed the interim 
EPA in 2014.  Finally, the last sub-region to reach an agreement was the SADC, which 
except for Angola signed their interim EPA in 2016. 
 
 
Table 1-2: EU-ACP negotiation blocks, development status, EPA status and trade 
relations with the EU. 
ACP subregional 
negotiating group & 
individual members 
Economic 
development 
status 
EPA Status Main Items 
exported to 
the EU 
Central Africa 
Cameroon 
Central African Rep. 
Chad 
Congo 
Congo-Democratic1 
Equatorial Guinea 
Gabon 
Sao Tome & Principe 
Non-LDC 
LDC 
LDC 
Non-LDC 
LDC 
LDC 
Non-LDC 
LDC 
Signed Interim EPA in 2013 
Non-signatory to EPA-under EBA 
Non-signatory to EPA-under EBA 
Non-signatory to EPA-under GSP  
Non-signatory to EPA-under EBA 
Non-signatory to EPA-under EBA 
Non-signatory 
Non-signatory to EPA-under EBA 
Oil & 
related 
products, 
cocoa, 
wood, 
copper, 
bananas, 
diamonds 
Eastern & Southern Africa (ESA) 
Comoros 
Djibouti 
Eritrea 
Ethiopia 
Madagascar2 
LDC 
LDC 
LDC 
LDC 
Non-LDC 
Initialled only 
Non-signatory to EPA-under EBA 
Non-signatory to EPA-under EBA 
Non-signatory to EPA-under EBA 
Signed Interim EPA in 2009 
sugar, 
coffee, fish, 
tobacco, 
copper and 
crude oil 
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Malawi2 
Maurititus2 
Seychelles 
Sudan 
Zambia2 
Zimbabwe2 
LDC 
Non-LDC 
Non-LDC 
LDC 
LDC 
Non-LDC 
Non-signatory to EPA-under EBA 
Signed Interim EPA in 2009 
Signed Interim EPA in 2009 
Non-signatory to EPA-under EBA 
Initialled only 
Signed Interim EPA in 2009 
East African Community (EAC) 
Burundi 
Kenya 
Rwanda 
Tanzania 
Uganda 
LDC 
Non-LDC 
LDC 
LDC 
LDC 
All members signed interim EPA 
in 2014 (as a group) 
coffee, cut 
flowers, tea, 
tobacco, 
fish and 
vegetables 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
Angola 
Botswana 
Lesotho 
Mozambique 
Namibia 
South Africa 
Swaziland 
LDC 
Non-LDC 
LDC 
LDC 
Non-LDC 
Non-LDC 
Non-LDC 
Non-signatory- under EBA 
 
All other members signed Interim 
EPA in 2016 (as a group, except 
Angola) 
 
 
Diamonds, 
beef, fish, 
oil, 
aluminium, 
platinum, 
manufacture
d goods, 
wine 
West Africa (ECOWAS & WAEMU) 
Benin 
Burkina Faso 
Cape Verde 
Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Guinea Bissau 
Ivory Coast 
Liberia 
Mauritania 
Mali 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Senegal 
Sierra Leone 
Togo 
LDC 
LDC 
Non-LDC 
LDC 
Non-LDC 
LDC 
LDC 
 
LDC 
LDC 
LDC 
LDC 
Non-LDC 
LDC 
LDC 
LDC 
Signed Interim EPA in 2014 (as a 
group) 
Mineral 
fuels and 
food 
products 
Caribbean 
Antigua & Barbua 
Bahamas 
Barbados 
Belize 
Dominica 
Dominican Republic 
Grenada 
Guyana 
Haiti 
Jamaica 
LDC 
Non-LDC 
Non-LDC 
LDC 
LDC 
LDC 
LDC 
Non-LDC 
LDC 
Non-LDC 
 
Signed full EPA in 2008 (as a 
group, except Haiti) 
Fuel and 
mining 
products, 
notably 
petroleum 
gas and oils, 
bananas, 
sugar and 
rum, 
minerals, 
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St Lucia 
St Vincent & the 
Grenadines 
St Kitts & Nevis 
Suriname 
Trinidad & Tobago 
LDC 
LDC 
LDC 
Non-LDC 
Non-LDC 
Non-LDC 
notably 
gold, 
corundum, 
aluminium 
oxide and 
hydroxide, 
and iron ore 
products, 
fertilisers 
Pacific 
Cook Islands 
Fiji 
Kiribati 
Marshall Islands 
Micronesia 
Nauru 
Niue 
Palau 
Papua New Guinea 
Samoa  
Solomon Islands 
Tonga 
Tuvalu 
Vanuatu 
Non-LDC 
Non-LDC 
LDC 
Non-LDC 
Non-LDC 
Non-LDC 
Non-LDC 
Non-LDC 
Non-LDC 
LDC 
LDC 
Non-LDC 
LDC 
LDC 
Non-Signatory-under GSP 
Signed Interim EPA in 2007 
Non-Signatory-under EBA 
Non-Signatory-under GSP 
Non-Signatory-under GSP 
Non-Signatory-under GSP 
Non-Signatory-under GSP 
Non-Signatory-under GSP 
Signed Interim EPA in 2007 
Non-Signatory-under EBA 
Non-Signatory–under EBA 
Non-Signatory-under GSP 
Non-Signatory-under EBA 
Non-Signatory-under EBA 
Sugar, palm 
oil, coffee, 
coconut, 
and fish. 
(Source: Compiled using the various fact sheets on the interim EPA and the EPA state of play updates (as at June 2017) from the 
European Commission website (http://ec.europa.eu)).1Congo-Democratic Republic falls under SADC but is negotiating the EPA as part 
of Central Africa. 2Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Zambia and Zimbabwe are part of SADC but are negotiating the EPA under ESA. 
 
 
1.2.3: The EU-ACP trade relationship 
 
As mentioned earlier, one of the underlying reasons for shifting away from the Lome 
provisions was the recognition by the EU that despite 25 years of existence, the Lome 
provisions had not materialised into improved trade performance of the ACP countries.  
This is evident in Figure 1-2, which shows the trend in the ACP’s percentage share in world 
exports and in developing economies exports, from 1948 to 2015.   
 
The ACP’s percentage share of developing economies exports has declined continuously 
from 1974 onwards despite the birth of the Lome Provisions during this same period (1975 
to 2000).  When related in terms of world exports, Figure 1-2 indicates that the relative 
share of the ACP group in world exports is very low.  A declining trend is evident over the 
years and the performance has remained subdued (below 7 percent), plunging to only 2.0 
percent in 2015.  Hence, Figure 1-2 does not reveal any significant breakthroughs in the 
export performance of the ACP group.  This is despite the series of revised Lome 
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provisions that outlined integration of the ACP group into the world economy through 
increased trade as a major objective. 
 
Figure 1-2: ACP's export performance (as a percentage share of world exports and 
developing economies exports) from 1948-2015. 
 
(Source: Compiled using trade merchandise data from UNCTAD available at unctadstat.unctad.org) 
 
 
Figure 1-3 shows the percentage growth in total exports and total imports for the ACP 
group from 1995-2015 which exhibits sharp fluctuations over the years, a reflection of the 
group’s narrow export base and hence the vulnerability to fluctuations in global commodity 
prices.  In particular, the ACP group’s total exports to the world plunged sharply in 2009 
and 2015 (by 27.6 percent and 28.0 percent, respectively).  The drop in exports in 2009 
largely reflected the impact of the global economic crisis on demand, commodity prices and 
trade finance (WTO, 2010).  The decline in 2015 was driven by the oil-exporting African 
countries5 following a 60 percent decline in global oil prices (due to increased global oil 
supply) along with domestic and political turmoil in some African countries (WTO, 2016).  
The peak of a 36.9 percent growth in the group’s exports (in 2010) reflected the recovery in 
world demand and escalations in the prices of fuels and mining products (WTO, 2011).   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
5 Algeria, Angola, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Libya, Nigeria, Sudan (WTO, 2016). 
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Figure 1-3: Percentage growth in ACP world exports & imports (1995-2015). 
 
(Source: Compiled using merchandise trade data from UNCTAD available at unctadstat.unctad.org) 
 
 
Next, we analyse the relative economic (trade) importance of the EU from the perspective 
of the ACP group, and vice versa.  Figure 1-4 and Figure 1-5, which shows the percentage 
share of each group in the other group’s total exports and imports clearly highlights the 
large difference in the degree of interdependency in trade between the EU and the ACP.   
 
 
Figure 1-4: Percentage share of EU and ACP in each group’s total exports. 
 
(Source: Compiled using trade merchandise data from UNCTAD available at unctadstat.unctad.org) 
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Figure 1-5: Percentage share of EU and ACP in each group’s total imports. 
 
(Source: Compiled using trade merchandise data from UNCTAD available at unctadstat.unctad.org) 
 
 
As revealed in Figure 1-4, the EU is a sizeable market for goods originating from the ACP.  
From 1995 to 2015, the share of the EU in total ACP exports averaged around 29 percent.  
However, from the EU’s perspective, the ACP’s trade importance is relatively insignificant.  
The average percentage share over the review period of the ACP in total EU exports was 
only 1.7 percent.  Likewise, the ACP is not a significant source of imports for the EU (see 
Figure 1-5).  The percentage share of ACP in total EU imports averaged around 1.6 percent 
from 1995-2015.  However, during the same period, the ACP group imported an average of 
around 28 percent of its goods from the EU.  Hence, while the ACP depends on the EU for 
both its exports and imports, from the EU’s perspective, the ACP is insignificant in their 
trade share.  This imbalance in the degree of trade dependence between these two groups 
indicates that as far as the EU-EPA negotiations are concerned, the stakes are far higher for 
the ACP than the EU (Fontagne et al., 2010).  The EU is a significant trade partner of the 
ACP while from the EU’s perspective, the ACP is not a significant trade partner.   
When viewed at individual ACP member country or at sub-regional group level, the 
importance of the EU market as a source of imports and/or a market for exports varies.  As 
an example, the inherent heterogeneity in the relative importance of the EU in exports for 
each sub-regional ACP group is illustrated in Figure 1-6.  This figure shows the percentage 
share of each sub-regional ACP group in total ACP exports to the EU, averaged from 2000 
to 2015.  The three sub-regional groups that have percentage shares greater than 20 percent 
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are Eastern & Southern Africa, South African Developing Community and West Africa.  
For all these three groups6 , the top export items to the EU are petroleum oils, crude 
vegetable materials, natural gas, fruits and nuts, tobacco, coffee, fish, textiles, and sugar.   
 
 
Figure 1-6: Percentage share of each sub-regional ACP group in the total ACP 
exports to the EU (2000-2015 average). 
 
(Source: Compiled using trade merchandise data from UNCTAD stat available at unctadstat.unctad.org) 
 
 
The Caribbean, Central Africa, East African Community and the Pacific have relatively 
smaller percentage shares in the total exports of the ACP to the EU.  However, at an 
individual country level, certain countries from these groups depend largely on the exports 
of selected products to the EU market.  For example, countries such as Fiji, Mauritius and 
Guyana have over the years benefitted from special preferences under the Sugar Protocol 
and thus depend heavily on the EU market for their sugar exports (Gilson, Hewitt, & Page, 
2005). 
 
 
1.2.4: The EU Sugar Protocol 
 
The sugar industry is a significant contributor to economic growth in many ACP countries 
(European Commission [EC], 2016).  Since the inception of the Lome provision in 1975, 
the EU has provided duty free, guaranteed market access (see Table 1-3 for sugar quotas 
                                                          
6 Table 2.0 in the Appendix shows the export items above US$200m in value exported to the EU from Eastern & Southern Africa, SADC 
and West Africa.   
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provided) to 187 ACP sugar producers at prices that are almost three times the world market 
price (see Figure 1-7).  These privileges are enshrined in the Sugar Protocol8  that emerged 
in the initial Lome Convention (1975) and continued through into consecutive revisions 
(Serrano, 2007).  Mauritius has the largest share in the ACP allocated quotas (37.9 percent), 
followed by Fiji and Guyana with 12.8 percent and 12.3 percent respectively. 
 
 
Table 1-3: EU sugar quotas allocated to ACP countries in the Sugar Protocol. 
ACP country Quota (tonnes, white 
sugar) 
% share of total 
ACP quota 
Mauritius 491,031 37.93 
Fiji 165,348 12.77 
Guyana 159,410 12.31 
Jamaica 118,696 9.17 
Swaziland 117,845 9.10 
Barbados 50,312 3.89 
Trinidad & Tobago 43,751 3.38 
Belize 40,349 3.12 
Zimbabwe 30,225 2.33 
Malawi 20,824 1.61 
St. Kitts & Nevis 15,591 1.20 
Madagascar 10,760 0.83 
Congo 10,186 0.79 
Côte d'Ivoire 10,186 0.79 
Tanzania 10,186 0.79 
Total 1,294,700 100 
(Source: European Commission, 2004) 
 
 
Moreover, in addition to being significantly higher than the world market sugar prices (see 
Figure 1-7), the EU sugar prices have also been comparatively less volatile, which makes 
the ACP’s privilege and protection from these price fluctuations through the EU’s 
guaranteed price more apparent.  For instance, in the period 1980 to 1989, 1990 to 1999 
and from 2000 to 2005 (prior to the EU sugar reforms and the consequent EU sugar price 
cuts) the average per annum change in the EU sugar price was only 2.2 percent.  In contrast, 
the world market sugar price fluctuated by 18.3, -5.4 and 9.6 percent during these same 
                                                          
7 The Sugar Protocol countries include Barbados, Belize, Guyana, Jamaica, Trinidad & Tobago, St Kitts & Nevis, Fiji, Republic of 
Congo, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe (EC, 2004). 
8 The Sugar Protocol (SP) is an agreement between 19 ACP countries and the EU (formed under the Lome Convention-1975).  These 19 
ACP countries are allocated guaranteed-price quotas and in addition, most ACP countries benefitted from the annually allocated Special 
Preferential Sugar (SPS), under which raw sugar is imported at 85 percent of the SP price (EC, 2004). 
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periods, respectively.  However, due to the series of EU sugar price cuts from late 2000, the 
gap between the world market and the EU sugar prices is now evidently narrower.   
Evidently, as revealed in Figure 1-7, the EU has over the past years provided lucrative 
returns to the ACP for their sugar.  This has allowed some high cost ACP sugar producers 
(see Table 1-4) to stay in business despite their lack of competitiveness and enabled them to 
invest this extra revenue from the sugar sector to meet their other budget obligations (Trade 
for Development, 2007).   
 
 
Figure 1-7: World and EU preferential sugar prices. 
 
(Source: Compiled using the World Banks commodity database available at http://www.worldbank.org/commodities) 
 
 
As summarised in Gilson et al. (2005), the estimates of income transfer under the sugar 
protocol is substantial for some sugar exporting ACP countries (see Table 3.0 in the 
Appendix) with total income transfers approximated (using the average 2000-2002 prices) 
at US$584.2M.  The resulting extra export revenue gained by these ACP sugar exporters 
due to the Sugar Protocol ranges from 0 percent to 11 percent of exports and of GDP as 
well (Gilson et al., 2005).   
 
In 2003, in response to the sugar complaint against the EU lodged by Brazil, Australia and 
Thailand, the EU embarked on its sugar reform program that led to an end of the Sugar 
Protocol in 2009 (Richardson, 2009; Mcqueen, 1998).  A new set of WTO compatible trade 
negotiations were triggered under the EU-EPA’s which involved redesigning of the EU-
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ACP trade relations including the sugar provisions.  The export prices received by the ACP 
on their sugar exports to the EU was reduced by a cumulative 36 percent, phased over four 
years from 2006 to 2009 (EC, 2016).  The EU-ACP sugar relations are currently under 
negotiation with transitory arrangements in place (Serrano, 2007).  The revised 
arrangements will be captured under the provisions of the EU-EPA’s, with the affected 
countries adopting different strategies in response to these sugar reforms (Agritrade, 2010).  
The EU has recognised the detrimental effects of its sugar industry reform on the ACP 
sugar dependent countries.  Fiji is listed as one of the most affected countries with effects 
ranging from income losses, unemployment, and socio-economic problems (Serrano, 2007).  
In order to assist the affected ACP countries, the EU has allocated development funds 
under the Accompanying Measures for Sugar Protocol (AMSP) countries (EC, 2016).  
Hence, while the EU sugar reform is anticipated to affect the sugar exporting ACP 
countries, the impacts will differ across each country.  Countries that depend heavily on the 
EU market and are high-cost sugar producers would face greater challenges.  As 
summarised in Table 1-4, Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, Fiji and Mauritius are high cost 
sugar producers with significant export dependence on the EU market.  Malawi, Dominican 
Republic, Zambia and Zimbabwe while being cost competitive have access to alternative 
markets for their sugar output and depend less on the EU.  These alternative markets 
include neighbouring countries, the US and the domestic market.   
 
 
Table 1-4: ACP countries cost of sugar production and export dependence on the EU. 
Cost of production Dependence on the EU market* 
High cost Cost competitive High Low 
Barbados, Guyana, 
Jamaica, Fiji, 
Mauritius 
Malawi, Zambia, 
Dominican Republic, 
Zimbabwe, 
Mozambique, 
Swaziland, Belize 
Barbados, Swaziland, 
Guyana, Belize, Fiji, 
Mauritius, 
Mozambique, 
Jamaica 
Malawi, 
Dominican 
Republic, 
Zambia, 
Zimbabwe 
(Source: Compiled from European Commission (2016)). *Countries that export more than 40 percent of their sugar output (2011-2014 
average) to the EU are categorised as highly dependent. 
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1.2.5: An overview of the Fijian Economy 
 
1.2.5.1: Introduction 
 
According to the World Bank’s classification, Fiji is categorised as an upper middle-
income country and is relatively the most developed of the Pacific island economies.  With 
approximately 322 islands within its Exclusive Economic Zone (Fiji Sugar Corporation 
[FSC], 2002), Fiji is the focal point of economic activity in the South Pacific region.  After 
being under British rule for 96 years, Fiji gained independence in 1970 (Secretariat of the 
Pacific Community [SPC], 2008).  Fiji’s economy is highly dependent on tourism, 
remittances and sugar for its foreign exchange earnings, with garments, fish, and gold also 
contributing significantly (Asian Development Bank [ADB], 2012).  The economy has 
faced several domestic and global challenges over the years, which have stalled economic 
growth.  
 
 
1.2.5.2: Fiji’s economic growth and other key economic indicators 
 
Economic growth over the past decades (see Figure 1-8) has been low, unstable and far 
below its potential (ADB, 2012).  In the pre-independence period (1960-1969), average 
economic growth was 5.2 percent and dropped slightly to an average of 5.0 percent (1970-
1979) following independence in 1970.  However, after this period, real economic growth 
has only averaged approximately 2 percent (1.6 percent in 1980-1989, 2.4 percent in 1990-
1999 and 1.6 percent in 2000-2009).  On a positive note, economic growth over the past 
recent years (2009 to 2015) has remained positive (see Figure 1-8 and Table 1-6).   
 
Several external and internal disturbances explain this turbulent growth path of the Fijian 
economy.  These include a number of natural disasters, lack of economic and structural 
reforms, corruption, political turmoils and the erosion of preferential market access (ADB, 
2012; Narayan & Prasad, 2007; and others).  Prior to the 1987 political turmoils, Fiji 
embarked on import substitution policies with high barriers on imports to protect and grow 
its domestic industries while a shift towards a more open economy occurred in the late 
1980s (ADB, 2012; Benson, 1997).  While enriched with forestry, fisheries and mineral 
resources (SPC, 2008), the economy is heavily reliant on the sugar and tourism industries, 
which increases its vulnerability to both political turmoil and natural disasters. 
43 
 
Figure 1-8: Real GDP growth (annual % change from 1960-2015). 
 
(Compiled using data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) World Economic Outlook database available at www.imf.org) 
 
 
Political havoc has been a constraint on Fiji’s development efforts.  Fiji’s history has 
marked several coups over the years, which led to major economic impacts and 
international community backlash.  These coups, with the first in 1987, resulted from 
efforts to overthrow the democratically elected governments in Fiji (Narayan & Prasad, 
2007).  In particular, the major political turmoils of 1987 caused a sharp decline in Fiji’s 
economic growth in the same period (see Figure 1-8: a decline of 7.2 percent).  Colonel 
Sitiveni Rabuka who later became the Prime Minister in 1992 and President in 1994 staged 
the two coups in 1987 (Narayan & Prasad, 2007).  The economy recovered strongly in 1989, 
recording a 13.9 percent growth, underpinned by broad based recovery across all sectors 
(Reserve Bank of Fiji [RBF], 1990).  Later, in the year 2000, businessman George Speight 
led Fiji’s third coup, while the fourth coup followed in December 2006, after Fiji’s military 
commander Commodore Frank Bainimarama took control over the country (Singh & 
Prasad, 2008).  As shown in Figure 1-8, the third and the fourth coups however resulted in 
comparatively smaller declines in economic growth, compared to the 1987 coups.  After 
seven years of military rule, Fiji held its elections in September 2014, with Commodore 
Frank Bainimarama democratically elected as Fiji’s Prime Minister.   
Apart from creating setbacks in economic progress, each of these political turmoils also 
tarnished the country’s image in the international community.  Suspension from 
international organisations, cutbacks in foreign aid and trade sanctions amplified the effects 
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of these political crises.  Alongside these man-made disasters, natural disasters (particularly 
cyclones, droughts and flooding) also explain the stagnant economic progress over the 
years.  Table 1-5 provides a summary of the natural disasters in Fiji since 1985 that caused 
estimated damages greater than US$10M.  These disasters have caused extensive damage 
to infrastructure, crops and livelihoods (Benson, 1997).  The most severe of these natural 
disasters was Cyclone Winston – a category 5 system that affected almost 80 percent of the 
population in 2016.  The agriculture, manufacturing, mining, construction and services 
industries were largely affected by Cyclone Winston and contributed to slower growth in 
2017 (RBF, 2016).   
 
 
Table 1-5: Natural disasters in Fiji with estimated damages greater than US$10M. 
Year Disaster Affected 
population 
No of 
deaths 
Estimated 
damage 
(US$M) 
1985 TC Erick & Nigel 30000 30 39.7 
1985 TC Gavin 2000 7 27.0 
1986 TC Rajah 4000 1 14.0 
1990 TC Rae n/a 0 26.2 
1990 TC Sina n/a n/a 10.1 
1990 TC Mick 6000 0 18.5 
1993 TC Kina 160000 49 100.0 
1995 TC Gavin 2000 25 18.3 
1997 Drought n/a n/a 60.0 
2003 TC Ami 30000 15 22.1 
2004 Flash Flood n/a 10 11.6 
2008 TC Gene 6000 8 20.5 
2009 Flash Flood n/a 11 113.0 
2009 TC Mick 3845 3 31.0 
2012 Flood 458 0 113.0 
2013 TC Evan 70000 0 64.3 
2016 TC Winston 540000 44 674.0 
(Source: Compiled using reports from the Fiji National Disaster Management Office, 2016; Asian Development Bank, 2016). Note: TC is 
Tropical Cyclone. 
 
 
Fiji’s economy is largely agrarian, with subsistence agriculture still an important lifeline.  
Agriculture, fisheries and forestry are significant sectors in terms of contributions to GDP9, 
employment and export earnings.  Low export earnings (see Figure 1-9) have always been a 
concern for Fiji and with a narrow export base, Fiji’s heavy dependence on a few 
commodities makes it more vulnerable.  The main crops grown in the country include 
                                                          
9 Table 4.0 in the Appendix shows the contribution to Fiji’s GDP by sector (2011 to 2015). 
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sugarcane, copra, ginger, tropical fruits and vegetables, while livestock products include 
beef, pork and chicken (Sharma, 2006).  Efforts to boost the manufacturing sector remain 
central, with the entry of Natural Waters of Fiji Limited in 1996 an important stimulus for 
growth.  As regards services, the lucrative tourism industry continues as a major source of 
domestic growth and foreign exchange earner.   
Fiji’s GDP per capita (which is comparatively higher than its other Pacific island 
neighbours), shows an increasing trend from 2010 (see Table 1-6).  In 2015, the GDP per 
capita increased by approximately 5 percent from the previous year, to reach 9052.0 
international dollars.  The country’s population is below one million, with an average 
population growth of 0.7 percent over the past five years (2010-2015).  Further, while the 
inflation rate increased in 2015 to 1.4 percent, after a significant decline in 2014, it 
remained below the levels experienced prior to 2014.  Weak global oil prices, low trading 
partner inflation and the absence of major domestic supply side shocks backed the low 
inflation in 2014 and 2015 (RBF, 2016).  However, the persistence of the unemployment 
rate at approximately 9.0 percent since 2010 indicates the struggles of the Fijian 
government in providing job opportunities.   
 
 
Table 1-6: Key economic indicators for Fiji (2010-2015). 
  2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Real GDP growth (annual %) 2.7 1.9 6.1 5.4 5.6 4.3 
GDP per capita, PPP (constant 
2011 international $) 
7203.7 7486.8 7671.9 8106.2 8629.4 9052.0 
Inflation, consumer prices 
(annual %) 
3.7 7.3 3.4 2.9 0.5 1.4 
Merchandise exports (current 
US$M) 
841.4 1069.5 1220.6 1108.0 1373.3 1200.0 
Merchandise imports (current 
US$M) 
1808.5 2181.9 2252.6 2825.7 3250.5 2940.0 
Population, total 859952 867327 874158 880487 886450 892145 
Unemployment, total (% of 
total labor force) (national 
estimate) 
8.9 9.0 8.6  8.7 8.8   8.8 
(Source: Compiled using data from World Development Indicators available at http://data.worldbank.org & IMF World Economic 
Outlook database available at www.imf.org) 
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1.2.5.3: International trade 
 
On the international front, Fiji joined the WTO in 1996.  In addition to this, Fiji also joined 
several trade agreements in pursuit of its regional/global integration efforts.  These 
include 10  the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG), Pacific Island Countries Trade 
Agreement (PICTA), Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations (PACER)11, South 
Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement (SPARTECA) and the 
interim EU-EPA.  The EU-EPA is therefore Fiji’s first reciprocal and comprehensive 
agreement with a developed country, reflecting a marked shift in their international trade 
policy.   
 
 
Figure 1-9: Percentage growth in Fiji's total exports and imports (1991-2015). 
 
(Source: Compiled using data from the IMF International Financial Statistics database available at www.imf.org). 
 
 
Figure 1-9 illustrates Fiji’s performance in total exports and imports from 1991 to 2015.  As 
for any other small island developing state, exports are a crucial source of foreign exchange 
for Fiji.  However, Fiji faces its own set of challenges in terms of generating export 
earnings - some of which includes a narrow export base, high costs of production, distant 
markets, instability in world commodity prices, lower productivity in the agricultural sector 
and natural disasters (Narayan & Narayan, 2004).  Moreover, over the past years, Fiji relied 
                                                          
10 Refer to Table 5.0 in the Appendix for details of these agreements. 
11 Fiji remains as a non-signatory to the PACER plus, due to disagreements on selected provisions.  Papaua New Guinea and Tonga have 
also withdrawn, which has derailed negotiations on this agreement, which commenced in 2009.  These 3 Pacific Island countries are 
significant economies in the region and some of their concerns include the impact on their local manufacturers, issue of labor mobility, 
and other effects due to the reciprocity of this agreements.   
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heavily on Australia, New Zealand, US and the EU for preferential access for their exports 
and the subsequent erosion of these arrangements has produced a dwindling effect on the 
economy (Narayan & Prasad, 2003).   
As shown in Figure 1-9, Fiji’s exports performance improved over the period 1991 to 1996, 
before a 17 percent decline in 1997.  After remaining subdued in 1998 as well, exports 
rebounded strongly (21.1 percent growth) in 1999.  In the 2000’s, similar fluctuations were 
experienced.  Positive export performances were experienced in 2003, 2008, 2010-2012 
and 2014 while the years 2000, 2009, 2013 and 2015 showed declines.   
 
In terms of Fiji’s key commodity exports, Figure 1-10 indicates that the movements in 
sugar, gold, fish and garment earnings largely explain Fiji’s exports performance.  The 
sugar industry 12  is one of the main pillars of Fiji’s economy in terms of exports, 
employment and economic growth.  It however faces several challenges such as the expiry 
of land leases, mill inefficiency, low farm productivity and the erosion of preferential 
market access into the EU (ADB, 2012; Narayan & Prasad, 2003).  Around 80 percent of 
Fiji’s sugar is exported to the EU market and an end to the EU’s preferential treatment to 
sugar imports from the ACP countries post 2017 will drastically reduce Fiji’s exports 
earnings (Rakotoarisoa & Chang, 2017; and others).  Furthermore, Fiji’s garment sector 
had a short lucrative phase.  The establishment of tax free zones in 1987 - the main feature 
of which was that companies exporting more than 70 percent of their annual production 
were provided a tax holiday for 13 years – attracted foreign investment in the garment 
sector (Narayan & Prasad, 2003).  Apart from this domestic economic policy, preferential 
arrangements such as the SPARTECA contributed to a flourishing garment sector (Narayan 
& Prasad, 2003).  As depicted in Figure 1-10, garment exports earnings even surpassed 
sugar in the late 1990s and the early 2000 period.  However, returns from this sector began 
to decline following the end of the tax exemptions and the preferential trading 
arrangements.  On a positive note, mineral water has emerged as a promising exports earner 
for Fiji with the US as its main market.  After a small decline in 2009, export earnings from 
mineral water increased steadily to become the top commodity exports in 2015.  The 
fisheries sector is also growing with export earnings surpassing the traditional export 
earners (sugar and garments) in 2010.   
 
                                                          
12 The sugar industry and the interdependency with the EU is discussed in more detail in section 1.2.5.4. 
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Figure 1-10: Fiji's key merchandise domestic exports from 1992-2015 (F$M). 
 
(Source: Reserve Bank of Fiji Quarterly Review (2016); Ministry of Finance & National Planning Fiji Budget Supplements (various 
issues)). 
 
 
Next, Table 1-7 shows Fiji’s main export partners, for each of the five years since 2000.  
Evidently, due to geographical location, Australia dominated other trading partners, with 
the percentage of market share above 20 percent for most of the years.  Surprisingly, New 
Zealand is relatively less important as an export partner despite the close geographical 
location.  The EU and the US had almost similar levels of market share in 2000 and 2005, 
however the EU’s share declined substantially in 2010 and 2015, reflecting the decline in 
sugar export earnings following the EU sugar reforms.   
 
 
Table 1-7: Value and percentage share of key trading partners in Fiji's exports. 
  2000 2005 2010 2015 
  % 
share 
Value 
in 
US$M 
% 
share 
Value 
in 
US$M 
% 
share 
Value 
in 
US$M 
% 
share 
Value 
in 
US$M 
EU 20.7 92.1 16.2 111.3 7.1 46.3 9.8 73.1 
Australia 33.4 148.8 20.8 143.2 27.1 177.1 18.2 135.5 
New Zealand 5.2 23.1 5.2 35.7 7.5 49.0 5.6 41.7 
United States 23.6 104.8 15.7 108.0 14.7 96.1 18.9 140.3 
Japan 4.8 21.2 5.8 40.0 9.2 60.3 4.7 34.7 
(Source: Compiled using IMF Direction of Trade database available at www.img.org) 
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Figure 1-11 illustrates the value of Fiji’s exports by market.  The impact of the EU sugar 
reform and its consequences on export earnings from the EU is evident through the 
significant fall in the EU as an export destination.  Fiji’s exports to the EU market ranges 
from a high of US$152M (in 1995) to a low of US$46M (in 2010).  In the period 1990-
1999, the EU’s average market share of Fijian exports was 22.8 percent.  This declined 
slightly to an average share of 18.6 percent in the 2000-2009 period, however, in the last 
six years (2010-2015), the average market share has fallen sharply to only 10 percent.  
Australia remains as an important export destination, with a widening of market share 
evident in the 1993-1999 period.  Moreover, Japan and New Zealand comprise a relatively 
smaller share of Fiji’s exports, while the value of exports to the US has fluctuated between 
US$70M – US$150M post 2000.   
 
 
Figure 1-11: Distribution of Fiji's exports (in US$M) by market from 1989-2015. 
 
(Source: Compiled using IMF Direction of Trade database available at www.imf.org) 
 
 
With a narrow production base, Fiji is heavily dependent on imports.  Figure 1-12 shows 
the sharp fluctuations in Fiji’s imports, with the trend mainly determined by imports of 
mineral fuels, machinery and transport equipment, manufactured goods and food, 
beverages & tobacco.  Most of Fiji’s imports are sourced from Australia, the US, New 
Zealand, Japan, Singapore (mainly mineral fuels) and the UK (Rogers, 2003).  In a study on 
the determinants of Fiji’s imports, Rogers (2003) revealed that imports are positively 
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affected by the level of GDP and the real effective exchange rate while tariffs discouraged 
imports.  Figure 1-12 shows that Fiji’s key imports have increased from 1992 to 2015.  
While mineral fuels and machinery & transport equipment dominated imports for most of 
the years, an increasing trend is also noted for food, beverages & tobacco and manufactured 
goods.   
 
 
Figure 1-12: Fiji's key imports (in F$M) from 1992-2015. 
 
(Source: Compiled using data from Reserve Bank of Fiji Quarterly Review, December 2016) 
 
 
1.2.5.4: Fiji’s sugar industry and EU trade dependency 
 
Fiji has a long colonial history with the EU and over the years has enjoyed non-reciprocal 
preferential treatment under the Cotonou Agreement (successor to the Lome Convention 
signed in 1975).  One of the significant privileges enjoyed by Fiji under this arrangement 
with the EU is the guaranteed, duty-free market access for its sugar exports.  Being a high 
cost sugar producer (EC, 2016), the Sugar Protocol enabled Fiji to export sugar to the EU 
without having to compete with other more efficient global suppliers such as Brazil, 
Thailand and Australia (see Table 1-3 for the quota allocated to Fiji).  Moreover, the EU 
paid prices that were almost three times more than the world market sugar price (see Figure 
1-7).   
The sugar industry contributes significantly to Fiji’s economy.  The industry has four cane 
crushing mills and about 22,000 individuals farming an average 3-4 hectares supply raw 
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sugar cane to these mills (FSC, 2002).  Sugar production in Fiji has however declined over 
the years.  After a peak production in 1994 (See Figure 1-13), sugar production fell to 
below the 1975 production levels since 2007.  Some of the factors that explain this 
declining trend include land tenure issues, political instability, mill inefficiency and natural 
disasters (Serrano, 2007).   
 
 
Figure 1-13: Fiji's total sugar production and sugar exports (1975-2014). 
 
(Source: Compiled using data from Reserve Bank of Fiji Quarterly Review, December 2016) 
 
 
While sugar was initially Fiji’s main export, the foreign exchange earnings from this sector 
are slowly declining due to both constraints in the domestic economy and the EU sugar 
reform.  The average percentage share of sugar exports in total domestic exports (see Table 
1-8) has fallen from around 38 percent in the 1992-1996 period to only 16 percent in the 
2012-2015 period, almost equivalent to the percentage share of a more recent export 
commodity - mineral water.   
 
Nevertheless, despite these declining earnings from sugar, it still remains an important 
industry in Fiji, amidst the narrow production base and relatively slow diversification of its 
exports.  As shown in Table 1-8, the garment sector has endured a similar fate as the sugar 
sector, whereby an erosion of preferential arrangements has reduced export earnings 
drastically.  From an average percentage share of 33 percent in the 1997-2001 period, 
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garment export earnings only represented 9.5 percent of export earnings in the 2012-2015 
period.   Gold and fish exports do not exhibit any significant developments either.   
 
 
Table 1-8: Average percentage share of key exports in Fiji's total domestic exports. 
Period Sugar Garments Gold Fish Mineral water 
1992-1996 37.81 22.25 9.82 8.30  
1997-2001 25.89 32.55 8.24 7.24 2.01 
2002-2006 24.91 20.05 7.44 9.47 6.40 
2007-2011 16.65 9.95 7.11 14.53 11.31 
2012-2015 16.07 9.54 9.85 7.75 15.64 
(Source: Calculated using data from Reserve Bank of Fiji December Quarterly Review, 2016) 
 
 
With the EU sugar reforms and the consequent conclusion of the benefits enjoyed under the 
Sugar Protocol, the challenges to the already struggling sugar industry have increased 
further.  Fiji signed an interim EPA with the EU in 2009 driven largely by its heavy 
reliance on the EU market for its sugar exports.  The government of Fiji implemented the 
Sugarcane Industry Strategic Action Plan in 2013 that will continue into 2022, with the 
core objectives to address crop production, harvesting, transport, milling, processing, 
payment system review and industry restructuring and legislation (Ministry of Finance & 
National Planning, 2016).   
Table 1-9 below shows Fiji’s exports to the EU by member country at every five-year 
interval since 1990.   
 
 
Table 1-9: Fiji's exports to the EU (by member country) - 1990-2015. 
 US$M 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 
Austria .. 0.03 0.11 0.13 0.18 0.07 
Belgium .. .. 0.03 1.62 0.03 0.08 
Finland .. 12.24 0.00 0.00 0.01 .. 
France 1.00 0.55 0.16 0.10 0.21 0.36 
Germany 1.29 2.69 3.07 1.42 1.91 1.70 
Greece .. 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.00 
Ireland .. 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.02 
Italy .. 0.40 1.25 0.38 0.14 0.03 
Netherlands .. 0.24 0.22 1.20 1.30 3.26 
Portugal .. 9.61 6.89 0.00 .. 16.09 
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Romania .. .. .. 0.00 .. 12.01 
Slovenia .. .. 0.02 0.02 0.01 
 Spain .. 0.23 0.19 0.06 0.06 0.02 
United Kingdom 113.87 124.87 79.85 106.21 42.27 39.21 
(Source: IMF Direction of Trade database available at www.imf.org) 
 
 
Evidently, Fiji has a greater export relationship with the UK while export earnings from the 
other EU member countries are comparatively smaller.  Fiji’s exports to the EU include 
sugar, palm oil, coffee, coconut and fish with sugar being the main item exported.  As 
illustrated in Figure 1-14, in each of the 5-year period from 1990 to 2014, the bulk of Fiji’s 
sugar was sold to the EU market, mainly the UK.  Additionally, sugar was also sold to 
Portugal under the Special Preferential Market scheme (SPM).  Figure 1-14 reveals the 
heavy dependence of Fiji on the EU market for its sugar exports.  Moreover, it also 
indicates that Fiji has not secured any other international markets for its sugar exports.  
While Malaysia was an important market in the 1990’s, Fiji did not export any sugar to this 
market after the year 2000.  Sugar exports to Japan have also declined over the period 
under review, with no exports made after 2008.  
 
 
Figure 1-14: Volume of Fiji's sugar exports by market. 
 
(Source: Compiled using Fiji Sugar Corporation Annual Report (various issues) available at www.fsc.com.fj). Note: SPM is Sugar 
Protocol Market. 
 
In terms of imports, Fiji mainly buys machinery, transport equipment, manufactured goods, 
food and beverages from the EU.  According to the IMF’s direction of trade statistics, Fiji’s 
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average of US$27.4M in 2000-2009 and a substantial US$138.2M on average in the period 
2010-2015.  The increase in imports in the 2010-2015 period reflects Fiji’s aircraft imports 
from France in 2013 and 2014 (FIBOS, 2015).  Hence, while Fiji’s main import partners 
from the EU are France and Germany, its main export partner from the EU has been the UK 
- largely due to sugar exports.  
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1.3: Literature Review 
 
 
 
A large and growing body of literature has investigated the economy wide effects of trade 
liberalisation.  Initiation of an EPA resulted in several quantitative, qualitative or mixed 
method studies over the years, conducted by independent researchers, government and/or 
other organisation commissioned studies.  The quantitative approaches can be broadly 
categorised into; 
 Partial Equilibrium Analysis (PEA), 
 Computational General Equilibrium (CGE) analysis.   
The partial equilibrium framework is a technique that analyses the effect of a policy on 
only the market that is directly affected while any economic interactions with related 
markets are not accounted for; while a CGE method also analyses the effect of a policy but 
on all inter-related markets (Francois & Reinert, 1997).  While both these approaches are 
used for the study of policy implications, the choice of either depends largely on the 
objective of the analysis.  By its very nature, the PEA approach is limited in scope but more 
detailed while the CGE approach is more comprehensive.  The PEA framework (which is 
rooted in the Vinerian trade diversion and trade creation theory explained in Figure 1-15) 
has the capacity to capture comparative static effects at a highly disaggregated product 
level which provides information on sensitive and specific products of special interest to 
policy makers (Dodson, 2013).  Although the set of factors accounted for in a PEA 
approach are limited (such as a few prices and policy variables), this narrow focus allows 
for relatively rapid and transparent analysis of a wide range of policy issues (Francois & 
Reinert, 1997).  The strength of the PEA therefore lies in its focus on sectoral effects and 
consequent identification of sensitive products.  Meanwhile, the CGE approach captures 
economy wide effects, is dynamic and provides the advantage of analysing the 
consequences on inter-related markets.  Hence, on the one hand while the PEA ignores 
these interactions between markets and is a comparative static approach, the CGE method 
on the other hand lacks the market detail that is possible under a PEA but is comprehensive.  
As this study aims to explore the effects at the detailed sectoral level, the PEA is adopted13.  
                                                          
13 CGE analysis for Fiji is not possible due to data limitations.  Moreover, the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) 
model which is used for conducting similar analysis as in Chapter 1 of this thesis can not be used for the case of Fiji 
because it does not provide data specifically for Fiji, but aggregated data for all Pacific Island countries. 
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Such an approach also enables the incorporation of excluded items from the liberalisation 
process, and hence a comparison of the outcomes under both a full and partial liberalising.  
As mentioned earlier, the PEA is rooted in the Vinerian trade diversion and creation theory, 
which is explained next. 
 
 
1.3.1: Vinerian trade diversion and trade creation theory  
 
Viner in the 1950’s provided the lead for the trade diversion and trade creation effects with 
his customs union theory.  Trade diversion is where a trade agreement shifts trade away 
from a more efficient supplier outside the agreement to a less efficient PTA partner; while 
trade creation is the additional trade that results after removal of tariffs (Krishna, 2013).  
This is explained here in Figure 1-15 on the assumption of a small price taking country and 
perfect competition.  The domestic demand and supply are illustrated by DH and SH 
respectively.   
 
 
 
Figure 1-15: Trade diversion and trade creation 
 
 
 
Suppose in addition to domestic production, this home country also imports goods from the 
EU (SEU) and from the rest of the world (ROW-SROW).  To illustrate trade diversion, it is 
assumed that the EU is the higher cost supplier.  A tariff on imports from the ROW and the 
EU will shift up the respective prices by the magnitude of the tariff.  After a PTA is formed 
with the EU, tariffs are removed from EU imports but maintained on imports from the 
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ROW.  The economy thus trades with the EU at PEU (zero tariff prices) which is much 
lower than PtROW - the tariff inclusive price of the ROW.  Initially, the home country 
consumed Q3 of which Q2 was sourced from domestic suppliers and Q2Q3 was imported 
from the ROW.  Following the EU-PTA, imports from the ROW (Q2Q3) are now diverted 
to the EU market.  This change in source of imports is termed as trade diversion.  
Additionally, Q1Q2 of domestically produced goods are now replaced by EU imports and 
there is also an expansion in imports from Q3 to Q4.  This reflects trade creation.  Hence 
while trade diversion from an efficient to less efficient supplier results in resource loss of 
area e, trade creation results in gains of area b and d.  Consumer surplus expands (by area 
a+b+c+d), producer surplus shrinks by size a and government loses tariff revenue (c+e).  
The overall welfare impact is ambiguous depending on the magnitude of trade diversion 
and trade creation.   
 
 
1.3.2: Empirical literature   
 
The Vinerian theory discussed in the previous section has guided many empirical 
investigations of the EU-ACP EPA (Dodson, 2013).  Some of these contributions include 
Milner et al. (2005), Greenway and Milner (2006), Zgovu and Kweka (2007), Thomy et al. 
(2013), Dodson (2013), Mbithi et al. (2015), Morrissey and Zgovu (2009), Muluvi et al. 
(2016), and Nwali and Arene (2015).   
Milner et al. (2005) conducted a PEA of the EU-EPA effects in the East African 
Community (EAC) countries.  The three countries included in their study are Tanzania, 
Uganda and Kenya.  They assumed perfect competition and perfect substitutability between 
imports sourced from different trading partners.  Their study measured the welfare effects 
of preferential trading arrangement for the case of a small home country.  The lack of 
comparable disaggregated data for Kenya limited analysis to Tanzania and Uganda.  The 
authors concluded marginal negative welfare effects for Tanzania (-0.5 percent of GDP), 
and small positive effects (0.05 percent of GDP) for Uganda.  This heterogeneous albeit 
marginal result highlighted the influence of trade pattern on welfare impacts despite other 
similarities between economies.  While the dominance of extra-regional trade diversion 
reduced welfare for Tanzania, Uganda gained from displacement of Kenyan imports by 
more efficient EU suppliers.   
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Greenway and Milner (2006) adopted a similar PEA model constructed on the standard 
concepts from customs union theory.  They however allowed for imperfect substitutability 
between products to measure welfare implications of an EU-EPA in the Caribbean 
Community (CARICOM) region14.  Their work provides a broader perspective by also 
including possible implications of extending liberalisation to the US and globally.  
However, the analysis used two-digit disaggregated data which limits its ability to highlight 
sensitive products beyond this level of aggregation.  Regardless, it provides a useful 
comparison across the three forms of liberalisation.  The findings support the virtue of 
multilateral liberalisation, with gains ranging from 0.3 percent to 0.8 percent of GDP.  
Restricted liberalisation with only the EU produces net welfare losses ranging from -1.9 
percent to -4.5 percent of GDP, while extending reciprocity to the US market results in 
smaller reductions in net welfare which range from -0.4 percent to -1.1 percent of GDP.   
Zgovu and Kweka (2007) applied the Milner et al. (2005) approach on the economies of 
Malawi and Tanzania and concluded significant welfare losses for both economies, 
reflecting the dominance of trade diversion over the positive results of trade creation.  The 
sample of countries chosen in their paper draws attention to the intricacy of EU-EPA 
negotiating settings that some countries are involved in, which further complicates the 
possible implication assessments.  For instance, Malawi and Tanzania both are members of 
SADC, however, each are negotiating an EU-EPA under a different regional grouping (see 
Table 1-2).  Malawi is also a member of COMESA and is therefore part of the COMESA-
EPA negotiating group.  Tanzania on the other hand is a member of EAC, however given 
the inactive involvement of EAC in the EPA negotiations, they are negotiating under the 
SADC-EPA arrangement.  Apart from the complexity arising from these overlapping 
regional arrangements, the authors also signalled the non-trivial potential impacts of EPA 
on regional integration initiatives.   
Dodson (2013) looked at the impact of the EU-CARIFORUM15 EPA on Guyana with the 
application of the PEA approach (Greenway & Milner (2006) technique) on 2008 data.  
The author concluded a static welfare loss of US$31.01M equivalent to 2.2 percent of 
Guyana’s 2008 GDP.  Also guided by a partial equilibrium framework, Muluvi et al. (2016) 
                                                          
14 CARICOM or the Caribbean Economic Community is a subset of ACP countries.  Its current members are Antigua & Barbuda, 
Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, St Kitts & Nevis, St Lucia, St Vincent, Grenadines, 
Suriname, Trinidad & Tobago.  Due to lack of data for Antigua, Barbuda, Monserrat, Suriname and only 1994 data for Guyana, these 
countries are not included in the analysis. 
15 Refers to the Caribbean sub-group of the ACP countries. 
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focused on the trade and welfare implications of the EU-EPA on Kenya.  Results showed 
that though Kenya will lose tariff revenue due to the EPA, they will experience lower 
consumer prices and hence overall welfare gains.   
While the studies discussed above have analysed the impacts on total imports, others have 
focused on a particular sector only.  For example, in a much more recent yet narrower work, 
Thomy et al. (2013) investigated the effects of the EU-EPA on Botswana’s imports of food, 
beverages and tobacco and found a net welfare benefit.  The authors adopted the Milner et 
al. (2005) approach under a full trade liberalisation assumption.  The only development in 
their empirical approach is the application of sensitivity analysis where the authors varied 
the degree of substitutability between products from different sources.  Results remained 
robust to this sensitivity analysis.  The results of this study are inconsistent with the mostly 
negative net welfare impact conclusions however, the authors argued that since Botswana is 
a net importer of food, beverages & tobacco, movement towards free trade opens up access 
to cheaper alternatives.  The findings here signal the need to assess potential impacts at a 
highly disaggregated sectoral level.   
Another narrower approach is Mbithi et al. (2015) who applied a PEA to study the effects 
of EU-EPA on EAC (Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda) manufactured goods 
imports.  Their results indicate that the shift towards elimination of tariffs on EU imports 
will produce a 9 percent increase in imports of manufactured goods from the EU 
(particularly products such as iron, steel, vehicles and related parts), result in lower prices 
for manufactured goods and consequently consumption gains of about 0.03 percent of the 
EAC regions GDP.  The increase in imports is greatest for Kenya, followed by Tanzania, 
Uganda, Rwanda and finally, Burundi.   
Furthermore, Morrissey and Zgovu (2009) estimated the impact of EU-EPA on a sample of 
36 ACP countries agricultural imports from the EU.  In a partial equilibrium setting, their 
work concluded that the combined welfare effect (for all 36 countries in the sample) is a 
loss of 0.03 percent of GDP.  However, on average, they found a welfare gain of 0.07 
percent of GDP.  This indicates that in terms of agricultural imports, the EU-EPA will 
produce average negligible gains for the ACP countries.  More specifically, 61 percent of 
the countries analysed are estimated to experience a welfare improvement.  This includes 
most of the LDC’s (11 of the 13) in their sample.   
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Nwali and Arene (2015) also focused on the implications of an EU-EPA on agricultural 
imports for the economy of Nigeria.  As pointed out by these authors, Nigeria is a 
significant economy from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 
region, accounting for almost 60 percent of the ECOWAS region’s trade.  They estimated a 
gain of US$35.3 billion due to trade creation, a loss of US$14.9 billion due to trade 
diversion and total tariff revenue loss of US$16.7 billion.   
All of the studies reviewed above echo a common finding i.e. the substantial tariff revenue 
losses and the subsequent negative welfare impacts.  This result is not surprising given that 
most developing economies have used trade taxes for domestic firm protection and more 
importantly as a source of government revenue.  Therefore, liberalisation of trade will 
reduce government revenue unless these are successfully replaced by other domestic 
revenue sources (Baunsgaard & Keen, 2010).  This view is also supported in a 
comprehensive study by Khattry and Rao (2002) who examined if trade liberalisation 
depressed tax revenue to GDP ratios in developing countries.  They investigated this in a 
panel of 80 developing and industrialised countries using data from 1970-1998 and 
concluded that low-income and upper-middle income countries experienced a decline in 
fiscal revenue due to falling trade taxes.  Structural characteristics of these economies 
inhibited domestic reforms and therefore significantly explained this decline.  Baunsgaard 
and Keen (2010) also expressed the same view after their investigation on whether 
countries had recovered from lost tax revenue due to past episodes of trade liberalisation 
process.  Their findings revealed that while high and middle-income countries showed 
robust signs of revenue replacement, the same could not be concluded for low income 
countries.   
As is evident from this literature review, it is mainly the African and Caribbean countries 
that have attracted research interest on the implications of the EU-EPA.  Empirical 
investigations have not illuminated much on the two countries from the Pacific region 
(Papua New Guinea and Fiji) that are involved in an EU-EPA negotiation.  In Morrissey 
and Zgovu’s (2009) sample of ACP countries, only Papua New Guinea is included.  As 
regards country specific analysis like those reviewed in this section, there are no studies on 
either Papua New Guinea or Fiji, to the best of our knowledge.  This study therefore 
contributes by providing such an analysis of the Fijian economy. 
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1.4: Research Method & Data  
 
 
1.4.1: Empirical framework 
 
A PEA framework is developed to address our first research question using the year 2012 
as the base period.  The model assumes a small open economy that has no influence on 
world export or import prices16.  Product differentiation by country of origin is assumed 
which implies that consumers differentiate among domestically produced and imported 
goods from different sources.   
 
Demand: On the consumption front, consumers have a three-layer Constant Elasticity of 
Substitution (CES) utility function.  Therefore, the decision-making process for consumers 
is a three-stage budget optimisation procedure (which we have illustrated using Figure 1-
16), where the first stage aggregates over distinct sectors, the decision to consume imported 
or domestic good occurs in the middle stage, and the subsequent decision to consume 
product j from the many trading partners takes place in the final stage.  
 
 
Figure 1-16: Nested utility structure for allocation of demand17. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
16 World market prices for imports are normalized to 1. 
17 The notations used in this chart are explained in the discussion below.  Note that the elasticity at each stage is different across each 
stage and across each sector (by broad product category).  See Table 6 in the Appendix for the elasticity values. 
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The upper level of the nested utility function aggregates over the products of j = 1,…..J 
distinct sectors such as food, machinery, transportation etc.  Total utility (U) is an additive 
function of the utility )(
ju  derived from the representative quantities consumed across 
distinct sectors.  The consumer’s utility maximisation problem therefore is: 
Max  


1






 
j
juU             such that      
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Where    11  is the elasticity of substitution in consumption between the distinct 
sectors.  j  is the price index for ju (to be specified below), and E18 gives total expenditure 
on all goods.  Hence expenditure on good j (Ej) is derived
19 by solving the consumer’s 
optimisation problem implied by (1).  This results in; 
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Letting zˆ denote a proportional change  
z
dz  for any variable z; 












 
1
ˆˆ
1
ˆˆ
k
k
k
j
j aEE         (3) 
which implies that 








 
k
k
k
j
j aEE 


ˆˆ
1
ˆˆ                           (4) 
where  
  






 

k
k
j
ja
1
1





     is the initial share of good j in total expenditure, 1
j
ja  
The utility obtained from consuming the outputs of sector j is disaggregated into 
domestically produced and imported components in the second layer.  For each good, 
consumers allocate expenditure between the locally produced good j (Dj) or an aggregate of 
imported j (Mj).  The decision-making process at this stage is; 
Max 𝑢𝑗 = [𝛽𝑗𝑀𝑗
ℓ + (1 − 𝛽𝑗)𝐷𝑗
ℓ]
1
ℓ⁄  such that jj
D
jj
M
j EDPMP    where 0 < ℓ < 1             (5) 
                                                          
18 Total expenditure (E) is assumed to be constant. 
19 The detailed derivations of all equations presented here are provided in section A.7 of the Appendix. 
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Where   11  is the elasticity of substitution between domestically produced j and 
imported j.  
M
jP  is the price index of the imported varieties of j while 
D
jP  is the price of 
the domestically produced j.  The respective demand function for domestic good j (Dj) is 
derived by solving the utility maximisation in (5) and is as follows; 
 
   
j
D
j
M
j
D
j
j E
PP
P
D



 



11
1
1





         (6) 
To obtain the change in this demand function, we totally differentiate (6), obtaining; 
 

 1ˆˆ 
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D
jjj PED -    
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

  11 
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

D
j
M
j PP        (7) 
which in turn gives;  
 DjDjMjMjDjjj PaPaPED ˆˆ
1
ˆ
1
ˆˆ 








        (8) 
where M
ja  is the share of imported j in total expenditure on good j while 
D
ja is the share of 
domestically produced j in total expenditure on good j.  Added together, M
ja and 
D
ja  
would therefore equal 1.  Finally, after some rearranging, the following is obtained; 
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which is further simplified to give; 
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and therefore; 
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jD                (10) 
As implied by (10), the change in demand for domestic product j is negatively related to 
own price relative to the price index of imported substitutes.  Therefore, a reduction in price 
of imported goods through tariff removal is expected to reduce demand for domestically 
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produced j, as consumers switch to the relatively cheaper imports.  Equation 10 is used to 
quantify the switch in consumption from domestically produced j to imported j.   
In the final stage of the three-level utility function, consumers choose among the different 
varieties of j sourced from various partner countries.  More specifically, the small country 
modelled here (Fiji) imports n varieties of product j from different trading partners where 
each variety i of j sells at a given world market price (pi).   As such, consumers maximise: 


1
0






 

n
i
ij
M cU                such that       
M
jij
i
ij Ecp              where 10             (11) 
Where    11  is the elasticity of substitution between varieties sourced from 
different countries.  
M
jE  is the total expenditure by Fiji on imports of product j.  Each 
product j has a subset of varieties distinguished by country of origin.  For example, under 
the good “cheese” there are several types of cheese, each of which is distinguished by 
country of origin.  Hence, variety h of cheese sourced from the EU is differentiated from 
variety h of cheese sourced from China.  The variable 𝑐𝑖𝑗 denotes consumption and 𝑝𝑖𝑗 is 
the (consumer) price of variety 𝑖 in Fiji.  A tariff on imports implies that the domestic price 
differs from the world market price.  Let 𝑡𝑖𝑗 ≥ 1 be the tariff imposed on variety 𝑖  of 
product j imported by Fiji, implying that 𝑝𝑖𝑗 = 𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑗.  From (11) the value of the demand 
for variety i of product j  ijX  in Fiji is derived as; 
 
M
j
j
iji
ij E
R
tp
X


1
                (12) 
where  𝑅𝑗 = ∑ [𝑝𝑘𝑡𝑘𝑗]
1−𝜎𝑛
𝑘=1  is a measure of aggregate consumer prices for imported 
varieties of j in Fiji.  
Using (12), the effects of a reduction in tariff on imports of varieties from the EU (i.e. the 
set of varieties 𝑙 ∈ 𝐸𝑈) is derived.  
Suppose that variety h is one of those imported from the EU market.  Then from (12) and 
allowing for any induced change in expenditure but assuming no changes in world prices, 
we have; 
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?̂?ℎ𝑗 = −[𝜎 − 1]?̂?ℎ𝑗 + ?̂?𝑗 − ?̂?𝑗                  (13) 
and   ?̂?𝑗 = −[𝜎 − 1]∑ 𝑚𝑙𝑗 ?̂?𝑙𝑗𝑙∈𝐸𝑈                         (14) 
where 𝑚𝑖𝑗 ≡
𝑋𝑖𝑗
𝐸𝑗
 denotes the (import) market share of variety 𝑖 .  Incorporating jRˆ  and after 
some rearranging, the change in value of imports of variety h of product j (∆𝑋ℎ𝑗) from the 
EU market is given by; 
 ∆𝑋ℎ𝑗 = [−[𝜎 − 1][1 − 𝑚ℎ𝑗]?̂?ℎ𝑗 + [𝜎 − 1]∑ 𝑚𝑙𝑗?̂?𝑙𝑗𝑙∈𝐸𝑈
𝑙≠ℎ
+ ?̂?𝑗] 𝑋ℎ𝑗            (15) 
Equation 15 implicitly captures the substitution of imports from regional and rest of the 
world trading partners with the now cheaper EU products20.  However, to calculate the loss 
in tariff revenue, this substitution is explicitly estimated (i.e. grouped by region and rest of 
the world) from the change in the sum of the value of imports from all other sources 
( ∑ Xiji∉EU ) using; 
 ∆∑ 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑖∉𝐸𝑈 = {[𝜎 − 1]∑ 𝑚𝑙𝑗 ?̂?𝑙𝑗𝑙∈𝐸𝑈 +?̂?𝑗} ∑ 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑖∉𝐸𝑈                        (16) 
 
 
Supply: On the supply side, producers maximise their value of output through sales in the 
domestic market and the export market, given prices and a resource constraint.  Producers’ 
optimisation problem therefore is: 
Max 
F
j
F
j
D
j
D
j QPQP                such that        
1
F
j
D
jj QQK     where 1           (17) 
This formulation allows for resource costs (in terms of foregone output) in transforming 
output for domestic sales versus exports.  Kj is total resources available for domestic 
production of good j, 
D
jQ is supply of j for domestic market sales and 
F
jQ is supply of j for 
the export market.  
D
jP  is the domestic price of good j and hence 
D
j
D
j QP gives the value of 
output j sold in the domestic market.  
F
jP is the export price, and so 
F
j
F
j QP gives the value 
of exports of product j.  11    reflects the elasticity of transformation between 
                                                          
20 Equations 15 and 16 reflect the change in imports from each respective market due to the EU-EPA (i.e. when the tariff on EU imports 
is changed only).  As an extension of this analysis, we later explored the effects on imports and consequent tariff revenues when tariff on 
all imports are changed together with an EU-EPA.  The equations used for the EU-EPA plus external tariff reform are reported in Table 
1-10 with derivations of these respective equations explained in section A.7 of the Appendix. 
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producing for domestic market sales and export market.  The producers’ optimisation 
problem (17) is solved to obtain the respective supply functions; supply for export market 
(18) and supply for domestic market (22). 
 
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                                                                                     (18) 
Total differentiation of (18) produces equation 19 which measures the change in supply of 
product j for exports  FjQˆ .  Hence total differentiation of (18) implies; 
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which gives the respective function; 
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and finally; 
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Likewise, from the producer optimisation problem in (17), the domestic supply function 
 DjQ  is derived; 
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Total differentiation of (22) gives equation 23 which estimates the change in supply of 
product j  DjQˆ  for domestic market sales.  Hence total differentiation of (22) implies; 
      jFjDjDjDj KPPPQ ˆˆ
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                                                                      (23) 
that produces the following function; 
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where 
D
ja  is the share of domestic sales in value of total output, and 
F
ja  is the share of 
value of exports.  Added together, 
D
ja and 
F
ja would therefore equal one, and so; 
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The domestic price  DjP  and the consequent change in domestic price  
D
jPˆ  is derived 
using (9) and (24).  In equilibrium, domestic demand is matched by domestic supply; hence 
equating (9) and (24) allows for 
D
jPˆ to be solved.  The resultant function is; 
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Table 1-10 below summarises the main equations and the corresponding indicators that 
they are used to measure, from the empirical framework discussed above. 
 
 
Table 1-10: A summary of the equations and key indicators measured. 
Key indicator measured Equation* 
Change in imports from 
the EU market 
(15) ∆𝑋ℎ𝑗 = [−[𝜎 − 1][1 − 𝑚ℎ𝑗]?̂?ℎ𝑗 + [𝜎 − 1]∑ 𝑚𝑙𝑗 ?̂?𝑙𝑗𝑙∈𝐸𝑈
𝑙≠ℎ
+ ?̂?𝑗] 𝑋ℎ𝑗 
 
Substitution of imports 
from the ROW markets 
for EU products 
(16) ∆∑ 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑖∉𝐸𝑈
i∈𝑅𝑂𝑊
= {[𝜎 − 1]∑ 𝑚𝑙𝑗 ?̂?𝑙𝑗𝑙∈𝐸𝑈 +?̂?𝑗} ∑ 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑖∉𝐸𝑈  
 
Substitution of imports 
from the Regional 
markets for EU products 
(16) ∆∑ 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑖∉𝐸𝑈
i∈𝑅𝑒𝑔
= {[𝜎 − 1]∑ 𝑚𝑙𝑗 ?̂?𝑙𝑗𝑙∈𝐸𝑈 +?̂?𝑗} ∑ 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑖∉𝐸𝑈  
 
Tariff revenue loss (from 
existing EU imports) 
Obtained as the product of the existing EU imports (sourced 
from FIBOS) and the MFN tariff rates (sourced from HS 
Tariff Schedule for Fiji – Fiji Islands Revenue & Customs 
Authority (FIRCA)) 
Tariff revenue loss (from Obtained as the product of ROW import substitution 
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ROW substitution) (calculated using equation 16) and the MFN tariff rates 
(sourced from HS Tariff Schedule for Fiji – FIRCA) 
Tariff revenue loss (from 
Regional substitution) 
Obtained as the product of Regional import substitution 
(calculated using equation 16) and the MFN tariff rates 
(sourced from HS Tariff Schedule for Fiji – FIRCA) 
Change in demand for 
domestically produced 
good 
(10)  
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
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(26) 
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Change in demand for 
imports from the EU with 
EU-EPA & external tariff 
reform 
(27) ∆𝑋ℎ𝑗 = [−[𝜎 − 1][1 − 𝑚ℎ𝑗]?̂?ℎ𝑗 + [𝜎 − 1]∑ 𝑚𝑙𝑗 ?̂?𝑙𝑗𝑙∈𝐸𝑈
𝑙≠ℎ
+
∑ 𝑚𝑘𝑗 ?̂?𝑘𝑗 + ∑ 𝑚𝑔𝑗 ?̂?𝑔𝑗 +𝑔∈𝑅𝑒𝑔  𝑘∈𝑅𝑂𝑊 ?̂?𝑗] 𝑋ℎ𝑗  
 
Change in demand for 
imports from the ROW 
with EU-EPA & external 
tariff reform 
(28) ∆𝑋ℎ𝑗 = [−[𝜎 − 1][1 − 𝑚ℎ𝑗]?̂?ℎ𝑗 + [𝜎 − 1]∑ 𝑚𝑘𝑗 ?̂?𝑘𝑗𝑘∈𝑅𝑂𝑊
𝑘≠ℎ
+
∑ 𝑚𝑙𝑗 ?̂?𝑙𝑗 + ∑ 𝑚𝑔𝑗?̂?𝑔𝑗 +𝑔∈𝑅𝑒𝑔  𝑙∈𝐸𝑈 ?̂?𝑗] 𝑋ℎ𝑗  
 
Change in demand for 
imports from the region 
with EU-EPA & external 
tariff reform 
(29) ∆𝑋ℎ𝑗 = [−[𝜎 − 1][1 − 𝑚ℎ𝑗]?̂?ℎ𝑗 + [𝜎 − 1]∑ 𝑚𝑔𝑗 ?̂?𝑔𝑗𝑔∈𝑅𝑒𝑔
𝑔≠ℎ
+
∑ 𝑚𝑙𝑗 ?̂?𝑙𝑗 + ∑ 𝑚𝑘𝑗 ?̂?𝑘𝑗 +𝑘∈𝑅𝑂𝑊  𝑙∈𝐸𝑈 ?̂?𝑗] 𝑋ℎ𝑗  
 
Notes: *Refer to the empirical framework explained in section 1.4.1 for details on the components of these equations and section A.7 of 
the Appendix for the detailed steps in deriving these equations.  The equation numbers are presented in brackets.  Equation 27-29 are 
used to analyse the impact of an EU-EPA plus external tariff reform.  
 
 
1.4.2: Data Requirements 
 
The data to estimate the equations explained in the empirical framework were obtained 
from various sources.  The 2012 data on bilateral imports for Fiji was sourced from the Fiji 
Islands Bureau of Statistics (FIBOS) through email communication.  To analyse the impact 
at a very detailed level, we used the Harmonised System 6 (HS6) data.  The HS is an 
internationally standardized system of names and codes to classify traded products (by 
function/form) and is organized into 22 sections and 99 chapters.  On average, 
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approximately 300 items are recorded under each chapter21.  This bilateral imports data was 
grouped into three main import sources: the EU, Region and the ROW.  The Regional 
market includes Fiji’s neighbouring countries (Papua New Guinea, Cook Islands, Marshall 
Islands, Nauru, Palau, Solomon Islands, Samoa, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu), while ROW is 
every other trading partner of Fiji, excluding the Region and the EU.  Furthermore, the 
model required tariff rates (MFN and preferential tariffs) for each product.  To align to the 
HS6 level of disaggregation, the 2012 HS Tariff Schedule for Fiji sourced from the Fiji 
Islands Revenue and Customs Authority (FIRCA) was used to obtain the MFN tariff rates 
imposed on imports from the ROW and the EU.  The preferential tariff rates on imports 
from the Region were obtained from the International Trade Centre’s market access map 
website (www.macmap.org).  The data on domestic production is extracted from the 
Agriculture, Forestry & Fishing Survey (2011) and the Manufacturing Economic Survey 
(2011) reports for Fiji, both of which were obtained through email communication with 
FIBOS.  For the partial liberalisation scenario simulation, the list of excluded items was 
obtained from the interim EU-Fiji EPA document, retrieved from the European 
Commission website (ec.europa.eu).  In terms of the behavioural parameters, the empirical 
framework explained above required the calculation of a set of parameters (  ,, ) which in 
turn need estimates of the selected elasticities.  More specifically, the three-layer utility 
function requires the elasticity of substitution between sectors ( : top layer), the elasticity 
of substitution between domestic and imported goods (  : middle-tier), and the elasticity of 
substitution between imports from different countries ( : :final layer).  Moreover, on the 
production front, calculation of the parameter ( ) requires the elasticity of transformation 
( ) between supplying the domestic market and export market.  Estimation of these 
parameters is beyond the scope of this study and these elasticity values22 are taken from the 
Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) which is a global network of researchers and 
policymakers working on quantitative analysis of international policy and from Devarajan 
et al. (1999).   
 
 
                                                          
21 The Harmonized System (HS) representation of the 6 digits is as follows: the first two digits is the chapter in which the good falls, the 
next two represents the group in that chapter, and the last two digits identify more specific description of the good (www.trademap.org). 
22 Table 6 in the Appendix provides these elasticity values. 
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1.5: Estimated results and discussion 
 
 
The impacts of the EU-Fiji EPA on our key variables of interest were estimated using the 
equations explained in section 1.4.1 and the data defined in section 1.4.2.  These results are 
presented from Tables 1-11 to 1-16 under both of our assumptions, i.e. under the 
assumption of full liberalisation (removal of tariffs on all EU imports) and partial 
liberalisation (exclusion of 20.3 percent of tariff lines).  The import substitution effects and 
tariff revenue effects were estimated at the disaggregated 6-digit tariff line level (HS6) and 
then aggregated by broad category23 for result presentation and discussion.  A detailed 
disaggregated level of discussion of results is provided only for selected vulnerable 
products24.  The use of disaggregated imports data facilitated the incorporation of excluded 
items and in calculation of tariff revenue loss, given that items within an aggregated 
category are tariffed at different rates.  Moreover, such disaggregated analysis also enables 
identification of sensitive products (such as those that are also domestically produced) and 
may therefore require greater attention in this liberalisation process.  The analysis also 
required grouping of the bilateral imports data into three broad sets: the EU, ROW and 
Region.  This is to facilitate the application of the different tariff rates by trading partner 
country (MFN tariff rates for ROW and preferential tariff rates for Region), and to 
explicitly observe impacts on Fiji’s imports relationship with the Region.  Tables 1-11 and 
1-12 show the impact on imports (9 broad categories and total) grouped by market (i.e. 
ROW, Region, and EU).  The import effects from here are then used to estimate the tariff 
revenue loss due to the EU-EPA and are summarised in Table 1-14.   
 
Furthermore, we extended our analysis to investigate the consequences of the EU-EPA 
along with an external tariff reform by Fiji.  A reduction of tariffs on EU imports (due to 
the EU-EPA) while holding the ROW and Regional tariffs fixed will result in substitution 
of imports (and the consequent tariff revenue losses) from these two latter groups of trading 
partners with EU products.  However, as mentioned in Richardson (1993), a reduction in 
external protection concurrently will reduce the potential welfare losses arising from the 
trade diversion that occurs when the tariffs are lowered on one trading partner (or PTA 
members) only.  Hence, along with the EU-EPA, we also reduced tariffs on the ROW and 
                                                          
23 See Table 7.0 in the Appendix for the aggregated products under each broad category.   
24 The results disaggregated at chapter level (99 chapters in total) are included in the Appendix in Tables 8 (full liberalisation) and 9 
(partial liberalisation). 
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regional imports simultaneously and compared the import substitution effects of the EU 
PTA only and the EU PTA plus external tariff reforms (see Table 1-13), under both of our 
scenarios (full and partial liberalisation).  The MFN tariff rates are imposed on imports 
from the ROW while for imports from the Region, preferential tariff rates are applied.  As 
part of our external tariff reform exercise, we removed the preferential tariffs on Regional 
imports while the ROW MFN tariffs were lowered by the percentage points that would 
maintain the existing preferential marginal between the ROW MFN tariffs and Regional 
preferential tariffs.  Lastly, the consequences on the domestic variables of interest are 
presented in Tables 1-15 and 1-16.   
 
 
1.5.1: Import substitution effects 
 
A reduction of tariffs on EU imports will induce substitution from the ROW and regional 
trading partners to the EU, shown implicitly in columns d and f of Table 1-11 and explicitly 
(i.e. by specific market – ROW and Region) in column c of Table 1-12.  Column a of Table 
1-11 reports the total imports in the base year (2012) while the value and share of imports 
from the EU in the same year are reflected in column b and c.  Comparatively, the EU is 
not a dominant import supplier across any of the 9 broad categories of goods shown in 
Table 1-11.  The percentage share of the EU in total base year imports in each of the 
aggregated import categories (see column c of Table 1-11) ranges from a low of 0.1 percent 
to 9.2 percent.  Overall, the EU had only a 2.2 percent share in Fiji’s total imports in the 
base year.  Comparing across the 9 aggregated import categories for the EU, only chemical 
and related products, beverages & tobacco, and machinery & transport equipment have 
percentage shares in total imports larger than 5 percent (see column c of Table 1-11), while 
the imports share of all other categories are minimal.  Instead, the ROW is a dominant 
import supplier (see column b of Table 1-12), with the import share of all the 9 aggregated 
categories above 90 percent.  Imports from the neighbouring countries (regional) is 
marginal, with food & live animals as the main imported item from the regional market (see 
column b of Table 1-12).  Hence, the bulk of Fiji’s imports are from the ROW while the EU 
and the regional market are comparatively less important sources of imports. 
Under a full liberalisation scenario of the EU-Fiji EPA, the removal of tariffs on EU 
products will result in consumers substituting goods from the ROW and Regional markets 
with the now relatively cheaper EU products.  As shown in column c of Table 1-12, the 
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total estimated substitution from the ROW and regional market is $11.3 million, which is 
equivalent to 0.3 percent of base year imports.  The bulk of this substitution is of the ROW 
market (shown in column c of Table 1-12), with only a marginal substitution of Regional 
imports.  From the ROW, F$11.3 million of total imports will be substituted with the now 
cheaper EU products (i.e. an estimated 0.3 percent decline in total ROW imports from the 
base year).  Likewise, F$0.02 million of Regional imports will be displaced by EU products 
(i.e. a 0.1 percent decline in regional imports from the base year).  Of the 9 categories, 
machinery & transport equipment is the most affected in absolute terms, with an estimated 
total substitution of F$5.7 million from the ROW and Regional markets to the EU.  
Machinery & Transport equipment was the second largest import for Fiji in the base year, 
with 5.3 percent of these imports originating from the EU market.  The ROW is a dominant 
supplier of machinery & transport equipment and while it will remain a dominant import 
source for machinery & transport equipment post liberalisation, F$5.7 million of the 
existing machinery & transport equipment imports is stimulated to shift from the ROW and 
Regional market to the EU market after full liberalisation.  The four other import categories 
that are expected to have substitution effects larger than F$1 million include beverages & 
tobacco ($1.5 million), food & live animals ($1.3 million), manufactured goods ($1.3 
million) and chemicals ($1.1 million).  However, when analysed in relative terms, i.e. as a 
percentage of base year total imports for that specific category, beverages & tobacco has 
the largest substitution effect (of 4.7 percent).  Consequently, the beverages & tobacco 
imports from the EU after this substitution is estimated to increase by a significant 62.7 
percent.  On this note, we investigated the specific items in this beverages & tobacco 
category.  The relative importance of the beverages & tobacco category for the Fijian 
economy are twofold: firstly, it has its fiscal significance in terms of tariff revenue 
generation and secondly, it is an important domestically produced category.  The two broad 
groups under this category are beverages, spirits, vinegar and tobacco.  The significant 
import substitution (of F$1.48 million) emanates from beverages, spirits and vinegar while 
F$0.03 million is imports substitution of manufactured tobacco and tobacco products.  The 
main substituted items under beverages, spirits and vinegar include alcoholic beverages 
(such as beer from malt, wine) and spirits (whisky, rum and gin).   
Overall, under full liberalisation the import substitution effect is estimated to increase 
imports from the EU by 12.7 percent (see column e of Table 1-11) from the base year.  The 
73 
 
incorporation of excluded items into our analysis (i.e. a partial liberalisation scenario) 
reduces this imports substitution effect from F$11.3 million to F$6.9 million (column d and 
f of Table 1-11).  This 39.1 percent decline in the estimated substitution effect is mainly 
driven by much smaller substitution of products from three categories; namely food & live 
animals, beverages & tobacco and mineral fuel products.  Under full liberalisation, the food 
& live animal imports from the EU market was estimated to increase by 18.3 percent, 
reflecting a F$1.3 million substitution from the ROW and regional market.  This falls 
significantly to only a 0.6 percent increase in EU imports (F$0.04 million substitution) in a 
partial liberalisation setting.  This significant difference in the substitution effect under a 
full and partial liberalisation scenario is because from the food & live animal category, a 
total of 69.5 percent of items are excluded from this liberalisation process, many of which 
are produced domestically and/or imported from the region.  For beverages & tobacco, 
which was identified as the most vulnerable (in relative terms) under full liberalisation, the 
total substitution effect under partial liberalisation declines from F$1.6 million to only 
F$0.03 million, hence a large reduction in the estimated increase in imports from the EU.  
In the base year, the EU had a 7.5 percentage share in imports of this category, with an 
estimated increase of 62.7 percent under a full liberalisation scenario.  An exclusion of 91 
percent of the items from this category from the liberalisation process has reduced the 
expected increase in EU imports from 62.7 percent to only 1.3 percent.  While items from 
the mineral fuels and products category initially (under full liberalisation) did not have a 
significant substitution effect (i.e. only a 3.9 percent increase in EU imports for this 
category), exclusion of 40 percent of items from this category has reduced its substitution 
effect from F$0.04 million to only F$0.004 million.  The expected increase in imports from 
the EU for mineral fuel and related products is now only 0.5 percent under partial 
liberalisation.  For the rest of the import categories, there is not much difference in the 
import substitution effects under the full and partial liberalisation scenarios, given that only 
a small percentage of items from the respective categories are excluded from this 
liberalisation process.  Notably, machinery & transport equipment continues to dominate 
(in absolute terms) the import substitution effects under the partial liberalisation scenario as 
well.   
Next, Table 1-13 summarises the impact on imports from each trading partner group (EU, 
ROW and region) under our assumption of an EU-EPA plus an external tariff reform, under 
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a full and partial liberalisation scenario.  The external tariff reform is defined as changes to 
tariffs imposed on imports from the ROW and Regional markets (which were held fixed 
under our EU-EPA analysis) in addition to the removal of tariffs on imports from the EU.  
We completely removed the tariffs on Regional imports.  The MFN tariffs on ROW 
imports were lowered by the percentage points that would preserve the existing preferential 
margin between the ROW MFN tariffs and Regional preferential tariffs - i.e. the Region 
retains its preferential margin with respect to the ROW.   
Column (a) (full liberalisation scenario) of Table 1-13 reveals that with an EU-EPA plus 
external tariff reform, imports from the Region will increase by F$0.13 million (a 0.63 
percent increase from base year), compared to a decline of 0.09 percent (column (d) of 
Table 1-12) under an EU-EPA only.  This turnaround is mainly driven by significant 
growth in food and live animal imports which is the largest imported category from the 
Regional market.  Imports from the ROW is now estimated to fall by only F$9.3 million 
(column (a) of Table 1-13), compared to a $11.3 million decline under an EU-EPA only 
(column (c) of Table 1-12).  Along the same lines, imports from the EU are now estimated 
to increase by F$9.2 million, compared to an increase of F$11.3 million under our initial 
analysis (column (d) of Table 1-11).  When considering the partial liberalisation scenario 
(column (b) of Table 1-13) with an EU-EPA plus external tariff reform, there is a marginal 
impact on the substitution of imports from the region and ROW to the EU.  Total import 
substitution from the ROW and region is now estimated to be F$6.4 million, a marginal 
decline from the F$6.8 million substitution estimated under the partial liberalisation 
scenario of an EU-EPA only.  In sum, our findings in this part of the analysis are consistent 
with the arguments presented in Richardson (1993).  The costly trade diversion when only 
the EU tariffs are removed is lowered when we also change the tariffs on the ROW and 
regional imports, with the findings more apparent under a full liberalisation scenario 
whereby all imported items are considered.  However, since the tariffs on the ROW imports 
are reduced by a certain percentage point while the tariff on EU imports are totally removed, 
there is still trade diversion (from the ROW to the EU) but it is relatively smaller compared 
to when only the EU imports are liberalised.  Moreover, while reducing the magnitude of 
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discrimination between EU imports and imports from all other countries is favourable from 
the trade diversion perspective, it would however produce much larger budgetary effects25.   
 
                                                          
25 A removal of tariffs on EU imports and regional imports and reduction of tariffs on ROW imports implies that the tariff revenue losses 
will now be much larger.  The effects on tariff revenue losses are summarised in Table 10 in the Appendix.   
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Table 1-11: Summary of the impact of EU-EPA on aggregated sectoral imports from the EU in a full and partial liberalisation 
scenario. 
Aggregated import category (a)                                        
Base year 
total imports 
(F$) 
(b)                            
Base year 
imports 
from EU(F$) 
(c)                                            
Base year 
% share of 
EU imports 
Scenario 1: Full liberalisation 
Scenario 2: Partial 
liberalisation 
(d)                                        
Change in EU 
imports due 
to substitution 
from ROW & 
Region (F$) 
(e)
% Change 
in EU 
imports 
from base 
year 
(f) 
Change in 
EU imports 
due to 
substitution 
from ROW 
& Region 
(F$) 
(g) 
% Change 
in EU 
imports 
from base 
year 
Food & Live Animals  748,755,257  6,963,151 0.93 1,278,108  18.3 44,025 0.6 
Beverages & Tobacco  32,276,246  2,411,014 7.47 1,511,755  62.7 30,615 1.3 
Mineral Fuels and Products 1,251,952,402  
 
 
 
 
 1,251,952,402  
926,279 0.07 35,672  3.9 4,547 0.5 
Animals, Vegetable Oils & Fats  83,363,833  706,579 0.85 104,564  14.8 104,178 14.7 
Chemicals & Related Products  231,709,307  21,222,213 9.16 1,085,770  5.1 987,688 4.7 
Manufactured Goods  707,897,016  13,334,093 1.88 1,256,931  9.4 1,065,850 8.0 
Machinery & Transport   770,231,194  40,435,610 5.25 5,740,624  14.2 4,388,342 10.9 
Misc. Manufactured Articles  160,219,352  2,343,354 1.46 291,209  12.4 245,340 10.5 
Commodities nec*  47,584,151  842,684 1.77 18,663  2.2 18,032 2.1 
Total  4,033,988,758  89,184,977 2.21 11,323,295  12.7  6,888,617  7.7 
Notes: The year 2012 is used as the base year.  For a detailed list of the items under each aggregated import category in this table, refer to Table 7.0 in the Appendix.  The full liberalisation scenario captures the 
aggregated substitution (from existing ROW and regional trading partners) to the EU.  The partial liberalisation scenario reflects this substitution after the list of excluded items (20.3 percent of national tariff lines) 
has been incorporated into the analysis.  Base year imports data (column (a) and (b)) is sourced from the FIBOS HS6 Trade Report (2012).  The substitution effect (column (d) and (f)) are estimated using equation 
15 from our empirical framework.  All other percentages reported here are the authors calculations. Regional market includes Fiji’s neighbouring countries (Papua New Guinea, Cook Islands, Marshall Islands, 
Nauru, Palau, Solomon Islands, Samoa, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu), while ROW is every other trading partner of Fiji, excluding the region and the EU. * not elsewhere classified. 
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Table 1-12: EU-EPA & impact on imports from the ROW & Region in a full & partial liberalisation scenario. 
Aggregated import category (a)                                        
Base year imports in F$ 
(b)                                        
Base year % share 
of ROW & 
Regional imports  
Scenario 1: Full liberalisation 
(c)                                        
Substitution from ROW 
and Region to EU (F$) 
(d)                                        
% Change in imports 
from ROW & Region 
 ROW Region ROW Region ROW Region ROW Region 
Food & Live Animals  728,320,733  13,471,373  97.3 1.8 -1,277,404  -704  -0.18 -0.01 
Beverages & Tobacco  29,859,808   5,424  92.5 0.0 -1,511,550  -205  -5.06 -3.78 
Mineral Fuels and Products 1,250,999,572   26,551  99.9 0.0 -35,671  -1  0.00 0.00 
Animals, Vegetable Oils & Fats  82,630,038   27,216  99.1 0.0 -104,564   -    -0.13 0.00 
Chemicals & Related Products  210,111,191   375,903  90.7 0.2 -1,084,598  -1,173  -0.52 -0.31 
Manufactured Goods  691,742,471   2,820,452  97.7 0.4 -1,253,301  -3,630  -0.18 -0.13 
Machinery & Transport   726,439,454   3,356,130  94.3 0.4 -5,727,735  -12,890  -0.79 -0.38 
Misc. Manufactured Articles  157,674,527   201,471  98.4 0.1 -290,940  -269  -0.18 -0.13 
Commodities nec  46,348,046   393,421  97.4 0.8 -18,561  -102  -0.04 -0.03 
Total 3,924,125,840  
 
20,677,941  97.3 0.5 -11,304,322  -18,973  -0.29 -0.09 
 Scenario 2: Partial liberalisation 
Food & Live Animals  728,320,733  
 
13,471,373  97.3 1.8 -43,547  -478  -0.01 0.00 
Beverages & Tobacco  29,859,808   5,424  92.5 0.0 -30,615   -    -0.10 0.00 
Mineral Fuels and Products 1,250,999,572   26,551  99.9 0.0 -4,547   -    0.00 0.00 
Animals, Vegetable Oils & Fats  82,630,038   27,216  99.1 0.0 -104,178   -    -0.13 0.00 
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Chemicals & Related Products  210,111,191   375,903  90.7 0.2 -986,754  -934  -0.47 -0.25 
Manufactured Goods  691,742,471   2,820,452  97.7 0.4 -1,064,423  -1,427  -0.15 -0.05 
Machinery & Transport   726,439,454   3,356,130  94.3 0.4 -4,382,279  -6,063  -0.60 -0.18 
Misc. Manufactured Articles  157,674,527   201,471  98.4 0.1 -245,081  -259  -0.16 -0.13 
Commodities nec*  46,348,046   393,421  97.4 0.8 -17,930  -102  -0.04 -0.03 
Total 3,924,125,840  20,677,941  97.3 0.5 -6,879,354  -9,263  -0.18 -0.04  
Notes: The year 2012 is used as the base year.  For a detailed list of the items under each aggregated import category in this table, refer to Table 7 in the Appendix.  The full liberalisation scenario captures the 
explicit substitution from existing ROW and regional trading partners to the EU.  The partial liberalisation scenario reflects this substitution after the list of excluded items (20.3 percent of national tariff lines) has 
been incorporated into the analysis.  Base year imports data (column (a)) is sourced from the FIBOS HS6 Trade Report (2012).  The substitution effect (column (c)) is estimated using equation 16 from our empirical 
framework.  All other percentages reported here are the authors calculations. Regional market includes Fiji’s neighbouring countries (Papua New Guinea, Cook Islands, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, Solomon 
Islands, Samoa, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu), while ROW is every other trading partner of Fiji, excluding the region and the EU.  * not elsewhere classified. 
 
 
 
Table 1-13: Impact on imports with an EU-EPA plus external tariff reform in a full and partial liberalisation scenario26. 
Aggregated import category 
Scenario 1: Full liberalisation Scenario 2: Partial Liberalisation 
(a) EU-EPA & External Tariff Reform Effect:  
Changes in imports by market group (F$) 
 (b) EU-EPA & External Tariff Reform Effect:  
Changes in imports by market group (F$) 
 Region ROW EU Region ROW EU 
Food & Live Animals 178,904 -1,042,248 863,345 -478 -42,277 42,755  
Beverages & Tobacco -100 -601,494 601,594 0 -7,630 7,630  
Mineral Fuels and Products -4 -33,251 33,254 0 -2,241 2,241  
                                                          
26 Table 1-12 and 1-13 can be compared to view the impacts of EU EPA only (Table 1-12) and EU EPA plus external tariff reform (Table 1-13). 
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Animals, Vegetable Oils & Fats 0 -104,564 104,564 0 -104,178 104,178  
Chemicals & Related Products 6,409 -1,032,445 1,026,036 2,169 -949,685 947,516  
Manufactured Goods -17,701 -1,075,172 1,092,873 4,158 -975,242 971,084  
Machinery & Transport -34,446 -5,195,775 5,230,221 -15,616 -4,102,227 4,117,842  
Misc. Manufactured Articles -1,838 -234,514 236,352 -536 -210,396 210,932  
Commodities nec -93 -14,664 14,757 261 -14,505 14,245  
Total 131,131 -9,334,128 9,202,997 -10,041 -6,408,380 6,418,421  
Notes: The year 2012 is used as the base year.  For a detailed list of the items under each aggregated import category in this table, refer to Table 6 in the Appendix.  The full liberalisation scenario captures the 
explicit substitution from existing ROW and regional trading partners to the EU.  The partial liberalisation scenario reflects this substitution after the list of excluded items (20.3 percent of national tariff lines) has 
been incorporated into the analysis.  The substitution effects reported in columns a and b are estimated using equation 27 to 29 from our empirical framework (see Table 1-10).  Regional market includes Fiji’s 
neighbouring countries (Papua New Guinea, Cook Islands, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, Solomon Islands, Samoa, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu), while ROW is every other trading partner of Fiji, excluding the region 
and the EU.  * not elsewhere classified. 
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In sum, the import substitution results (Tables 1-11 and 1-12) indicate that the proposed 
EU-Fiji EPA will not significantly change Fiji’s existing trade relationship with the ROW 
and with countries from the Pacific region.  While the substitution of imports from the 
ROW and region will produce a 12.7 percent increase in EU imports from base year under 
full liberalisation or a 7.7 percent increase under partial liberalisation, the overall 
percentage declines in imports from the ROW and region (due to import substitution with 
EU products) are marginal.  For the ROW, full liberalisation produces a F$11.3 million 
substitution of total imports with EU products (which is only a 0.3 percent decline in total 
ROW imports compared to the base year), while for the Region, F$0.02 million of total 
imports are displaced with EU products (a 0.1 percent decline in Regional imports from the 
base year), under the same liberalisation scenario.  These substitution effects narrow 
substantially by 39.1 percent for the ROW (from F$11.3 million to F$6.9 million) and by 
51.2 percent for the Region (from F$0.02 million to F$0.01 million) when the list of 
excluded products are incorporated.  Compared to the base year, partial liberalisation 
substitution effects result in only a 0.18 percent and 0.04 percent declines in total imports 
from the ROW and Region, respectively.   
The ramifications of these findings are twofold.  Firstly, the negligible displacement of the 
ROW and Regional imports with EU products indicate that (depending on the tariff rates) 
the potential tariff revenue losses may be small as well.  Imports from these two markets 
(ROW and region) earn tariff revenue for the government at the MFN tariff rates (for ROW 
imports) and preferential tariff rates (for Regional imports).  When these are replaced with 
EU products, the government will likely lose tariff revenue, a major concern of the EU-
EPA consequences for many ACP member countries (Milner et al., 2005 and others).  
These estimated tariff revenue losses are presented in Table 1-14 and discussed next.  
Secondly, from a regional context, the negligible estimated displacement of regional 
imports indicates no significant effects on Fiji’s trade relationship with its neighbouring 
Pacific Island countries.  The negative consequences of the EU-EPA on the regional 
integration efforts of the ACP group have been emphasised in the relevant literature (see for 
example Fontagne et al., 2010; Zgovu & Kweka, 2007; and others).  Additionally, the 
exclusion of a large percentage of items from the food & animal category also augur well 
for Fiji’s regional economic relations, given that food & live animals is a major imported 
item (with F$13.5 million imports or a 65.1 percent share in total Regional imports in the 
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base year - see Table 1-12) from the Region.  Hence, our findings on the displacement of 
imports from the region contrasts with conclusions drawn for some other ACP countries, 
where the EU-EPA is envisaged to have detrimental consequences for regional trade.  For 
example, Zgovu and Kweka (2007) revealed that the EU-EPA will shift significant amount 
of imports from the SADC as consumers from Tanzania and Malawi swap these regional 
products with the relatively cheaper EU products.  The authors contend that such large 
regional substitution effects can hinder any regional integration efforts.  However, our 
findings do not indicate any significant displacement of regional imports by Fiji.     
Finally, when viewed by the specific imports category, the substitution impact (in absolute 
terms) on machinery & transport equipment remains high under both the full and partial 
liberalisation scenarios (F$5.7 million and F$4.4 million, respectively), while relative to 
base year imports, the significant threats to the beverages & tobacco category under full 
liberalisation (4.7 percent of base year beverages & tobacco imports) is largely reduced 
under partial liberalisation to only 0.09 percent of base year beverages & tobacco imports.  
For machinery & transport equipment, only 3.3 percent of items in this category were 
excluded from liberalisation.  While this may contribute to significant tariff revenue losses 
from this category, the liberalisation of imports of capital goods (such as machinery) has 
also been acknowledged in the related literature as growth enhancing (see for example 
Mazumdar, 2001; Lee, 1995; and others).  Fiji does not produce any machinery & transport 
equipment and liberalisation of this category will enable imports at comparatively lower 
prices.  At the disaggregated level, it was found that the sub-group “vehicles other than 
railways and tramways” had the largest substitution effect of F$2.1 million, followed by 
machinery, mechanical appliances and electrical goods (with estimated F$1.5 million 
substitution).  Many of the specific items under these broad categories are relevant for 
agriculture, manufacturing and/or other development and construction projects.  More 
specifically, some of the major items from these sub-groups included tractors, motor 
vehicles for transport of people, vehicles for goods transportation, engines & parts, 
industrial electrical equipment, packaging, sealing, labelling machinery, weighing 
machinery, bulldozers, graders, road rollers, and machinery parts.  As for the beverages & 
tobacco category, which was highlighted as the most vulnerable in relative terms under full 
liberalisation, a significant 91 percent of excluded products from this group has reduced the 
estimated substitution effect under partial liberalisation.   
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These findings on the Fijian economy are in contrast to the findings on some other ACP 
countries, where the import substitution from their non-EU ROW and regional markets to 
the EU market was estimated to be much larger.  For instance, Milner et al (2005) estimated 
a 16% increase in Tanzania’s imports and 23% increase in Uganda’s imports from the EU 
after the EU-EPA, largely driven by the manufacturing sector.  Sizeable impacts for the 
CARICOM was also estimated by Greenway & Milner (2006).  Their estimated increase in 
EU imports for the CARICOM countries ranged between 12% (Trinidad) and 16% 
(Jamaica).  On average, regional import substituon for the CARICOM was estimated at 
24%, while substitution of imports from the non-EU ROW market to the EU was estimated 
between 40% and 57%.  Furthermore, Zgovu & Kweka (2009) also estimated 
comparatively larger import substitution effects for Tanzania and Malawi.  At the sectoral 
level, for Malawi they estimated a 30% substitution from non-EU market to the EU in the 
Fisheries sector, 15% in Mining and Quarying, and 10% in the Manufacturng sector.  For 
Tanzania, they estimated a 52% substitution in the Fisheries sector, 10% in the Mining and 
Quarying and 13% in the Manufacturing.  The differences in the magnitude of the impact of 
the EU-EPA on imports of the Fijian economy and of these selected other ACP countries 
are mainly due to their different trade patterns and substitution elasticities.  Selected ACP 
countries have a higher proportion of imports from the EU.  Regional imports are also 
significant for some of the ACP countries, resulting in comparatively larger regional import 
substitution.   
 
1.5.2: Tariff revenue implications of the EU-Fiji EPA 
 
Next, the import substitution results presented in Tables 1-11 and 1-12 were used to 
estimate the tariff revenue implications of the EU-Fiji EPA liberalisation process.  The 
results are presented in Table 1-14.  The imports from the ROW and the EU are subject to 
the MFN tariffs while the imports from the Region have a comparatively lower preferential 
tariff.  With the EU-Fiji EPA, removal of tariffs will produce tariff losses from three 
sources.  First, the existing EU imports earn tariff revenue at the MFN tariff rate.  The EU-
Fiji EPA will remove tariffs on EU products, therefore this will produce tariff losses from 
the existing EU imports.  This impact, in total and by aggregated product level is shown in 
column a of Table 1-14.  Under full liberalisation, a total tariff revenue loss of F$8.1 
million is estimated from the existing EU imports.  This loss is largely driven by machinery 
83 
 
& transport equipment (F$2.8 million), food & live animals (F$1.8 million), manufactured 
goods (F$1.3 million) and chemicals (F$1.1 million).  With partial liberalisation, this tariff 
revenue loss halves to only F$4.7 million.  Exclusion of products, mainly from the food & 
live animals, beverages & tobacco and mineral fuel products categories contributed to this 
decline in the estimated tariff revenue loss arising from the existing EU imports.  The tariff 
loss due to machinery & transport equipment, however, remains significant under the 
partial liberalisation scenario, given that only 3.3 percent of items under this category are 
excluded. 
 
 
Table 1-14: Tariff revenue impact of the EU-Fiji EPA by aggregated import category. 
Aggregated import 
category 
Scenario 1: Full liberalisation 
(a)                                        
Loss from 
existing EU 
imports (F$) 
(b)                            
Loss due to 
ROW 
substitution 
(F$)  
(c)                           
Loss due to 
Regional 
Substitution 
(F$) 
(d)                         
Total (F$) 
Food & Live Animals -1,847,704 -332,267 -9.6 -2,179,980 
Beverages & Tobacco -724,956 -273,948 -9.8 -998,913 
Mineral Fuels and 
Products 
-46,314 -4,840 0.0 -51,154 
Animal , Vegetable Oils 
& Fats 
-101,354 -17,460 0.0 -118,814 
Chemicals & Related 
Products 
-1,100,509 -97,565 -76.2 -1,198,150 
Manufactured Goods -1,283,512 -144,624 -270.7 -1,428,406 
Machinery & Transport  -2,765,882 -662,450 -247.6 -3,428,580 
Misc. Manufactured 
Articles 
-206,563 -56,142 -2.5 -262,707 
Commodities nec -13,576 -3,456 -0.5 -17,032 
Total -8,090,369 -1,592,751 -617.0 -9,683,737 
 Scenario 2: Partial liberalisation 
Food & Live Animals -41,770 -8,458 0.0 -50,228 
Beverages & Tobacco -7,729 -2,958 0.0 -10,687 
Mineral Fuels and 
Products 
-4,785 -841 0.0 -5,626 
Animal , Vegetable Oils 
& Fats 
-101,354 -18,114 0.0 -119,468 
Chemicals & Related 
Products 
-958,174 -81,661 -62.0 -1,039,898 
Manufactured Goods -1,101,123 -107,186 -107.7 -1,208,417 
Machinery & Transport  -2,253,083 -383,246 -16.0 -2,636,345 
Misc. Manufactured -186,958 -41,907 -2.2 -228,868 
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Articles 
Commodities nec -13,025 -3,321 -0.5 -16,346 
Total -4,668,002 -647,692 -188.5 -5,315,883 
Notes: The tariff loss from existing EU imports (column a) is calculated as the product of the existing EU imports and the corresponding 
MFN tariff rate at each HS6 tariff line, and then aggregated at product and category level.  The tariff loss from the ROW (column b) is 
the product of the ROW imports substitution (column c of Table 1-12) and the respective MFN tariff rate at each HS6 tariff line, and then 
aggregated at product and category level.  The tariff loss from region (column c) is calculated as the product of regional imports 
substitution (column c of Table 1-12) and the corresponding preferential tariff rate at each HS6 tariff line and aggregated by product and 
category.  The MFN tariff rates were obtained from the 2012 HS Tariff Schedule for Fiji available from FIRCA, while the preferential 
tariff rates were extracted from the ITC website. *nec is not elsewhere classified. 
 
 
The second source of tariff revenue loss emanates from the substitution of imports from the 
ROW to the EU market, after liberalisation.  These imports, which initially earned tariff 
revenue at the MFN tariff rates, will no longer produce revenue when substituted with 
liberalised EU products.  As shown in column b of Table 1-14, the estimated loss from this 
corridor (under full liberalisation) is F$1.6 million.  Notably, while significant import 
substitution of machinery & transport equipment was estimated from the ROW (see Table 
1-12), the contribution of this to tariff revenue losses is not significant.  However, it is the 
existing machinery & transport equipment imports from the EU which contributes largely 
to the estimated tariff revenue losses.  Furthermore, when the exempted products are 
considered, the tariff revenue loss due to ROW imports substitution falls to only F$0.6 
million.  Finally, the third source of tariff revenue losses is due to substitution from the 
Regional market to the EU, which otherwise earned tariff revenue at the preferential tariff 
rates.  However, given that both, imports and tariff rates in this market are very low, the 
consequent impact on tariff revenue loss under both full and partial liberalisation is 
negligible.   
 
Overall, the estimated tariff revenue loss (with full liberalisation) is estimated at F$9.7 
million (equivalent to 0.2 percent of GDP in the base year), with the bulk of this loss 
emanating from the existing EU imports.  Under partial liberalisation, this loss declines to 
F$5.3 million.  Using the base year as the comparison point 27 , full liberalisation is 
estimated to lower tariff revenue by 2.5 percent while partial liberalisation will produce a 
1.4 percent decline in tariff revenue.  Hence, exclusion of 20.3 percent of the tariff lines in 
a partial liberalisation scenario has narrowed the estimated tariff revenue loss by 82.2 
percent28, from full liberalisation.  Tariffs are an important source of government revenue 
                                                          
27 In the base year (2012) total tariff revenue was F$384 million, equivalent to 19 percent of total tax revenue (FIBOS, 2016).   
28 Calculated as tariff loss (full) less the tariff loss (partial) divided by tariff loss (partial) and multiplied by 100. 
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for Fiji.  From the period 2000 to 2015, the average share of tariff revenue in total tax 
income for Fiji was 23.6 percent (RBF, 2017).  Figure 1.0 in the Appendix shows the 
different sources of government tax revenue.  Hence, almost a fifth of government taxation 
revenue is generated from tariffs.  Relative to the economy size, in 2015 tariff revenue was 
equivalent to 7.3 percent of GDP and remained at around this same level in 2016.  With the 
EU-EPA, findings presented in Table 1-14 indicate that concerns of substantial tariff 
revenue losses from the EU-EPA are not significant for Fiji.  Tariff revenue is estimated to 
shrink (from the base year) by 2.5 percent (under full liberalisation) or 1.4 percent (with 
partial liberalisation).  These findings are in contrast with the conclusions drawn for some 
other ACP member countries such as Tanzania, Uganda (see Milner et al., 2005; Zgovu & 
Kweka, 2007) and Malawi (in Zgovu & Kweka, 2007), where results indicated that tariff 
revenues will almost halve following the EU-EPA.  Their result was driven by both, a 
relatively high share of imports from the EU for these countries, particulary manufactured 
goods and high tariffs on these goods.  Moreover, Fontagne et al. (2010) also identified the 
Pacific group amongst the top three most protected ACP sub-groups in terms of tariffs 
imposed on imports from the EU.  Nevertheless, though the tariff revenue losses for Fiji are 
negligible, it will have implications on government’s expenditure decisions and may induce 
cuts in essential sectors such as education and housing if the government is unable to 
substitute this income loss with other sources.   
 
 
1.5.3: Impact on domestic production, consumption, prices and exports 29 
 
Fiji produces a narrow range of agricultural and manufactured products.  We investigated 
the consequences of the EU-Fiji EPA on the domestic demand for the locally produced 
goods, supply into local and export market, and prices.  This list of selected non-sugar 
agricultural and manufactured products30 was extracted from Fiji’s Agriculture, Fisheries 
and Forestry Report (2011) and Manufacturing Report (2011) sourced from the FIBOS.   
 
 
                                                          
29The estimated consequences on exports reflect the overall change only and does not refer to changes in exports to any specific market.  
The results should be interpreted as the growth in exports supply for each commodity.  While noting that the EU will also open its market 
for Fiji products, the implications on exports presented in Table 1-15 and 1-16 does not represent the changes in Fiji-EU exports.  This 
study only considers the impacts of the EU-Fiji EPA from the Fijian tariff removal perspective. 
30 We only considered the non-sugar agricultural and manufacturing production of items provided in our respective data source.  Sugar is 
not included in this analysis on domestic production.  It is a non-import competing exported product, sold to the EU under specific trade 
arrangements (discussed in sections 1.2.4 and 1.2.5.4).  Given the special and significant role of sugar in the overall EU-EPA, this sector 
warrants comprehensive research on its own.  Some of the investigations of the EU-EPA implications on the sugar industry include 
Rakotoarisoa and Chang (2017), OECD and WTO (2011), Mahadevan and Asafu-Adjaye (2010), Richardson (2012), Serrano (2007).   
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Impact on Agricultural Goods 
 
Similar to the substitution of imports sourced from the ROW and region with EU products, 
liberalising EU imports will also prompt consumers to shift from domestically produced 
goods to cheaper EU imports.  Table 1-15 summarises the implications on agricultural 
goods.   
 
 
Table 1-15: Agricultural goods - Impact of the EU-EPA on domestic consumption, 
exports, price and supply. 
Product (a)  
% of Domestic 
consumption 
substituted 
with EU 
(b) 
% Δ 
Exports 
(c) 
% Δ 
Domestic 
Price 
(d) 
% Δ 
Domestic 
Supply 
Maize 0.04 0.01 -0.05 -0.05 
Rice 1.37 0.23 -1.45 -1.39 
Root crops 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 
Tomatoes 2.11 0.52 -2.63 -2.58 
Egg Plant 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Capsicum 1.74 0.01 -1.47 -0.03 
Bananas 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Pineapples 1.00 0.24 -1.24 -1.23 
Papayas & watermelon 0.27 0.06 -0.32 -0.26 
Citrus fruits 1.65 0.22 -1.58 -1.12 
Mangoes 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Milk 1.90 0.88 -4.59 -4.47 
Eggs 0.55 0.49 -2.65 -2.28 
Honey 0.13 0.00 -0.20 -0.20 
Poultry 0.03 0.00 -0.06 -0.06 
Notes: The results in this table were calculated using equation 10 (for column a), equation 21 (column b), equation 26 (column c) and 
equation 25 (column d) from our empirical framework.  The estimates are presented here in percentage forms with all the respective 
percentage changes calculated with referral to the base year.  The required data for these equations were obtained from various sources 
(see section 1.4.2 for specific data source). 
 
 
Overall, our results in Table 1-15 indicate that the implications of the EU-EPA on 
agricultural production will be small, largely because most of the agricultural products can 
be defined as “native’ to the Fijian economy and are either not in direct competition with 
the imported varieties or not imported at all.  For example, root crops, eggplants, bananas 
and mangoes have no substitution effect.  Moreover, only marginal displacement (of less 
than 2 percent) is estimated for more common products (such as rice, tomatoes, capsicum, 
fruits and dairy produce).  Column c of Table 1-15 shows the estimated declines in prices 
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of these agricultural products.  Except for milk, tomatoes and eggs, the percentage declines 
in prices of all other commodities are below 2 percent.  A lower price and reduced domestic 
demand is anticipated to dampen incentives for domestic producers and thus reduce supply 
into the local market.  This decline in supply are estimated to vary between 4 percent and 0 
percent (see column d).  With the exports market as an alternative, our estimates (column b) 
show very negligible increase in exports.  In sum, the implications on domestically 
produced agricultural products (as shown in Table 1-15) are not significant.  The EU-EPA 
does not produce a large displacement of domestically produced agricultural products 
mainly because many of the agricultural products produced in Fiji are not in direct 
competition with EU products.  However, for items like rice, tomatoes, capsicum, citrus 
fruits, eggs and milk, although the estimated effects in terms of domestic demand and 
prices are marginal, these products can be viewed as vulnerable agricultural products.  This 
is because the production structure of these items in Fiji are either small to medium scaled 
enterprises or family operated farms.  As argued in Godfrey (1999), smallness 
disadvantages an economy in terms of exploiting scale economies, and alongside that, 
remoteness of island economies further dampens commercialisation prospects.  On this note, 
even minor declines in prices or domestic demand can affect the viability of these products 
and/or necessitate effective strategies for success. 
 
 
Impact on manufactured goods. 
 
Table 1-16 summarises the EU-EPA implications on Fiji’s manufactured products which 
are broadly categorised into manufactured food products, beverages & tobacco and 
manufactured products classified chiefly by material.  Firstly, for manufactured food 
products, the displacement of domestically produced goods with imported EU products 
falls between approximately 8 percent and 1 percent.  Food products that can be highlighted 
as susceptible (see column b of Table 1-16) include macaroni, noodles and similar items 
(8.4 percent), cocoa, chocolates & confectionary (6.9 percent), rice (4.6 percent), dairy 
products (3.0 percent), processed fruits & vegetables (2.8 percent), breads, cakes & biscuits 
(2.5 percent).  In terms of changes in domestic price, macaroni & noodles, cocoa, 
chocolates & confectionary, processed fish, dairy products and rice are estimated to have 
percentage declines in prices of more than 5.0 percent.  While these price declines will 
benefit consumers, it will reduce production incentives, with the estimated effects on 
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domestic supply presented in column d of Table 1-16.  Hence, supply of manufactured food 
products such as macaroni, noodles, cocoa, chocolates & confectionery, dairy products, rice 
and processed fish (all of which are estimated to decrease by more than 5.0 percent) can be 
categorised as the most vulnerable manufactured food products from the perspective of 
domestic supply implications of the EU-EPA.   
 
 
Table 1-16: Manufactured goods: Impact of the EU-EPA on domestic consumption, 
exports, price and supply. 
 
 
 
 
(a) 
Domestic 
production 
(F$) 
 
 
(b) 
% of Domestic 
consumption 
substituted 
with EU 
products 
(c) 
% Δ 
Domestic 
Price 
 
 
(d) 
% Δ 
Domestic 
Supply 
 
(e) 
% Δ 
Exports 
 
 
 
Manufactured Food Products 
Meat production 128,069,416 0.93 -3.90 -3.93 0.78 
Processed fish 91,152,468 2.32 -5.60 -5.63 1.09 
Processed fruits & 
vegetables 
28,562,843 2.80 -2.70 -2.80 0.47 
Veg & animal oils and fats 40,256,284 2.17 -2.91 -2.91 - 
Dairy Products 83,755,046 3.02 -5.58 -5.59 1.10 
Rice milling 31,514,287 4.64 -5.46 -5.46 - 
Flour & other grain 
milling 
88,809,127 1.74 -1.73 -1.74 0.34 
Bread, cakes, biscuits 49,613,365 2.53 -2.53 -2.54 - 
Cocoa, chocolates, and 
other confectionary 
45,285,104 6.94 -6.25 -6.94 0.56 
Macaroni, noodles & 
similar items 
4,785,214 8.44 -8.44 -8.45 - 
Beverages & Tobacco 
Alcohol & tobacco 148,851,458 14.03 -10.21 -10.21 - 
Soft drink 63,521,472 1.23 -0.68 -0.88 0.15 
Mineral water 113,528,462 1.46 -0.92 -1.09 0.01 
Manufactured Products classified by material 
Wearing apparel 158,826,015 2.99 -7.94 -8.42 1.11 
Footwear and leather 
products 
27,219,807 1.81 -5.23 -5.29 0.99 
Wood & wood products 118,983,030 0.99 -2.35 -2.46 0.35 
Paper & paper products 72,515,957 4.73 -5.50 -5.79 0.81 
Chemical and allied 
products 
27,321,067 2.91 -3.33 -3.35 0.64 
Paints,varnishes,printing 
ink 
29,235,241 4.92 -7.28 -7.28 - 
Soaps, detergents, cleaning 52,025,324 4.52 -7.06 -7.08 1.39 
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preparations 
Rubber products 9,263,514 7.11 -7.96 -7.96 - 
Plastic products 28,278,715 7.00 -7.82 -7.84 1.54 
Glass & glass products 695,628 8.16 -8.34 -8.34 - 
Cement, lime, plaster 30,323,843 4.28 -5.79 -5.79 - 
Articles of concrete, 
cement, plaster 
42,516,814 1.66 -2.74 -2.74 - 
Furniture 85,677,372 1.22 -3.03 -3.09 0.54 
Notes: The results in this table were calculated using equation 10 (for column b), equation 26 (column c), equation 25 (column d) and 
equation 21 (column e) from our empirical framework.  The estimates are presented here in percentage forms with all the respective 
percentage changes calculated with referral to the base year.  The required data for these equations were obtained from various sources 
(see section 1.4.2 for specific data source). 
 
 
For beverages and tobacco products, the most affected category is alcohol and tobacco (the 
bulk of which is largely sold in the domestic market), while the effects on soft drink and 
mineral water are minimal.  Approximately 14 percent of domestic alcohol & tobacco 
demand is estimated to be substituted with cheaper EU products.  In our analysis on imports 
(see Table 1-11), beverages and tobacco was also highlighted as the most vulnerable 
category (in relative terms) under full liberalisation.  Hence, if this sector is fully liberalised, 
our results indicate that it will have significant consequences on both, displacement of 
imports from the ROW and region, and on displacement of domestic production.   
 
In terms of manufactured products classified chiefly by material, results reveal possible 
threats to glass, rubber, plastic, paper products, paints, varnishes, printing ink, soap and 
cleaning preparations.  The manufacturing sector expanded into production of these items 
largely supported by the Governments’ various investment incentives, which eventuated as 
part of its efforts to diversify the production base (Chandra, 2002).  While the percentage 
substitution of these locally produced goods with EU imports are not significant 
(approximately between 5 and 8 percent), influx of cheaper EU products can heighten 
competition in these relatively young industries, which mainly produce for the local market.  
Moreover, results also reveal possible threats to garment production.  The domestic supply 
of wearing apparel is estimated to decline by 8.4 percent (see column d of Table 16).  
Garments were once an important industry in Fiji.  Secured preferential market access and 
tax-free zones drove production in this sector in the 1990s, however the cessation of these 
incentives prompted several large garment producers to relocate in more efficient countries 
(Narayan & Prasad, 2003).  Consequently, after rising to around 27 percent of total exports 
in the late 1990s, the significance of the garment sector has now decreased to only 5.0 
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percent of exports in 2016 (RBF, 2017).  On a positive note, the dampening domestic 
market indicators can prompt expansion into exports market instead, (estimated percentage 
increases of which are presented in column e of Table 1-16).  However, the ease with which 
this opportunity can be exploited is subject to its own set of impediments.  Restrictive bio-
security measures by trading partners, quality concerns, competition from other low-cost 
producers will affect entry and/or expansion in export markets (McGregor, 2007).   
From the results presented in Tables 1-15 and 1-16, the potential effects of the EU-EPA on 
key agricultural and manufactured products can be consolidated as follows.  For 
agricultural products, while the EU-EPA will not affect the demand for domestically 
produced native goods, it will have marginal impacts on products such as rice, tomatoes, 
capsicum, citrus fruits and milk.  Production of most of agricultural products in Fiji can be 
characterised as either small to medium scaled producers or family operated farms.  On this 
note, even minor price decreases or market share losses can affect viability of these 
producers.  As such, based on results in Table 1-15, rice, tomatoes, capsicum, citrus fruits 
and milk are highlighted as vulnerable agricultural products.  For manufactured goods, 
Table 1-16 highlights potential threats of the EU-EPA to selected segments of the 
manufacturing activity.  In particular, infant industries such as glass, rubber, plastic and 
paper product manufacturers are estimated to face increased competition from EU imports.   
The analysis on the domestic production, consumption, export supply and prices presented 
in Tables 1-15 and 1-16 assumed a full liberalisation scenario.  When considering partial 
liberalisation, there will be no consequences on agricultural production since all of the 
items in Table 1-15 are excluded from this liberalisation process.  However, for the 
manufactured goods, the availability of the production data (presented in Table 1-16) only 
in aggregated form precludes the incorporation of the specific excluded items.   
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1.6: Concluding remarks 
 
 
Chapter 1 of this thesis provides an assessment of the static impact of the EU-Fiji EPA on a 
set of indicators for the Fijian economy.  In particular, the investigation focused on how 
imports from all other markets would respond when the tariff on EU imports are removed 
due to the EU-EPA.  These results were then used to estimate the potential tariff revenue 
losses.  Additionally, the analysis looked at the consequences for selected domestically 
produced agricultural and manufactured goods.  We considered a full liberalisation scenario 
where all imported items were included in the investigation and then a partial liberalisation 
scenario with only 80 percent of imports incorporated into the analysis.  According to the 
interim EU-EPA report, 20 percent of imported items can be excluded from this 
liberalisation process.  Our partial equilibrium method of analysis and the use of detailed 
HS6 level of disaggregated imports data has allowed our analysis to reflect the exclusion of 
these sensitive sectors. 
While maintaining that our partial equilibrium analysis is not a comprehensive assessment 
of the consequences of the EU-Fiji EPA, some interesting findings do emerge from our 
results.  Firstly, we found that the imports substitution and tariff revenue impacts differ 
considerably under our two scenarios.  The exclusion of 20 percent of tariff lines from this 
liberalisation process has limited the potential losses.  The total imports substitution from 
the ROW and Regional market to the EU decreases from F$11.3 million under a full 
liberalisation setting to F$6.9 million under partial liberalisation.  Consequently, the tariff 
revenue loss shrinks from an estimated F$9.7 million under full liberalisation to F$5.3 
million under partial liberalisation.  These findings indicate that the provision of an 
exclusion list has enabled Fiji to exclude vulnerable commodities and this has cushioned 
the consequences.   
Secondly, in contrast to the arguments of significant potential tariff revenue losses due to 
the EU-EPA in the existing literature, our findings show that the tariff revenue 
consequences for Fiji are much smaller compared to the considerable losses concluded for a 
few other ACP countries.  Overall, the estimated tariff revenue loss (under full 
liberalisation) is equivalent to 0.2 percent of base year GDP.  From the base year, full 
liberalisation is estimated to lower tariff revenue by 2.5 percent which shrinks to only a 1.4 
percent decline under partial liberalisation.  The relatively smaller tariff revenue loss is not 
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surprising given that the EU is not a major source of imports for Fiji.  Hence, while 
concerns of considerable tariff revenue losses due to the EU-EPA is not applicable to Fiji, 
data indicates that a fifth of the Fijian Government’s revenue is from import duties.  As 
highlighted in Brenton et al (2007), a key challenge for low income countries is to maintain 
tax revenues as tariffs are reduced.  On this note, with the EU-EPA and with any future 
import liberalisation initiatives (especially with major trading partners), Fiji will have to 
focus on improvement in efficiency of tax collection, alternative tax income or cutback 
government expenditure.   
Furthermore, another concern of the EU-EPA in the existing literature is the threats to 
regional integration efforts due to potential regional trade diversion.  However, given that 
the Region is not a significant source of Fiji’s imports, we found that the EU-EPA does not 
produce any significant displacement of Fiji’s imports from the Region.  Trade diversion 
from the Regional market is estimated at F$0.02 million (full liberalisation) which declines 
to F$0.01 million under partial liberalisation.  Finally, in terms of domestic production, 
results indicated that the impacts on agricultural production are negligible.  However, the 
estimated negative effects on selected infant manufactured products may threaten the 
viability of these sectors.  In sum, the fiscal losses and potential costs on domestic 
production analysed in this study partly define the financial needs for the Fijian government 
as it adjusts to the consequences of the EU-EPA.   
Given that we have adopted the partial equilibrium approach for our analysis, it is 
important to highlight the drawbacks of this method, particularly in terms of interpreting 
our results.  Since a partial equilibrium method ignores the wider economy effects, we do 
not construe our results as the full consequences of the EU-EPA.  Clearly, the EU-EPA will 
have wider positive and negative economic effects.  On the one hand, the liberalisation of 
imports will heighten competition for some domestic producers, resulting in closure of 
production plants and thus unemployment.  On the other hand, lower demand from the 
domestic market implies export expansion opportunities.  Arguably, the availability of 
cheaper inputs due to import liberalisation will also lower costs of production and thus 
improve production.  Moreover, there are also a number of dynamic effects of the EPA’s.  
These include potential for higher domestic and foreign investment, economies of scale, the 
spill-over effects of enhanced credibility of trade policy reforms, exposure to global 
production networks, access to cheaper EU products and the EU market for exports.    
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Moreover, reforms to EU sugar prices will also have comprehensive macroeconomic 
effects on Fiji.  Yet another area that would need to be considered is the implications of the 
EU’s development assistance provided to the ACP member countries to assist them to 
adjust to the EPA.  Hence, results from this study should not be considered as overall 
welfare implications of the EU-Fiji EPA but should instead be viewed as a detailed sectoral 
level partial equilibrium analysis on selected economic indicators for the Fijian economy.  
As future work, given the availability of data, empricial investigation on the economy wide 
effects with the use of CGE techniques, both static and dynamic, would complement these 
sectoral findings.  Moreover, the application of GTAP’s model to investigate the same 
impacts as in chapter 1 would provide interesting comparisions.  Additionally, while there 
is some research on the implications of EU’s sugar price cut on Fiji’s exports, investigation 
of this change on related markets such as land and labor would provide a more 
comprehensive analysis.  Moreover, a recent development in the EU is the United 
Kingdom’s decision to exit from the EU, which is scheduled to formalise in early 2019.  As 
shown in Table 1-9, the UK is a major export destination (mainly for sugar) for Fiji.  The 
impact on Fiji will thus largely depend on whether the UK will continue with the 
preferential agreements (on a bilateral basis) that existed between Fiji and the EU.  The 
implications of this transition on Fiji and thus its exisiting relationship with the EU can be 
addressed in future research.  
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Chapter 2  
The effect of Preferential Trade Agreements on Foreign 
Direct Investment: empirical evidence from the African 
Caribbean Pacific group 
 
 
 
2.1: Introduction 
 
 
The second chapter of this dissertation focuses on two notable developments in 
international economics – Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 31  and Preferential Trade 
Agreements (PTAs)32.  The objective of this study is to extend the debate on PTAs beyond 
trade effects with particular focus on the ACP group.  The motivation to explore effects 
beyond trade arises from two distinctive developments of this trade policy.  The first 
development is the dramatic increase in the number and geographical spread of PTAs 
despite the dramatic fall in the average Most Favored Nation (MFN) tariff rates.  When a 
PTA is formed member countries attain a competitive edge over non-PTA members and the 
preferential margin is determined by the difference between the MFN tariff rate (imposed 
on non-PTA trade partners) and the preferential tariff rate (imposed on PTA members).  
However, a decline in the MFN tariff rate reduces this preferential margin because non-
PTA members are also faced with much lower tariffs and in line with this the growth of 
PTAs should slow.  Instead, the latest data from the WTO indicates that PTAs are gaining 
unprecedented popularity as a trade policy option across the globe.  The number and 
geographical spread of PTAs has increased dramatically over the years.  According to the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO), the total number of PTAs reached over 300 towards the 
end of 2013 with a noticeable acceleration from 1990 onwards.  Alongside this, the average 
                                                          
31 The World Bank defines FDI as investment made to acquire lasting interest in enterprises operating outside of the economy of the 
investor.  The purpose of this investment is to gain an effective voice in the management of the enterprise.  The IMF suggests a threshold 
of 10 percent of equity ownership to qualify as a foreign direct investor.  The components of FDI are equity capital, re-invested earnings 
and intracompany loans (between parent and affiliates). 
32 A PTA is defined as a trade pact that provides preferential treatment (such as lower tariff) on bilateral trade among member countries, 
while autonomy in trade policy on non-members is maintained. 
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number of PTAs that each country participates in has increased from just 2 in 1990 to 12 in 
2010.  The African Caribbean Pacific33 (ACP) group has not lagged behind in this race for 
global integration.  Cumulative to 2010, the group totalled 85 PTAs (WTO, 2011).  
Secondly, PTAs have also extended their coverage beyond trade to include deep integration 
provisions.  These include for example specific provisions covering foreign investment, 
labor, services, competition policy, intellectual property rights, dispute settlements and 
standards.  Consequently, this wider coverage of PTAs indicates potential impacts beyond 
trade, one of which includes the effects on FDI.   
 
Since PTAs were conventionally designed to address trade flows there exists an extensive 
empirical literature on the effects of PTAs on trade (see for example Kohl & Trojanowska, 
2015; Foster, Poeschl, & Stehrer, 2011; Hur, Joseph, & Park, 2010; Chen & Joshi, 2010; 
Baier & Bergstrand, 2009; Carrere, 2006; amongst others).  However, the non-trade or 
“deep integration” provisions have not received much investigation.  This changing 
landscape of PTAs indicates that the predominant drivers of these agreements extend well 
beyond trade objectives alone and thus motivate this study to explore the effects on FDI.   
Together with the lack of investigation on the PTA-FDI nexus, there is also a dearth of 
empirical work with exclusive focus on the ACP group.  This group of states, which has 
experienced approximately 30 percent average increase in population in each of the past 
five decades (see Table 2-3) also comprises a large part of the world’s least developed 
countries.  Of the 49 Least Developed Countries, 40 are from the ACP group with 33 in 
Africa, 1 from the Caribbean and 5 from the Pacific (United Nations Conference for Trade 
and Development [UNCTAD], 2011).  Given the significant development constraints and 
challenges faced by this group, FDI provides an important development opportunity (Naude 
& Krugell, 2007; Bankole & Adewuyi, 2013; amongst others) and is often cited as a 
fundamental non-trade driver for PTA membership (Buthe & Milner, 2014).  This is not 
surprising given the importance of FDI and the growing competition among countries to 
attract this longer term capital inflow.  Given low income levels and domestic savings, the 
ACP groups heavy reliance on funds from abroad is well recognised.  While foreign 
Official Development Assistance (ODA) addresses part of this deficiency, it has declined 
over the years following austerity measures in America and Europe after the 2008/2009 
                                                          
33 This group comprises of 79 states from Africa, Caribbean and the Pacific with the majority of states being African, followed by 
Caribbean and then the Pacific.  See Table 11 in the Appendix for the list of all ACP countries. 
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crisis (Amendolagine, Boly, Coniglio, Prota, & Seric, 2013).  This has prompted efforts for 
a more stable and long-term inflow in the form of FDI (Asiedu, 2002), the positive effects 
of which are widely acclaimed in the literature.  FDI provides a means for creating direct, 
stable and long-lasting links between economies and with the right policy environment, it 
can serve as an important catalyst of local enterprise development (Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD], 2002).  It enables host countries to 
achieve investment levels beyond their own domestic saving and is an important means of 
transferring modern technology and innovation from developed to developing countries 
(Kohpaiboon, 2003; Mina, 2007; Sichei & Kinyondo, 2012; Ethier & Markusen, 1996).  It 
can create employment, enhance productivity and managerial skills (Mina, 2007; Asiedu, 
2004), increase competition, raise dynamic efficiency and add to gross capital formation 
(Gastanaga et al., 1998).  Yeyati, Stein and Daude (2004) provides a more balanced view 
and highlights that for the widely proclaimed benefits to be realized the foreign affiliates 
need to establish strong forward and backward linkages with domestic firms, engage in 
exports to offset the pressure on the Balance of Payments due to input imports, and 
domestic firms need to build the capacity to absorb all positive spill overs.  Amendolagine 
et al. (2013), Markusen and Venables (1999) and Ping and Saggi (2007) also emphasise the 
importance of backward linkages for positive spill overs of FDI to materialise.   
Despite these growth enhancing effects of FDI, the ACP group’s record in attracting 
foreign investors is rather poor.  Worldwide FDI flows have surged from about US$13 
billion in 1970 to a significant US$1467 billion in 2013 (UNCTAD, 2014).  The developing 
countries attracted more than half of this global FDI flow, with an average share of around 
54 percent over ten years (2005-2014).  By contrast, the ACP group’s average global FDI 
share was a subdued 3 percent over this same period.  There are various explanations on the 
factors behind this low FDI directed towards the ACP group, particularly in the African 
countries.  These include for example, few opportunities offered by Africa for multinational 
corporations (Nunnenkamp, 2002), lack of development in their competitive factors (Pigato, 
2001), low progress in trade and investment liberalisation, poor infrastructure development, 
weak institutional quality (Asiedu, 2002), poor macroeconomic stability and governance 
(Bankole & Adewuyi, 2013) and the existence of an ‘Africa perception’34  (Jenkins & 
Thomas, 2002; Asiedu, 2002).  Nevertheless, as emphasised in Asiedu and Gyimah-
                                                          
34 Jenkins and Thomas (2002) explain the Africa perception as the view that instability is endemic in the region.  Likewise, Asiedu (2002) 
highlighted the common perception of Africa as region strife with corruption, instability and poor governance.   
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Brempong (2008) and by various other scholars, FDI constitutes an important source of 
foreign capital for this group, amidst low income levels, declining foreign aid and low 
domestic savings.  As a corollary to this, international organisations such as the IMF and 
the World Bank have been active in advising policy makers to pursue market liberalisation 
and other reforms to attract more FDI (Tuman & Emmert, 2004). 
PTAs provide various channels through which their effects on FDI can be realised.  
Medvedev (2011) groups the transmission of PTAs to FDI into direct and indirect channels.  
The presence of investment provisions provides a direct channel, whereas trade and other 
provisions such as competition policy, standards and dispute settlement are grouped as 
indirect channels.  The international institutionalisation of policy reforms through PTAs 
increases the creditability of government commitments by locking-in reforms, therefore 
reducing the investment risks of a host nation.  Likewise, Buthe and Milner (2014) link 
trade agreements to FDI on the argument that such agreements act as a reassurance 
mechanism for foreign investors.  They theorize that because subtle changes in domestic 
economic policies increases uncertainty and business risks, commitment made through 
international trade agreements increase credibility and make reversal of policies more 
costly.  The FDI-trade nexus is yet another indirect channel whereby PTAs increase trade 
and consequently augments a host nation’s openness to the global economy.  Moreover, 
greater regional integration effects of PTAs create larger markets that increase 
opportunities for economies of scale and export platform FDI.  As mentioned in Godfred, 
Bokpin and Michael (2015), formation of groups and trading blocs provide larger markets 
for market seeking FDI and also pushes countries to adopt democratic governments and 
acceptable trade behaviours - all of which enhances the attractiveness of a destination for 
FDI. 
While various scholars like Baltagi, Egger and Pfaffermayr (2007), Aggarwal (2008) and 
Blomstrom and Kokko (1997) have extended the literature on PTA impacts by exploring its 
effects on FDI in a number of regional agreements, the coverage of the ACP states is 
limited.  It is noticeable that most of the studies that do exist on individual ACP countries 
and/or sub-regional groups (such as Bankole & Adewuyi, 2013; Godfred et al., 2015; 
Naude & Krugell, 2007; Asiedu, 2002; Asiedu & Gyimah-Brempong, 2008) have explored 
the traditional determinants of FDI but research that explains if trade agreements matter for 
FDI is still in its infancy.  Moreover, existing studies along this line have mainly focused on 
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countries from the African continent, while the Caribbean and Pacific region have received 
relatively less attention.  Hence, this paper contributes by adding to the relatively small 
literature on FDI in the ACP group.  It does this by focusing on the role of PTAs in 
attracting FDI.  The empirical analysis utilises panel data that captures bilateral FDI from 
34 OECD countries into 45 ACP countries over the period 2000-2012.  This bilateral 
specification allows controlling for country pair variables such as a PTA between an OECD 
and ACP country, distance, time difference, and Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) along 
with other important explanatory variables (as identified in the literature) for foreign 
investment activity.  Furthermore, we include surrounding market potential as a 
determinant of FDI in our model.  While the host market size is explained in the literature 
as an important determinant of FDI, integrated surrounding markets also enhance the scope 
for further expansion and ultimately economies of scale opportunities that are otherwise 
limited in segmented markets (Blomstrom & Kokko, 1997).  We also investigate whether 
PTAs have the same implications for FDI in each of the three subregions.  Additionally, we 
also consider the interactions between BITs and PTAs and explore the role of these two 
policies in more detail.   
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows; after an introduction in section 2.1, in 
section 2.2 we provide key stylized facts on PTAs, FDI activity and an economic overview 
of the ACP group.  In particular, this synopsis of key economic indicators highlights the 
significance of FDI for a group of states plagued with subdued economic performance 
amidst various challenges.  Section 2.3 reviews the related theoretical and empirical 
literature that explain the determinants of FDI.  Section 2.4 explains the empirical model 
and the results are discussed in section 2.5.  Finally, section 2.6 concludes this chapter.   
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2.2: Key stylized facts: PTAs, FDI and economic activity in the 
ACP group 
 
 
 
2.2.1: An overview of PTAs and the ACP group 
 
The use of PTAs is now a prominent feature of international trade policy.  Almost every 
nation, except for Mongolia is signatory to at least one PTA (WTO, 2011).  Moreover, 
according to the WTO, the average number of PTAs that each country participated in has 
increased from just 2 in 1990 to 12 in 2010.  This indicates intensification and greater 
network per PTA.  These agreements are no longer confined within specific geographic 
regions or income groups.  The prevalence of regional and cross-regional PTAs and the 
formation of such agreements between countries of different income levels are illustrated in 
Table 2-1.  Data shows that PTAs are mainly cross-regional (68 percent) with more of them 
being formed between developing countries (64 percent).   
 
 
Table 2-1: PTAs by regional type35 (cumulative to 2010). 
 Total Percentage (of total) 
Intra-regional 146 32 
Cross-regional 307 68 
Developed-Developed 26 6 
Developed-Developing 139 31 
Developing-Developing 288 64 
(Source: WTO Report, 2011) 
 
 
Moreover, the content of PTAs has also changed considerably over time.  While initially 
PTAs focused on tariff reduction on imports, the contents have now deepend to include 
additional provisions such as foreign investment, labor issues, dispute settlement 
mechanisms etc.  Hofman et al (2017) analysed the contents of around 279 PTAs and 
revealed the presence of legally enforceable regulations in some policy areas in more than 
50% of these PTAs, which fall within the WTOs current mandate.  These provisions 
include customs regulations, anti-dumping, sanitary standards, etc.  Additionally, these 
PTAs also include provisions outside the WTO mandate such as investment, environmental 
laws, nuclear safety etc.  As highlighted in Hofman et al (2017), since the MFN tariffs are 
                                                          
35 Includes both reciprocal and non-reciprocal PTAs. 
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already low between developed countries, North-North PTAs are comparatively deeper 
(average number of provisions-22), compared to PTAs among developing countries 
(average number of provisions-13).  For North-South PTAs, the average number of 
provisions is 20.   
 
The ACP group has not lagged behind in this worldwide surge of PTAs.  Either 
individually or as part of their sub-regional groups, they have formed trade agreements with 
other countries.  According to the WTO (2011), the African region dominates the group in 
terms of signed PTAs, with a total of 55 PTAs cumulative to 2010, of which 24 are intra-
regional and 31 are cross-regional.  Around 78 percent of these PTAs are with developing 
countries.  Covering the same time period, the Caribbean group of countries accumulated 
19 PTAs (mainly cross-regional), of which 16 are with developing countries while the 
Pacific Islands totalled 11 PTAs.  However, while active in forming trade partnerships to 
integrate into the global economy, FDI in this group remains subdued.   
 
 
2.2.2: Global FDI flows and the ACP states performance 
 
Global FDI flows have increased over time and the UNCTAD projects this growth to 
continue.  A 9 percent growth was realised in 2013, and developing countries shared more 
than half (approximately 54 percent) of this global flow.  Table 2-2 shows the unequal 
geographical distribution of FDI for the years 2011-2013.  The EU and North American 
countries buoyed the developed economies FDI activity, while East and South East Asia 
(notably China) strengthened the developing nation’s global FDI share.  China maintained 
its position as the world’s second largest recipient of global FDI.  Amidst this upbeat 
picture of global FDI flows and the remarkable share of developing economies, the ACP 
group’s stake remained low.  Countries from this group have never been a major recipient 
of FDI and hence lag behind other regions.  In 2013, Africa attracted only 4 percent of 
global FDI, the Caribbean 0.9 percent and the Pacific region just 0.2 percent.  Combined, 
the ACP group attracted only 5 percent of world FDI.  Despite the surge in FDI flows 
worldwide, this group struggles to attract FDI.  Of the developing countries FDI inflows in 
2013, the ACP group accounted for only 9 percent (7.3, 1.6 and 0.4 percent respectively).   
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Table 2-2: Global Geographical Distribution of FDI inflows (2011-2013). 
(billions of USD) 2011 2012 2013 
World Total 1700 1330 1452 
o/w Developing Economies 725 729 778 
(% share in global FDI flows) 
Developing Economies 42.6 54.8 53.6 
     Africa 2.8 4.1 3.9 
     Asia 25.3 31.2 29.4 
     Latin America & Caribbean 14.3 19.2 20.1 
      o/w Caribbean 0.7 1.1 0.9 
      Pacific Islands 0.1 0.2 0.2 
(% share of developing countries FDI inflows) 
Africa 6.6 7.5 7.3 
Asia 59.4 56.9 54.8 
Latin America & Caribbean 33.7 35.1 37.5 
o/w Caribbean 1.7 2.0 1.6 
Pacific Islands 0.3 0.4 0.4 
(Source: Calculated using data from UNCTAD World Investment Report, 2014) 
 
 
This comparatively weak FDI performance of the ACP group is not a recent phenomenon.  
Plagued by various economic, political and social constraints, the group has struggled over 
the years to attract a larger share of this global capital flow.   
As is observable in Figure 2-1 shown next, global FDI inflows increased dramatically 
particularly from the 1990s, before declining in 2001.  The flows then made a turnaround in 
2004, and after reaching a peak in 2007, it declined again between 2008 and 2009.  While 
another series of fluctuation in global FDI inflows occurred in the 2010-2014 period, the 
developing countries remained upbeat during these years. The ACP group’s FDI activity 
however is largely in contrast to this lustrous global and developing country performance. 
 
When it comes to FDI in the ACP countries, particularly in the African continent, the 
common perception is that it is largely attracted by natural resource endowments.  While 
this remains true for some countries, the predominant drivers of FDI in the African group 
have over the years shifted from resource-industries into consumer-oriented sectors.  The 
extractive industries share has been dwarfed by growing investment into manufacturing 
(agro-processing, textiles, building materials, electronics), and services 
(telecommunications, finance, business services, hotels, restaurants).  For example, 
cumulative from 2009-2014, 44 percent of FDI projects were in the services sector, 32 
percent in manufacturing and 24 percent in the primary sector (UNCTAD, 2014).  The FDI 
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inflows vary within the African sub-region, with Northern and West Africa attracting 
comparatively more FDI than Central, Southern and East African countries.  In a regional 
comparison of African FDI, Anyanwu and Yameogo (2015) revealed that North Africa’s 
average share (2005-2014) of African FDI was 35 percent.  This was followed by West 
Africa (26 percent), East Africa (17 percent), Southern Africa (14 percent) and Central 
Africa (8 percent).  The main extra-regional investor into the African countries is Europe, 
with investments spread across primary, manufacturing and services sectors, followed by 
North America and Japan.   
 
 
Figure 2-1: Global, developing countries and ACP FDI inflows (US$M) - 1970-2014. 
 
(Source: Compiled using data from UNCTADstat available at unctadstat.unctad.org) 
 
 
In the Caribbean group of countries, while the primary sector remains important, there are 
also significant investment inflows into manufacturing and services.  Countries endowed 
with natural resources (such as gold, oil and gas) attract relatively higher FDI inflows.  
Additionally, sectors such as telecommunications, electricity, manufacturing and business 
financial services have also expanded with foreign investment.  The main sources of FDI 
are the same as in the African countries.   
For the Pacific Island countries, all three sectors (primary, manufacturing and services) are 
equally important for FDI.  The main parent countries into these group of islands are the 
US, EU, and Australia.  Mining, quarrying and fisheries (specifically in Papua New Guinea 
& Fiji) are the main source of attraction in the primary sector.  Garment and food 
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processing sectors are major FDI attractors in the manufacturing sector while tourism, 
construction and business services dominate the services sector.   
The importance of FDI to the ACP group has increased over time and in terms of individual 
countries the share of FDI to GDP varies within and across the three major groups.  For 
instance, as shown in Figure 2-2, the 2010-2014 average FDI to GDP ratio for Liberia and 
Mozambique is quite high (45 and 29 percent, respectively) compared to other ACP 
countries that range between 20 and 4 percent.   
In the Caribbean, relatively high FDI to GDP ratios are observed for Saint Vincent & 
Grenadines, Saint Kitts & Nevis and the Bahamas, closely followed by the Marshall and 
Solomon Islands from the Pacific group.   
FDI is an important form of capital inflow for all developing countries, and the importance 
is amplified for the ACP group given their underdeveloped capital markets.  Alongside this, 
unpredictability of foreign aid flows and volatility of short-term inflows rank FDI as an 
important source of capital (Asiedu, 2002; Onyeiwu, 2004).  However, the capacity of a 
nation to attract and benefit from FDI hinges on many factors, some of which include 
national policies, international relations, investment infrastructure and political and 
economic stability.  According to the African Economic Outlook (2016) lack of effective 
regional integration also has a role, due to market fragmentation and lack of economies of 
scale opportunities.   
 
 
Figure 2-2: FDI’s share of GDP (in %) for selected ACP states - 2010-2014 average. 
(Source: Compiled using data from UNCTADstat available at unctadstat.unctad.org) 
Africa Caribbean Pacific 
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2.2.3: Economic indicators -ACP states 
 
The ACP states lacklustre performance in terms of key economic indicators reflect the 
inherent challenges faced by this group some of which, as identified by the UNCTAD 
(2013) include high economic vulnerability, low income levels, sea/land lockedness, 
isolation from main markets, weak institutional, regulatory and productive structures.  
Furthermore, an increasing population (shown in Table 2-3) continues to weigh heavily on 
the ACP governments to provide jobs, education, health and other services.  The group 
hosted 14 percent of the global population in 2014 compared to 8 percent in the 1960s.  For 
each of the ten-year periods shown in Table 2-3, the ACP population grew by almost 30 
percent.  The group has maintained this trend with a 9.7 percent growth over the more 
recent five years (2010-2014).  While the African continent is the most populous, followed 
by the Caribbean and then the Pacific, the growth over 2010-2014 shows a notable increase 
in the Pacific region population (8.2 percent).   
 
 
Table 2-3: Total population of ACP states. 
 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2014 
In Thousands 
World 301834
4 
368248
8 
443963
2 
530966
8 
612662
2 
6929725 726578
6 
Developing 
economies 
206285
3 
262181
8 
329317
4 
408812
2 
485402
5 
5603433 591963
9 
ACP 249713 318913 416394 547490 711411 923710 101365
9 
Africa 213105 272462 358548 475833 551332 717271 746963 
Caribbean 18494 22814 26814 30822 34694 38111 39433 
Pacific 2787 3520 4541 5714 7179 8904 9631 
% Growth 
ACP  27.7 30.6 31.5 29.9 29.8 9.7 
Africa  27.9 31.6 32.7 15.9 30.1 4.1 
Caribbean  23.4 17.5 14.9 12.6 9.8 3.5 
Pacific  26.3 29.0 25.8 25.6 24.0 8.2 
% share of world 
ACP 8.3 8.7 9.4 10.3 11.6 13.3 14.0 
% share of ACP 
Africa 85.3 85.4 86.1 86.9 77.5 77.7 73.7 
Caribbean 7.4 7.2 6.4 5.6 4.9 4.1 3.9 
Pacific 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
(Source: Compiled using data from UNCTADstat available at unctadstat.unctad.org). Note: ACP group totals do not add up to the ACP 
total because of missing data for some individual countries. 
 
 
In terms of economic growth, the ACP group’s performance is characterised by wide 
fluctuations, evident from Figure 2-3.  The group recorded negative growth rates four times 
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since 1980 (-0.87 percent in 1983, -0.59 percent in 1991, -0.99 percent in 1992, and -0.27 
percent in 1993).  After continued growth from 1994 to 1996, slowdowns were experienced 
again in 1997 and 1998.  Compared to 1998 growth picked up in 2014 from 2.5 percent to 
3.9 percent respectively, underpinned mainly by rising investment in natural resources and 
infrastructure, and strong household spending (IMF World Economic Outlook, 2015).  
However, the sharp growth fluctuations, disparity among countries within the ACP group 
and dependence on commodity prices continue to contribute to the group’s economic 
fragility (UNCTAD, 2013).   
 
Figure 2-3: World, developing and ACP real GDP growth rates (%) - 1971-2014. 
 
(Source: Compiled using data from UNCTADstat available at unctadstat.unctad.org)  
 
 
A growing population (see Table 2-3) and low economic performance (Figure 2-3) has 
produced weak purchasing power in the ACP states.  Table 2-4 shows that the group’s per 
capita real income fell from US$1106 in 1975 to US$1043 in 1985, a 6 percent decline over 
the decade.  It weakened further until the 2000s, from where it has shown sluggish 
improvements.  Comparatively, the per capita income of the ACP countries falls far behind 
that of developing economies, being less than half of the developing countries average per 
capita income in 2014.   
Table 2-4: World and ACP states annual real GDP per capita from 1975-2014. 
USD (2005 
constant prices) 
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014 
World 4622 5114 5350 5844 6017 6676 7248 7650 8042 
-2
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World   Developing economies ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States)
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Developing 
Economies 
986 1150 1188 1309 1529 1771 2141 2707 3100 
ACP 1106 1096 1043 1031 936 979 1130 1279 1356 
(Source: Compiled using data from UNCTADstat available at unctadstat.unctad.org)  
 
 
On the external front, Table 2-5 shows the exports and imports performance of the ACP 
group.  The average value of exports for the ACP group has increased over the averaged 
periods and when disaggregated by main regions, a similar increasing pattern holds for 
Africa and the Pacific, while the Caribbean experienced a decline in 1991-2000.  The 
Pacific region is comparatively more dependent on exports, evident by the high exports to 
GDP ratios ranging from 31 percent to 44 percent.  As in other economic indicators, the 
group’s performance in terms of global exports is sluggish, averaging between 1.8 percent 
and 4.4 percent over the reviewed years.  While the developing countries had a 43.8 percent 
share of global exports in the 2010-2014 period, the ACP group’s share was just 2.5 percent.  
The group’s dependency on imports is also evident from their high imports to GDP ratios. 
 
 
Table 2-5: Exports and Imports (average) from 1970-2014. 
  1970-
1980 
1981-1990 1991-2000 2001-2010 2010-2014 
Exports (in current US$M) 
World 958470 2384863 4927756 11016642 18016904 
Developing economies 243469 595127 1399342 4100527 7895697 
ACP 42602 70985 89671 243182 456703 
   Africa 31673 52658 73633 210792 400803 
   Caribbean 8992 14743 11368 23950 35259 
   Pacific 836 1622 2926 4602 7864 
% Share of their GDP 
ACP 17.6 17.1 19.8 24.9 25.6 
   Africa 15.6 15.1 20.6 26.5 27.7 
   Caribbean 34.0 28.5 16.2 17.6 18.9 
   Pacific 31.4 33.7 39.5 44.2 37.1 
% share of world exports 
ACP 4.4 3.0 1.8 2.2 2.5 
Developing countries 25.4 25.0 28.4 37.2 43.8 
Imports (in current US$M) 
World 986353 2458685 5033493 11227401 18079096 
Developing economies 214272 576532 1413763 3749160 7402376 
ACP 40282 74386 95904 240853 460354 
   Africa 28490 51735 71411 186831 365493 
   Caribbean 10407 19125 19179 40705 59812 
107 
 
   Pacific 1036 2022 2755 4740 8905 
% Share of their GDP 
ACP 16.6 17.9 21.1 24.7 25.8 
   Africa 14.0 14.9 19.9 23.5 25.3 
   Caribbean 39.3 36.9 27.4 30.0 32.1 
   Pacific 38.9 42.0 37.2 45.5 42.1 
% share of world imports 
ACP 4.1 3.0 1.9 2.1 2.5 
Developing countries 21.7 23.4 28.1 33.4 40.9 
(Source: Compiled using data from UNCTADstat available at unctadstat.unctad.org) 
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2.3: Literature Review  
 
 
2.3.1: Theoretical literature  
 
On the theoretical end, two prominent frameworks on the determinants of FDI are the 
works of Dunning (1977, 1980, 1998, 2000 and 2001), Markusen (1984, 1998 and 2002) 
and Markusen, Venables, Konan, & Zhang (1996).  Dunning is credited in the literature for 
his theory of FDI determinants known popularly as the “eclectic paradigm”.  The 
compatibility of the Dunning framework with any theory of comparative advantage and its 
applicability to either micro or macro level of analysis has added to the flexibility and the 
popularity of this theory (Gastanga, Nugent, & Pashamova, 1998).  This framework is 
founded on the concept that firms invest abroad to exploit three advantages; Ownership (O), 
Location (L), and Internalisation (I).  Hence, Dunning’s framework is also referred to as the 
OLI framework.  The ownership specific advantages arise due to property rights, 
management expertise and other intangible assets (brand name, patent etc.) of a firm that 
gives it a competitive advantage despite being foreign.  The locational advantages are host 
country attributes such as resource endowment, cheap factors of production and large 
market size.  These locational factors attract FDI.  Internalization advantages arise when the 
costs of licensing out activity through product licensing, capital lending or technical 
assistance more than offsets the costs of engaging in production abroad itself.  The OLI 
framework therefore provides firm specific motivations for FDI (ownership and 
internalization) and host-country specific motivations (location).  The existing empirical 
literature has largely drawn on the implications of this framework in explaining the 
determinants of FDI, with market size claimed as the single most important factor 
(Chakrabarti, 2001).  Additionally, Navaretti and Venables (2013) added to the location-
motivated FDI by emphasizing the role of industrial policy for FDI.  In particular, while the 
authors maintained the importance of other traditional determinants of FDI, they provided 
empirical evidence of the impact of industrial policy (such as state aid and corporate 
taxation) on foreign firms’ location decisions.  In a broader analysis on the importance of 
location, Porter (1994) highlighted a number of attributes (some of which includes labor, 
technology, infrastructure, market, and local suppliers) that influences the competitive 
advantage and thus attractiveness of a host nation in terms of attracting global firms.  
Furthermore, in later explanations of the knowledge-capital model, Markusen (2002, 2013) 
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emphasized that the sources of locational advantages vary for horizontal and vertical firms - 
with high trade costs and large market size more important for horizontal firms while low 
trade costs and factor price differences being important for vertical multinationals.   
Markusen (1984) developed the knowledge-capital model, based on a world of two factors 
(skilled and unskilled labor), two goods and two countries.  This approach is grounded on 
three assumptions.  Firstly, the services of knowledge-based assets (which includes 
headquarter services such as research & development, marketing, management) are 
fragmented from production and can be easily supplied to separately located production 
plants.  Secondly, knowledge-based assets are skilled labor intensive relative to production 
which is unskilled labor intensive.  These first two assumptions imply vertical FDI, locating 
activities based on relative factor requirements and relative factor endowments.  The 
vertical Multi-National Enterprises (MNE) export output back to the home country.  The 
third defining assumption of the knowledge-capital model is the joint-input characteristic.  
Knowledge-based services are used simultaneously by separately located production 
facilities.  This third assumption indicates horizontal FDI, with affiliate firms replicating 
production in multiple geographical locations for sales in that respective market.  
While the traditional theoretical works on FDI explicitly explained either vertical FDI 
(fragmented production process motivated by factor price differences) or horizontal FDI 
(replication of identical production process in another country), the more recent literature 
(for example Ekholm et al., 2007; Helpman, Melitz, & Yeaple, 2004; Raff, 2004; Yeaple, 
2003; Grossman, Helpman, & Szeidl, 2006; Markusen, 2013; and others) has accentuated 
that the modes of supply of multinational firms are much more complex than the simple 
horizontal or vertical forms of FDI.  For example, Grossman et al. (2006) pointed out that 
while such a clear distinction between vertical or horizontal FDI is probable in a 
hypothetical two-country and two-production activity scenario, the presence of more 
countries and more stages of production is inconsistent with such distinctive categorisation 
of FDI.  Rather, multinational companies follow complex integration strategies which are 
defined in Yeaple (2003) as the presence of both horizontally and vertically integrated 
foreign firms.  Consequently, in line with complicated multinational strategies and 
international investment motivations, scholars (including Yeaple, 2003; Grossman et al., 
2006; and Ekholm, 2007) have extended the traditional FDI theories into three-country 
frameworks.  Some examples of complex integration strategies of multinational firms 
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include (i) firms located in some countries to save on transport costs associated with the 
alternative of exporting and located in other countries to benefit from factor price 
differences (Yeaple, 2003), (ii) firms performing intermediate stages of production in one 
country to save on production costs and subsequent stages in several plants to conserve on 
transport costs (Grossman et al., 2006), (iii) or export-platform FDI where firms produce 
goods in a foreign subsidiary and sell the output in either both the host country and other 
markets and/or primarily in third-country markets (Ekholm et al., 2007; Grossman et al., 
2006; Bergstrand & Egger, 2007).  Markusen (2013) provided further evidence on the shift 
from multinationals exporting back to home country to exporting to third countries using 
sales data on US manufacturing affiliates.  Their analysis revealed that while local sales 
accounted for 60 percent of all sales, most of the exports did not go back to the parent US 
but instead to third countries.   
 
 
2.3.2: Review of empirical literature 
 
From the empirical perspective, many studies have been carried out to determine the 
importance of various locational factors implied in the above theoretical frameworks in 
attracting FDI.  The results mainly support market size, relatively lower resource costs, 
lower business risks and resource availability as important determinants of FDI location.  
However, empirical research that includes PTA effects on FDI is limited.  The existing 
literature on the PTA-FDI relation can be grouped into case-study type that focused 
exclusively on large well-known trade arrangements (e.g. NAFTA, MERCOSUR)36, and 
the more recent cross-country regressions.   
Results from case-study type research (ex post analysis) generally support an increase in 
FDI inflows following PTA formation.  Blomstrom and Kokko (1997) conducted a 
comprehensive analysis of three regional agreements (CUSFTA, NAFTA, & 
MERCOSUR37).  Though their approach is a comparative analysis based on FDI flows pre 
and post regional agreements, it provides useful insights.  They concluded a relatively 
modest increase in the inflow of FDI into Canada following the formation of CUSFTA, 
noting that trade and investment between Canada and the US was already considerable 
prior to the regional agreement.  For the case of NAFTA, Mexico experienced an increase 
                                                          
36 Refer to Table 12 in the Appendix for details of these agreements. 
37 CUSFTA is Canada US Free Trade Agreement, NAFTA is the North American Free Trade Agreement formed by the US, Canada and 
Mexico, MERCOSUR is a southern common market and the member states are Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay. 
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in FDI inflows, while Argentina and Brazil were the largest beneficiaries for the case of 
MERCOSUR.  Based on a similar pre and post comparison approach, Lim (2001) noted 
that FDI inflows more than doubled over the four years post-PTA for Portugal and Spain 
(EU integration), Brazil (MERCOSUR) and Mexico (NAFTA), while Argentina 
experienced a 70 percent increase.   
In a panel data regression framework, Feils and Rahman (2008) examined the effect of 
NAFTA on individual member countries and the entire region’s FDI inflows and found that 
NAFTA had a significant effect on regional FDI inflows.  However, for individual country-
effects based on time-series regression the US and Canada were the main beneficiaries.  
Another similar study in support of a positive effect of NAFTA on US FDI into Mexico is 
Naranjo (2002), who highlighted that the impact persisted only during the first two to three 
years post-PTA.  Likewise, Buckley, Clegg, Forsans, and Reilly (2000) concluded a 
positive impact of NAFTA and CUSFTA on Canada’s FDI inflows from the US.  Pain 
(1997) quantified the impact of the EU Internal Market Program on intra-EU FDI from UK 
firms in a panel setting.  The author concluded that the European integration had 
significantly increased intra-EU FDI from UK firms, along with some weak evidence of 
declines in US-bound FDI.  Though the studies discussed here provide useful insights on 
PTA-FDI nexus, they also caution that the effect is not automatic and solely PTA driven 
but also depends on concurrent policy reforms of host countries and specific agreement 
provisions.  Since they do not control for other contemporaneous events, the effects of 
macroeconomic stabilisation and changes in FDI related policies undertaken around the 
same time cannot be disentangled.  More importantly, empirical generalisations from such 
findings are severely limited since PTA contexts differ from each other.   
Cross-country analysis mostly using gravity model techniques that control for other factors 
noted above also provide support for the positive PTA-FDI link.  Cardamone and Scoppola 
(2012) investigated the impact of EU trade agreements on the investment of EU firms in 
third countries (173 host countries) over the period 1995-2005.  They developed an 
empirical model based on Markusen’s knowledge-capital theory to assess the impact of 
both trade and deep integration provisions on EU’s outward FDI.  Cardamone and Scoppola 
(2012) is a comprehensive study as it includes all third countries and all PTAs signed by the 
EU during the study period.  Their study is distinct from others in that it estimated the 
elasticity of FDI to trade protection and focused explicitly on the deep integration 
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provisions, though via a dummy variable.  They concluded that there was a negative impact 
of EU tariffs while the host country tariff effect differed across groups of partner countries.  
The deep integration provisions positively affected EU FDI.  While the two distinctive 
features of their paper mentioned above weigh positively on its contributions, the focus 
specifically on EU FDI outflows and EU trade provisions limits its empirical 
generalisations. 
Medvedev (2011) investigated the effect of PTAs on net FDI inflows using a panel of 153 
countries from 1980-2004 and found that PTA membership is associated with increased 
FDI inflows.  A significant aspect of Medvedev’s work is that it is the most comprehensive 
study on PTA-FDI relation because it included all PTAs in its framework.  In addition, it 
focused on and provided a description of the possible channels through which PTAs affect 
FDI.  However, the drawback lies in the selection of net FDI inflows as the dependent 
variable.  This precludes the estimation of bilateral flows and consequently the variables of 
interest in such a context.  For example, whether host countries with PTAs with third 
countries provide more lucrative FDI location cannot be modelled in a non-bilateral model.  
Three further limitations of Medvedev (2011) are that firstly, endogeneity between GDP 
and FDI was addressed by subtracting FDI from GDP.  This does not address the two-way 
causality between FDI and GDP given the potential multiplier effect of the former on the 
latter variable.  Secondly, the calculation of common market size is arguable.  Medvedev 
introduced two variables to capture potential PTA effects; GDP sum of PTA members and 
average distance between host and all PTA members.  While both these variables are 
significant (at 1 percent level), and have the expected signs, the inclusion of all members in 
common market despite their geographical location is debatable.  Moreover, it also 
assigned uniform weight to geographically scattered markets.  Thirdly, Medvedev treated 
all PTAs homogenously, and so ignored the inherent variability of specific provisions 
across different PTAs.   
Yeyati et al. (2004) focused on the regional integration channel of trade agreements and 
investigated the effect of the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) on Latin 
American countries.  The study adopted an augmented gravity model approach using a 
dataset that covered bilateral FDI flows from 20 OECD countries into 60 host nations from 
1982-1999.  To capture regional integration, the paper used dummy if same Regional 
Integration Agreement (RIA) membership existed, summed the GDP of RIA members for 
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extended market host, and likewise for extended market source.  They concluded all these 
variables were significant in explaining FDI.  Along the same vein but with particular focus 
on the market size effect of Regional Trade Agreements (RTA), Jaumotte (2004) yielded a 
significantly positive effect of RTA-induced market size on FDI inflows.  It covered a 
sample of 71 developing countries from 1980-1999 and mainly included South-South 
RTAs.  Through an extension to the empirical model the paper also highlighted the need for 
less attractive host nations to par up with other countries in the region in terms of their 
labor skills and financial stability in order to benefit equally.  Likewise, but with a specific 
focus on the informational effects of trade agreements, Buthe and Milner (2008) found that 
trade agreements increased flows of FDI into 122 developing countries.  Their main 
argument was that international commitments to policy reforms are more credible than 
domestic policy reforms and this increases a host country’s ability to attract FDI.  In a later 
empirical investigation, Buthe and Milner (2014) scrutinized the specific features of PTAs 
and concluded that PTAs that are in force have greater effect than PTAs signed only.  
Moreover, they also emphasised that comparatively, PTAs with investment clauses and/or 
dispute settlement mechanisms attracted more FDI.    
Two studies that diverge from all other papers reviewed earlier are Adams, Dee, Gali, and 
Macguire (2003) and Dee and Gali (2005).  These papers took a microscopic view of the 
actual contents of all 18 PTAs in their sample and explicitly modelled (using gravity model) 
the effects of trade provisions and non-trade provisions on trade (on 116 countries from 
1970 to 1997) and FDI inflows (on 77 countries from 1988-1997) through development of a 
Member Liberalisation Index (MLI) designed to capture the breadth and depth aspect of 
PTAs.  However, the subjective weight based on authors’ evaluation of the extent of 
liberalisation of each provision is a limitation.  It also fails to address possible endogeneity 
in the empirical model.  Still, this paper acknowledged the difference in breadth and depth 
among different PTA’s, an aspect largely ignored in approaches using binary dummy 
variables to measure PTA effects.   
As for relevant studies concentrating on the ACP group, the bulk of the work has focused 
on African countries, some from the perspective of single countries or economic sub-
groups.  However, and as is also pointed out in Bankole and Adewayi (2013), the role of 
PTAs in the FDI context has not gained much attention as yet.  Most empirical work has 
focused on the effects of traditional host country characteristics such as market size, 
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resources and investment environment.  These works include Bankole and Adewayi (2013), 
Godfred et al. (2015), Naude and Krugell (2007), Asiedu (2002), Asiedu (2006) amongst 
others.  Bankole and Adewuyi (2013) provided support to the role of BITs in attracting FDI, 
but found no such role for PTAs, in a sample of 16 West African countries.  Godfred et al. 
(2015) investigated the impact of natural resources (with other control variables) on FDI in 
Africa and revealed that the different measures of natural resources differ in their impacts 
and concluded a positive relationship between natural resources and FDI.   
Naude and Krugell (2007) identified government consumption, inflation rate, investment, 
governance and literacy as important determinants of FDI in Africa, while Asiedu (2002) 
highlighted market size, natural resources, infrastructure, low inflation, legal system and 
investment framework as crucial in attracting FDI.  From a human resource perspective, 
Wood, Mazouz, Yin, and Cheah (2014) concluded that cheap labor mattered and that strong 
worker rights did not deter FDI choices into Africa.  In a sample of Sub-Saharan African 
(SSA) countries, Bartels, Napolitan, and Tissi (2014) affirmed political-economic stability 
of host countries and the availability of location specific advantages of resources and factor 
inputs as crucial for attracting FDI.  Asiedu (2006) also concentrated on a sample of SSA 
countries and revealed the importance of large local market, infrastructure, and an efficient 
investment framework for FDI and also highlighted the relevance of regional economic 
cooperation for enhancing foreign investment.   
From a micro-economic perspective, Kinda (2013) used firm-level data for 30 SSA 
countries and held that infrastructure, human capital and institutions are crucial in attracting 
FDI.  As a further breakdown, Kinda (2013) provided empirical evidence that horizontal 
FDI is encouraged by higher trade regulations.  This form of FDI was also found to be more 
affected by financial and human resource constraints whereas vertical FDI was more 
responsive to infrastructure and institutional constraints.   
In the Caribbean setting Kolstad and Villanger (2008) who claimed to be the first to 
examine FDI inflows to this group concluded that unlike Africa, the Caribbean is more 
preferred by foreign investors.  With the use of interaction terms, they concluded that FDI 
inflows were particularly sensitive and positively related to political stability whereas less 
stringent regulations encouraged more FDI.  They linked the latter finding to the presence 
of important tax havens in the Caribbean for foreign investors.  On a narrower scale, 
Tuman and Emmert (2004) studied the determinants of US FDI into Latin American and 
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Caribbean countries and found that more open economies with higher growth and higher 
human capital attracted US FDI while membership of a trade agreement had no effect.  In 
terms of stability, they measured political stability using revolution deaths and riots and 
concluded negative and significant effects of these on US FDI.  Additionally, their positive 
and significant coefficient for the human rights abuse variable provides substance to the 
class analytical theorist’s assertion that political regimes with restrictive labor unions attract 
multinational activity.   
Gani and Clemes (2015) assessed the factors attracting FDI into a panel of 9 Pacific Island 
countries, with particular emphasis on the business environment.  The various measures of 
business environment (cost of doing business, legal rights, and the time required in 
resolving insolvency and building a warehouse) were concluded as important for FDI.   
In the next section we draw on this review to select our variables and to anticipate the likely 
outcomes. While most of the variables that explain FDI elsewhere also explain FDI in the 
ACP countries, there are interesting differences as we shall see. It also turns out that there 
are differences across the African, Caribbean and Pacific subgroups. 
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2.4: Econometric specification and data  
 
 
This study adopts an augmented gravity model approach.  Tinbergen (1962) is credited in 
the literature for the first empirical exploration of the gravity specification.  The initial 
intuitive gravity model (analogous to Newton’s law of gravity) stated that trade flows are 
increasing in the size of the countries involved and decreasing in the geographical distance 
between them.  The size is approximated by GDP or population.  Moreover, as highlighted 
in Andersen and van Wincoop (2003), it is important to include not only the trade 
resistance between a pair of countries, but the barriers to trade that each country faces with 
all its trading partners, termed as the multilateral resistance.  Multilateral resistance has 
been incoprated into gravity models with the use of country fixed effects (see Andersen van 
Wincoop, 2016; Adam & Cobham 2007, and others).38   While the main criticism of the 
gravity model was its lack of theoretical grounding, scholars such as Anderson and van 
Wincoop (2003), Baier and Bergstrand (2001), Feenstra, Markusen, and Rose (2001), 
Deardorff (1998), and Evenett and Keller (1998) addressed this weakness by providing a 
theoretical foundation.  They derived the model as a reduced form from a general 
equilibrium model of international trade in goods.  While traditionally used in modelling 
bilateral trade, the model has more recently been augmented to study FDI (see for example 
Loungani, Mody, & Razin, 2002; Yeyati et al., 2004; Blonigen, Davies, Waddell, & 
Naughton, 2007; and Stein & Daude, 2007).  The gravity equation works almost as well for 
bilateral FDI as for bilateral trade (Bergstrand & Egger, 2007).  The model specification is 
as follows: 
 
𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝐶𝑃𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑂𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑅𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑡 +
                                          𝛽6𝐿𝐹𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑆𝑀𝑃𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑁𝑃𝑇𝐴𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽10𝑂𝐻𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽11𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑗𝑡 +
                                          𝛽12𝐷𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽13𝑃𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼𝑗 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡   (1) 
 
Equation 1 contains variables that reflect characteristics of host country j.  These include 
market size (ACPGDPjt); trade openness (TOjt); investment risk (IRjt); resource abundance, 
captured by natural resource rent (NRRjt); human resource availability, captured by the 
labor force (LFjt); surrounding market potential (SMPjt); and the number of PTAs of which 
                                                          
38 See Baldwin & Taglioni (2006) and Baier & Bergstrand (2009) who provide additional estimation techniques. 
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the host country is a member (NPTAjt).  Also included is the parent country GDP 
(OECDGDPit) and bilateral dummies denoting international treaties such as a BIT, a PTA 
or a DTT.  Additionally, we also control for the bilateral distance (Distij) and time 
difference in the form of ‘overlap in office hours’ (OHij) between each country pair.  α_i is 
unobserved specific effects in parent country i, α_j is unobserved specific effects in host 
country j  while εijt is the stochastic error term.  Each of these explanatory variables used in 
our model and their expected relation to FDI are summarised in Table 2-6. 
The sample consists of panel data from 2000-2012.  The FDI data are sourced from the 
International Direct Investment statistics of the OECD.  This database provides FDI 
between OECD member countries and the rest of the world.  For our purpose, the 
transaction between OECD members and the ACP countries was extracted.  For the 
explanatory variables, data for 5 of the 13 variables was sourced from the World Bank, 
namely from its World Development Indicators (WDI) and Wealth of Nations databases39.  
Other sources used include the WTO, Heritage Foundation, CEPII, International Trade 
Centre (ITC) and the timeanddate web link. 
The dependent variable is the outward FDI stock (ln FDIijt) from the parent country i into 
the host country j in year t.  The 34 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) countries are the parent countries (from where FDI originates) and 
countries in the ACP group are the hosts of this FDI.  Altogether, there are 305 country 
pairs in our sample40.  The bilateral stock of FDI from parent country to host country is 
selected as the dependent variable mainly due to data considerations.  It facilitates more 
country pairs to be included in the sample due to data availability, compared to FDI flows 
which have more missing data.  There is no consensus in the literature on the 
appropriateness of either however, both flows and stock data has been widely used in 
empirical studies.  The FDI stocks have the advantage of being a closer proxy to the level 
of activity of foreign firms in the host country, compared to FDI flows (Stein & Daude, 
2007).  As a further support, FDI flows are more susceptible to single events such as 
mergers and acquisitions. 
To identify the determinants of inward FDI, several explanatory variables suggested by the 
theoretical and empirical literature are adopted.  The traditional determinants of FDI (such 
                                                          
39 Table 13 in the Appendix provides variable description and data source 
40 See Tables 14, 15 and 16 in the Appendix for the respective country pairs and number of partners for ACP and OECD countries.   
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as market-access factors, labor costs, infrastructure, human capital, investment risks) have 
been extensively studied.  In addition, the UNCTAD’s categorisation of FDI determinants 
(see Table 17 in Appendix) sourced from the World Investment Report (2011) is also used 
in developing these explanatory variables.  As highlighted by Yeyati et al. (2004), it is 
challenging to assess the impact of trade agreements on FDI mainly due to the possibility of 
many channels through which a PTA could affect the location of FDI and the different 
predominant drivers (motivations) of FDI.  For example, while horizontal FDI could be 
driven by high tariffs, a PTA would erode the motive for this type of FDI.  At the same 
time, vertical FDI motivated by relatively lower resource cost would be encouraged by 
PTAs.  Hence, different impacts could be realised depending on the underlying motives of 
FDI, however these different and complex forms of FDI – namely, horizontal, vertical, 
export platform, and fragmented vertical cannot be discerned from FDI data.  Also, the 
importance of the many determinants of FDI may differ across different sectors (primary, 
industrial and services), but this can only be understood from highly disaggregated data, 
availability of which is very limited.  With this backdrop, this research deviates from 
examining the sectoral distribution, motives or form of FDI.  It adopts a macroeconomic 
perspective with particular focus on the channels through which PTA-FDI are connected.   
 
 
 
The size of source and host economies, as captured by their GDPs, are the main 
explanatory variables of a gravity model.  Market size has, by far, been the single most 
widely accepted variable as a significant determinant of FDI flows (Chakrabarti, 2001).  
The host market size indicates the level of demand in the host country.  A larger market 
provides opportunities for economies of scale and is more attractive for market seeking 
FDI, as opposed to a smaller economy (Medvedev, 2011; Adams et al., 2003; Yeyati, Stein, 
& Daude, 2002; Jaumotte, 2004; Blomstrom & Kokko, 1997; Mina, 2007; Kang & Lee, 
2007).  This is mainly because the plant-specific fixed cost is spread over a larger output as 
the market size increases, and thus FDI will likely supersede the alternative (exports) mode 
of serving foreign markets.  Host economy GDP is expected to have a positive relation to 
FDI inflows.  On the other end, parent country economy size (given by GDP) may reflect 
its ability to invest abroad, although this is a weaker link.  This variable is thus expected to 
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have a positive relation with FDI.  These data (Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) adjusted 
GDP) are sourced from the WDI database of the World Bank.   
The degree of a country’s openness to international trade is deemed relevant in FDI 
location decisions because most investment projects are directed towards the tradeable 
sector (Chakrabarti, 2001).  Trade openness can affect FDI in multiple ways.  Lower import 
barriers (more open economies) may discourage FDI by dampening the tariff-jumping 
motivation and eroding the competitive advantage over other foreign producers (analogous 
to benefits enjoyed by domestic producers through protected trade).  However, it may 
stimulate vertical FDI by facilitating the imports of inputs and machinery.  Lower export 
barriers tend to stimulate vertical FDI by facilitating the re-export of processed goods, and 
other non-tariff jumping horizontal FDI by expanding the effective market size, leading to 
improved business climate and expectations of better long-term economic growth.  
Openness data, estimated by the total trade to GDP ratio is sourced from the WDI.  Thus, 
while trade openness may encourage FDI inflows, it could also reduce tariff hopping 
motivated FDI.  The expected sign on this variable is therefore ambiguous.   
Human resources are documented in the literature as fundamental in attracting FDI.  Other 
things equal, the availability of labor is expected to significantly boost the locational 
advantage of the host country, and the coefficient of this variable (host labor force) is 
therefore expected to be positive.  While we expect the availability of labor to have a 
positive relationship with FDI, we also note that this relation does not capture the influence 
of differences in labor productivity, government interventions in the labor market and the 
strength and influence of labor unions (Noorbuksh et al., 1999).  This data is sourced from 
the WDI. 
Several countries from the ACP group are resource-rich countries.  Countries well-endowed 
with natural resources would attract more resource seeking FDI (Mina, 2007).  Sichei and 
Kinyondo (2012) revealed that the ten leading recipients of FDI inflows (2009) in Africa 
have large petroleum and mineral reserves.  The natural resource rent (as a percentage of 
GDP) sourced from the Wealth of Nations database of the World Bank is used to 
approximate for resource endowment.  This variable is expected to be positively related to 
FDI.   
120 
 
Investment risk reflects additional cost of doing business in a foreign location.  Poor legal 
protection, corruption and institutions diminish FDI activity (Blonigen et al., 2007), and 
create an unfavourable business climate (Sichei & Kinyondo, 2012).  The clarity of a 
country’s laws, the extent and honesty of its law enforcement, the efficiency of the 
bureaucracy and the absence of corruption reduce transaction costs (Gastanaga et al., 1998) 
and would therefore encourage more FDI inflows.  Most studies have used some form of an 
index to capture investment risk.  This study uses the economic freedom index sourced 
from the Heritage Foundation database.  A host economy with a lower value of this index 
reflects greater costs or uncertainty and would discourage FDI.  Hence a positive sign is 
expected for this variable.   
A PTA between parent and host country is indicative of more liberal approach towards each 
other.  With the use of a dummy, the specification controls for whether a PTA is in place 
between the parent and host country.  The coefficient of this variable is ambiguous since it 
captures a combination of tariff jumping and vertical integration FDI motives.  The data on 
PTA is sourced from the WTO.  Additionally, we also control for the existence of a 
Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) and Double Taxation Treaty (DTT), sourced from the 
UNCTAD.  The preambles of the large volume of BITs formed worldwide are to protect 
and promote foreign investors41.  BITs could help attract FDI by serving as a commitment 
device (Hallward-Driemeier, 2003) however, empirical findings on the same is mixed 
(Sauvant & Sach, 2009).  This result is not surprising given that a BIT could even be 
formed in consequence of FDI or be a political outcome.  While Gallagher and Birch 
(2006), UNCTAD (2009), and Tobin and Rose-Ackerman (2003) found no evidence of a 
BIT-FDI relation in their studies, Neumayer and Spess (2005) and Egger and Pfaffermayr 
(2004) have provided empirical support that a BIT stimulates FDI.  A BIT may encourage 
more FDI through its commitment effect where when a parent and host enter into a BIT, the 
parent is provided assurance on the host’s commitments to the agreed provisions.  Buthe & 
Milner (2008) referred to this as credibility of a host country’s policies, withdrawal from 
which is more costly when entered into through an international treaty such as a BIT.  In 
their political perspective of a BIT, these authors argued that a BIT between the investors’ 
home and the FDI host country (i.e. a parent-host BIT) reduces transaction costs because 
they remove the need for individual investors to negotiate the same provisions individually 
                                                          
41 Motivated by the concurrent and rapid growth in the use of PTAs and BITs for stimulating FDI, we extend our empirical analysis in 
several ways to further investigate the role of these international treaties in attracting FDI (see section 2.5). 
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with host governments.  Hence, in line with the investor-protection objective of a BIT, a 
positive correlation with FDI is expected.  Moreover, as argued in Murthy and Bhasin 
(2015), redesign of tax systems can increase the international competitiveness of countries 
in terms of attracting investment.  The popularity of DTT has grown over time (Parikh, 
Pankaj, & Spahr, 2011) with its positive association with FDI inflows concluded by Barthel, 
Busse, & Neumayer (2009), Blonigen and Davies (2004), Murthy and Bhasin (2013) and 
others.  The DTT data is sourced from the UNCTAD and is included in the estimation as a 
dummy variable.  A positive sign is expected for this variable. 
Distance is the second pillar of the gravity model.  Distance may encourage FDI as an 
alternative to exports due to higher transportation costs, but it may also reduce FDI 
prospects due to the increasing psychic costs of distance, involving familiarity with laws, 
institutions and culture.  As such, the expected sign on this variable is ambiguous.  The data 
is sourced from CEPII (a French research centre in international economics, which 
produces studies, research, databases and analyses on the world economy and its evolution).   
While the importance of geographical distance is well captured in empirical models of FDI; 
little attention has been paid to the economic effects of time zone differences.  Time zone 
differences would matter more for activities that are intensive in information and require 
frequent interaction and so is highly relevant for the case of FDI.  Stein and Daude (2007) 
are acknowledged as the first researchers to include time difference as a determinant of FDI.  
They concluded a negative and significant effect of time difference on FDI location.  While 
geographical distance measures one form of the cost of doing business (mainly transport 
cost), the non-pecuniary transaction costs related to the need for frequent interaction 
between parties (parent and affiliate in the case of FDI) is ignored.  New communication 
technology has reduced the financial cost of distant interaction, but they cannot overcome 
the problem of time difference.  Difference in time matters even given today’s easy and low 
cost communications for the obvious reason that people at night usually prefer to sleep 
(Stein & Daude, 2007; Head, Mayer, & Ries, 2009).  Head et al. (2009) refers to this as the 
synchronization effect.  They further add that wide time differences however also provide 
opportunities for a company to operate over a 24-hour business day (continuity effect) and 
promote trade in services.  As the synchronization effect and the continuity effect oppose 
each other, this makes the link between this variable and FDI ambiguous.  In order to 
differentiate these effects, we include as our measure of time difference, the number of 
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office hours (assumed to be from 9am to 5pm) that overlap between host and source 
country.  This data is sourced from www.timeanddate.com.  A positive sign then indicates 
that the synchronization effect dominates, a negative sign that it is the continuity effect that 
prevails.  
Additional variables introduced in the specification are surrounding market potential42 and 
host overall involvement in PTAs.  A PTA promotes greater regional integration.  This 
creates possibilities of an extended market and thus provides firms with scope for further 
expansion and ultimately economies of scale.  Such opportunities are otherwise limited in 
segmented markets (Blomstrom & Kokko, 1997).  This interdependency amongst markets 
was raised by Harris (1954) when he explained industrial clustering in the US.  As a 
corollary to this, empirical studies such as Head and Mayer (2003), Medvedev (2011), 
Blonigen et al. (2007) and Redding and Venables (2004) found that countries with higher 
surrounding market potential attracted more FDI.  Similar results were concluded by Kang 
and Lee (2007), with surrounding provinces of a particular province in China defined as the 
extended market.  These papers emphasised the importance of nearby markets in bilateral 
specifications of FDI.  Our approach to calculating the surrounding market potential is 
adopted from Blonigen et al. (2007), with a slight modification.  Their method defined 
surrounding market potential broadly as the sum of inverse-distance weighted GDPs of all 
other countries in their sample.  The exclusion of host nation in this calculation allows for 
the identification of export-platform FDI.  Medvedev (2011) also summed all PTA member 
countries as surrounding markets.  This study refrains from including all ACP members 
into the calculation and instead defines inverse-distance weighted GDP of countries within 
a sub-regional grouping as the surrounding market.  Data on GDP is sourced from the WDI 
while CEPII data on distance are adopted.  In line with empirical findings mentioned above, 
this variable is expected to have a positive relation to FDI.   
Moreover, a country can be a signatory to a number of PTAs.  This growth in the number of 
PTAs signal growing commitment by countries to more liberal economic policies.  Buthe 
and Milner (2008) argued that such international institutionalisation of commitments has an 
information effect.  International commitments are more visible, and non-compliance can 
be easily detected and thus be costly.  Buthe and Milner (2008) used cumulative PTAs as 
an explanatory variable in their FDI model and found a significant and positive coefficient 
                                                          
42 Table 18 in the Appendix provides details on how this variable was calculated. 
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for this variable.  They argued that policy reforms documented at international level 
increases credibility, relative to domestic policies which are easily reversible.  We follow 
their lead and include cumulative PTAs (sourced from the WTO) as a signalling variable.  
But given that it signals increased openness to trade, its implications for FDI are ambiguous 
for the same reasons as the openness measure. 
 
Table 2-6: Explanatory variables and their expected signs. 
Dependent variable: log (bilateral FDI) 
Explanatory variable Expected sign   
coefficient ACP GDP* + 
OECD GDP* + 
Trade Openness +/- 
Labor force* + 
Natural Resource Rent* + 
Investment Risk* + 
PTA +/- 
BIT + 
DTT + 
Distance* +/- 
Time Difference + 
Surrounding Market Potential* + 
PTA volume +/- 
      Note: * indicates variables transformed by logs 
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2.5: Empirical analysis, results and discussion 
 
 
Table 2-7 presents the summary statistics of all non-dummy variables used in our 
estimation.   
 
 
Table 2-7: Summary statistics. 
Variable (in values) Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Maximum Minimum 
FDI (US$M)* 695.4 3263.6 59603 -1459.843 
ACP GDP (PPP, $M)* 50558 123174 893276 451 
OECD GDP (PPP, $M)* 141841
1 
2750589 15878110 9448 
Trade Openness (%) 79.6 37.8 351.1 21 
Investment Risk * 55.3 9.3 77.0 21.4 
Natural Resource Rent (% of GDP)* 15.2 19.7 100.4 0 
Labor force (millions)*  6.24 
 
9.25 
 
53 
 
0.04 
 
Number of PTAs 2.5 
 
0.85 
 
5 0 
SMP* (PPP,$M)* 134017 149147 941768 3991 
Distance* 7559 3140 17615 1482 
Overlap in Office hours 5.0 2.8 8.0 0 
*Variables transformed into logs for all estimation.  ACP GDP, trade openness, investment risk, natural resource rent, labor force, 
surrounding market potential, number of PTAs are host country specific variables and averaged over the host countries and not as country 
pair variables.  Similar treatment applies to OECD GDP while distance, overlap in office hours and FDI are averaged as country pair 
variables. 
 
 
Results show great variability in bilateral FDI stock, evident from the high standard 
deviation as well as the large difference between the maximum and minimum values of this 
variable.  This is in line with the data presented in Table 2-2 that reflects the vast variation 
in the geographical distribution of FDI in the ACP group.  Similar results hold for ACP 
GDP and other economic variables such as trade openness and surrounding market 
potential, reinforcing the fact that this group hosts economies of varying income levels.  In 
terms of resource endowments, the average natural resource rent is 15.2 (as a percent of 
GDP) and also varies significantly, ranging from 0 and 100.4 percent.  Incidentally, the 
highest value of natural resource rent is from Equatorial Guinea for the year 2000.  As 
revealed by the OECD (2002) and the IMF (2015), rapid development in the oil and timber 
sector contributed to Equatorial Guineas era of economic boom from the year 2000, turning 
it into SSA’s wealthiest nation in terms of per capita GDP.  In terms of geographical 
                                                          
43 There are also a small number of negative values for FDI stocks. The OECD writes that these can arise since the “changes in FDI 
positions are affected by the accumulated flows and hence may also result in negative values, but mainly for other capital (e.g. when the 
loans from the direct investment enterprise to the parent exceed the loans – or even the original capital – given by the parent to the direct 
investment enterprise. It could be the case where conduits or treasury companies are involved) 
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disparity, the average bilateral distance between the parent and the host country is 7559 km 
with the largest bilateral distance being between Italy and Tonga.  Meanwhile, while the 
average office hours overlap between the parent and host is 5, 19 of the host ACP countries 
have a maximum 8 hours of office hours overlap with their partner OECD investor country.   
An issue that arises with the use of macroeconomics time series data is that of stationarity.  
There are different unit root tests for panel data some examples of which are Levin, Lin and 
Chu (2002), Breitung (2000), Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003), and Hadri (2000).  The Im- 
Pesaran-Shin (IPS) test is used for this study which, unlike the other panel unit root tests, 
allows the autocorrelation coefficient to vary across cross-sections.  It calculates a 
standardised t-bar test statistic based on the averaged augmented Dickey Fuller statistics for 
panels (Im et al., 2003).  The results are summarised in Table 2-8.  The IPS tests the null 
hypothesis of each series in a panel containing a unit root against the alternative that allows 
for some (but not all) of the individual series to have unit roots (Baltagi, 2008).   
 
 
Table 2-8: Panel unit root test results – Im, Pesaran and Shin (IPS). 
Variable Statistic Variable Statistic 
FDIⱹ* -3.3949*** Natural Resource Rent* -1.7604** 
ACP GDP* -0.6478 Trade Openness  -1.9361*** 
OECD GDP* -1.3735 Investment Risk*  -3.3833*** 
Labor Force* -2.8143*** SMP*  -0.0789 
Significance levels: *10 percent  **5 percent  ***1 percent.  ⱹ includes constant and trend.  Automatic lag selection based on Schwarz 
Information Criterion.*Variables transformed into logs. 
 
 
As depicted in Table 2-8, the null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected for all variables 
except for ACP GDP, OECD GDP and surrounding market potential.  With the dependent 
variable (log FDI) as a stationary process, the inclusion of these three non-stationary 
variables does not raise concerns of spurious correlation44.  Moreover, two of these non-
stationary variables are also cointegrated45, and the residuals from the Feasible Generalised 
Least Squares (FGLS) estimation of equation 1 (model 1) are stationary (see Table 21 in 
the Appendix).   
 
                                                          
44 We re-estimated our base model after a first-differenced transformation of the three non-stationary variables.  See Table 19 in the 
Appendix for the results.   
45 Moreover, we also find the presence of cointegration between two of the non-stationary variables which further rules out any concerns 
of spurious regression.  A panel cointegration test (Pedroni, 1999) revealed the presence of panel cointegration between two of the non-
stationary variables (ACP GDP and surrounding market potential).  Since these are host country variables they were treated as host 
variables and not as country pair variables.  The sample included 45 cross-sections with data from 2000 to 2012.  OECD GDP is origin 
country specific variable and hence was not included in the cointegration test.  See Table 20 in the Appendix for the cointegration test 
results. 
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Pooled OLS and test for fixed effects 
A natural starting point in a panel regression is pooled OLS which regresses the dependent 
variable on an intercept and the set of explanatory variables using both the cross-sectional 
and time variation in the data (Cameron & Trivedi, 2010).  Pooled OLS is likely to result in 
inconsistent estimates as it ignores country specific heterogeneity (Egger, 2002), however, 
it is often used as a benchmark.  The ACP states consist of a rather heterogeneous group of 
countries, adding to concerns of unmeasured country-specific characteristics that are not 
captured by the explanatory variables in our model.  When these individual effects are 
relevant, pooled OLS (which ignores these fixed effects) yields biased and inconsistent 
estimates (Baltagi, 2008).  In line with this, country fixed effects are introduced into our 
model by including a dummy variable for each host (ACP) and parent (OECD) country .  
Table 2-9 presents the pooled OLS (in column 1) and the Fixed effects (also known as the 
Least Squares Dummy Variable (LSDV) regression) results (in column 2) estimated with 
robust standard errors.  The F test on the significance of country fixed effects rejected the 
null hypothesis of no significant difference across countries (F = 27.92, p=0.00) at the 5 
percent level of significance, indicating that pooled OLS is not appropriate. 
 
Fixed Effects (FEM) and/or Random Effects Model (REM). 
The unobserved country specific factors can be incorporated into the estimation through a 
FEM or REM.  The main difference between these two techniques is their treatment of the 
unobserved country-specific factors.  In a FEM model, these unobserved characteristics are 
subsumed in the intercept and hence each country has a different intercept, while in a REM 
they are considered as part of the error term (Baltagi, 2008).  The time invariant individual 
specific effects are allowed to be correlated with the regressors in a FEM whereas in a 
REM they are treated as purely random (Cameron & Trivedi, 2010).  The Hausman 
specification test (χ2 = 65.41, p =0.00) rejects the null hypothesis that REM provides 
consistent estimates and hence, the FEM is selected46.  Additionally, as noted in Baltagi 
(2008), the FEM is an appropriate specification when the focus is on a specific set of 
countries making inference conditional on these observed countries.  There are different 
ways through which a FEM can be estimated.  These include within-transformation, 
                                                          
46 Year effects are jointly insignificant (F=1.15, p=0.32) at the 5% level of significance, hence a one way Fixed Effects Model is 
estimated.   
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between-effects or LSDV approach.  Equation 1 includes time invariant variables such as 
distance and time difference.  Since the transformation procedure in the first two of the 
FEM regression strategies mentioned earlier would remove these time invariant variables, 
the Dummy Variable regression is applied in this study. 
The Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation of our Fixed Effects model (equation 1) 
presented in column 2 of Table 2-9 explains 67.83 percent of the variation in the dependent 
variable.  As per the results in Table 2-9, we obtain significant positive coefficients for the 
variables origin GDP, natural resource rent, and labor force.  Investment risk, surrounding 
market potential, overlap in office hours, distance and DTT are also significant (at various 
significance levels-see Table 2-9) with signs in line with our expectations.  Ambiguous 
relationships were expected for trade openness, the number of PTAs and the PTA dummy 
variable.  While trade openness and the number of PTAs are negatively signed, the 
coefficient of PTA is positive.  However, all these three variables are insignificant.  
Furthermore, the signs on the coefficients for host country GDP and BIT are insignificant 
and contradictory to our expectations.   
 
 
Table 2-9: Pooled OLS and OLS estimation of Fixed Effects model. 
Dependent variable: log(bilateral FDI) 
Explanatory variable Column 1 
(Pooled OLS) 
Column 2 
(Fixed Effects) 
ACP GDP ⱹ 1.015*** 
(0.051) 
-0.171 
(0.439) 
OECD GDP ⱹ 0.850*** 
(0.040) 
1.867** 
(0.858) 
Trade Openness  0.017***** 
(0.002) 
-0.004 
(0.004) 
Investment Risk ⱹ 0.693*** 
(0.282) 
1.802** 
(0.737) 
Natural Resource Rent ⱹ -0.207*** 
(0.036) 
0.197* 
(0.111) 
Labor Force ⱹ -0.417*** 
(0.060) 
1.991** 
(0.826) 
SMP ⱹ 0.061* 
(0.048) 
0.555* 
(0.319) 
Distance ⱹ -0.481*** 
(0.135) 
-0.517** 
(0.232) 
Overlap in office hours 0.217*** 
(0.025) 
0.118*** 
(0.036) 
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BIT -0.067 
(0.106) 
-0.045 
(0.102) 
DTT 1.312*** 
(0.095) 
1.352*** 
(0.103) 
PTA -0.300*** 
(0.114) 
0.098 
(0.157) 
NPTA -0.168 
(0.058) 
-0.140 
(0.101) 
Constant -14.248*** 
(1.840) 
-56.140*** 
(10.525) 
N 2158 2158 
R2 0.44 0.67 
F 123.37 86.79 
Significance levels: *10%  **5%  ***1%.  ⱹ Control variables that are expressed in natural logarithms. Note: Country dummy results are 
not reported here due to space constraints.   
 
 
Empirical tests on the residuals from the OLS estimation of our fixed effects model 
revealed the presence of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation.  These are often of concern 
in panel data due to inclusion of both time and cross-country information.  
Heteroscedasticity - where the variance of the disturbance term is not constant (Gujarati, 
2003) is a violation of an important assumption of classical linear regression.  While the 
heteroscedastic error terms do not affect the unbiased and consistency property of OLS 
estimates, it is no longer efficient (Wooldridge, 2002; Baltagi, 2008).  The Breusch Pagan 
test results for heteroscedasticity (χ2 = 113.5, p =0.00) rejected the null hypothesis of 
homoscedasticity at the 5 percent level of significance.   
Moreover, the Woodridge test for autocorrelation indicated the presence of serially 
correlated residuals (F (1,262) = 58.5, p=0.00).  Autocorrelation is defined in Gujarati 
(2003) as the disturbance term of any one observation being influenced by the disturbance 
term of another observation.  The effect of serially correlated errors is similar to the 
consequences of heteroscedastic residuals - the OLS estimates are still unbiased and 
consistent but no longer efficient (Wooldridge, 2002).  The null hypothesis of no 
autocorrelation in the OLS estimation of equation 1 was rejected at the 5 percent level of 
significance.   
Furthermore, in line with the concerns in the existing literature on probable endogeneity 
(through two way causality) between the dependent and independent variables in an FDI 
129 
 
model, we tested for such possibilities for the variables ACP GDP and trade openness47.  
While a huge volume of literature has investigated and concluded the significant effects of 
variables such as market size and trade openness on inward FDI, the main criticism directed 
towards these studies is their ignorance of reverse causality.  This criticism mainly holds 
for market size which is measured using GDP.  For example, it is argued that host 
economies with a larger market provide expansion and more profitable opportunities for 
foreign firms (market size hypothesis).  However, FDI also provides various positive 
externalities that contribute to faster economic growth (FDI led growth hypothesis).  There 
is empirical support for both these hypotheses.  For example, Schneider and Frey (1985), 
Billington (1999), Medvedev (2011), Adams et al. (2003), Yeyati et al. (2002), Jaumotte 
(2004), and Blomstrom and Kokko (1997) have provided evidence of the former hypothesis, 
while Kohpaiboon (2003), Mina (2007), Sichei and Kinyondo (2012), Gastanaga et al. 
(1998), Yeyati et al. (2004), and Batten and Vo (2009) have contributed to the literature on 
the latter hypothesis.  As such, models with interdependency between the control variables 
and the dependent variable violate the fundamental assumption of no relation between the 
error term and the explanatory variables.  Consequently, OLS estimation would produce 
inconsistent estimates. 
A common problem in testing endogeneity is the identification of valid instruments for the 
endogenous variables.  A valid instrument should be highly correlated with the endogenous 
explanatory variable but not with the error term (Cameron & Trivedi, 2010).  In light of 
these constraints, we used a one period lag of the suspected endogenous variables as an 
instrument to test for possible endogeneity using Durbin-Wu-Hausman test.  Table 22 in the 
Appendix summarises the results.  The null hypothesis of exogenous variables was not 
rejected for host GDP and trade openness.  Hence results indicate that endogeneity may not 
be an issue in our sample48.   
Based on these findings, equation 1 is estimated using the feasible generalised least squares 
(FGLS) estimator49.  The FGLS approach allows us to simultaneously account for the 
                                                          
47 Other variables that may give rise to endogeneity problems are PTA and BIT.  Due to the difficulty in obtaining valid instruments for 
these variables and the inappropriateness of using their lagged forms, we do not test their exogeneity in this study.  As a further support, 
Aisbett (2007) mentioned that since BITs are exogenous ex post (i.e. once a BIT is formed, it cannot become more or less in place for at 
least 10 years), endogeneity can be addressed by controlling for the adoption of BITs by including host and source country dummies, 
possible with a bilateral dataset.  Additionally, correcting for autocorrelation will also reduce the bias due to BIT endogeneity (Aisbett, 
2007).  These issues are taken into account in our model. 
  
48 As a further check we assumed endogeneity and estimated a fixed effects model using instrumental variable regression.  See Table 23 
in the Appendix for comparison of estimates. 
49 Hence, our estimation strategy is similar to Medvedev (2011) who also found heteroscedastic and auto-correlated residuals in his 
estimation and resorted to FGLS estimator of his Fixed Effects model.   
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presence of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation 50  (Medvedev, 2011).  Table 2-10 
presents the FGLS estimates of equation 1 under three alternative versions.  In model 1 
(base model) we do not distinguish the PTA variable by the specific region whereas in 
models 2 and 3, the PTA and BIT variables are disaggregated into African, Caribbean or 
Pacific regions.  Hence while model 1 estimates the average effect of a PTA and BIT on 
inward FDI, models 2 and 3 explain the effects of an African, Caribbean or Pacific PTA 
and BIT, respectively51.  
 
 
Table 2-10: FGLS estimation - base model and decomposition of PTA & BIT by 
region. 
Dependent variable Log (FDI) 
Regressors Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
ACP GDP ⱹ 0.391** 
(0.154) 
0.252** 
(0.108) 
0.397** 
(0.153) 
OECD GDP ⱹ 0.159 
(0.276) 
0.059 
(0.278) 
0.197 
(0.277) 
Trade Openness  -0.004*** 
(0.001) 
-0.004*** 
(0.001) 
-0.004*** 
(0.001) 
Investment Risk ⱹ 0.872*** 
(0.192) 
1.056*** 
(0.164) 
0.856*** 
(0.193) 
Natural Resource Rent ⱹ 0.024 
(0.022) 
0.043** 
(0.021) 
0.019 
(0.022) 
Labor Force ⱹ 0.591 
(0.365) 
0.962*** 
(0.331) 
0.670* 
(0.356) 
SMP ⱹ 1.223*** 
(0.168) 
1.170*** 
(0.158) 
1.158*** 
(0.167) 
Distance ⱹ -1.105*** 
(0.241) 
-1.148*** 
(0.270) 
-1.247*** 
(0.260) 
Overlap in office hours 0.028 
(0.037) 
0.076** 
(0.037) 
0.017 
(0.039) 
BIT -0.031 
(0.065) 
-0.042 
(0.068) 
 
DTT 1.129*** 
(0.092) 
1.173*** 
(0.103) 
1.096*** 
(0.091) 
PTA -0.141 
(0.139) 
 -0.131 
(0.138) 
                                                          
50 Alternatively, clustering standard errrors at country pair level will also address the problem of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation 
(Cameron & Trivedi, 2010).. 
51 This disaggregation of the PTA and BIT variables and the decomposition of the sample into specific regions is done on concerns that 
aggregation of a heterogenous group of countries may mask results.  As mentioned in Garrett (2003), the use of aggregated data assumes 
the relationship is homogeneous across individuals, and since the statistical significance of a coefficient is positively related to the 
coefficient size and negatively to its standard error, it is likely that the significance of coefficients from an aggregated regression and 
disaggregated regression will differ. 
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NPTA -0.086*** 
(0.026) 
-0.050 
(0.031) 
-0.049 
(0.030) 
PTA-African   -0.538*** 
(0.149) 
 
PTA-Caribbean  1.015*** 
(0.261) 
 
PTA-Pacific   0.034 
(0.521) 
 
BIT-African    -0.019 
(0.103) 
BIT-Caribbean    0.232 
(0.223) 
Constant -23.939*** 
(5.07) 
-27.128*** 
(4.642) 
-23.509*** 
(5.102) 
Significance levels: *10%  **5%  ***1%.  ⱹ Control variables that are expressed in natural logarithms.  The standard errors are in brackets.   
 
 
Starting from model 1, results show that the host economy size 52  has a positive and 
significant effect on FDI, consistent with the consensus in the existing literature that market 
size is the single most widely accepted significant determinant of FDI.  Additionally, the 
size of the surrounding market also has a significant and positive impact on FDI.  These 
results indicate that apart from the local market, the surrounding market potential is 
important for foreign investors.  These findings are consistent with the existing literature, 
where market size has been noted as an important determinant of FDI.   
Host countries who are members of more PTAs tend to receive less FDI, other things equal, 
which is consistent with the result on openness.  The coefficient of trade openness - which 
was expected to be either positive or negative – is negative and significant.  Hence, our 
results provide evidence of tariff-hopping motivated FDI whereby in response to greater 
trade openness, FDI is substituted with trade.  In terms of investment risk, we obtain a 
significant and positively signed coefficient which is in line with the existing literature and 
our expectation that an economy that is riskier (a lower index) will attract less foreign 
investment.  With regards to the variables capturing the importance of geographical 
distance and time difference, the coefficient of geographical distance is negative and 
significant while the overlap in office hours variable is not significant in model 1.  It was 
expected that distance may either encourage FDI as an alternative to exports or discourage 
FDI due to the increasing psychic costs of distance, involving unfamiliarity with laws, 
                                                          
52 Given the possibility of a lagged effect of GDP (host or parent) on current FDI, we included a one-year lag of these variables and re-
estimated our base model.  As shown in Table 24 in the Appendix, the coefficients of both ACP GDP and OECD GDP are insignificant. 
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institutions and culture.  The negatively signed coefficient of distance provides evidence of 
the latter.  Turning to the effects of international treaties, surprisingly the coefficients of 
BIT and PTA are insignificant, while the presence of a DTT has a significant and positive 
effect in our model.  For the BIT variable, two possible reasons for no relationship between 
FDI and BIT in our sample may be due to firstly, inadequate and/or weak protection 
standards provided in these BITs and therefore failure to promote much FDI.  For example, 
in a comparison of the efficacy of BITs, Salacuse and Sullivan (2005) concluded that the 
US BITs (which provide the strongest investor protection) were more effective in attracting 
FDI compared to BITs concluded by other OECD countries with relatively weaker 
provisions.  As a further support, Banga (2003) and Coupe, Orlova, and Skiba (2009) found 
that BITs with developed countries had a significant impact on FDI but could not conclude 
the same for BITs with developing countries, while Hallward-Driemer (2003), UNCTAD 
(2009), Gallagher and Birch (2006), and Tobin and Rose-Ackerman (2003) found no 
evidence of a BIT-FDI relation in their studies.  Falvey and Foster-McGregor (2017) found 
that the significant impact of BITs is in establishing new bilateral FDI links rather than 
expanding existing relationships.  Secondly, as highlighted in UNCTAD (2011), BITs may 
lose relevance if large foreign investors are able to secure favorable investment treatment 
through direct liaison with host governments.  In such cases, only smaller and/or less 
influential investors may focus on BITs in their investment decisions.  Also, the 
investment-promoting impact of BITs depend on its efficiency compared to a variety of 
alternatives such as financial mechanisms, alternative dispute settlement procedures and 
political risk insurance (Aisbett, 2007).  The explanations provided here for the irrelevance 
of BIT in our results are to be treated only as possibilities since we do not review the BIT 
contents or the intensity of foreign company and host government collaboration in securing 
investment interests.  However, given that BITs are one of the most widely used agreement 
for protecting and influencing FDI (see Salacuse & Sullivan, 2005; Banga, 2003; Aisbett, 
2007; Neumayer & Spess, 2005, Guzman, 1998), we extended our empirical analysis on the 
impact of BITs on FDI under a set of different specifications in models 11 to 16, presented 
later.   
Furthermore, model 1 results show that the presence of a PTA between the parent and the 
host country has no relationship with bilateral FDI.  This finding is consistent with the 
ambiguity in our expectations on this variable.  Trade can be a complement or substitute for 
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FDI, depending on the motivation behind the FDI, and it is not implausible that a sample of 
countries as diverse as the ACP group embraces examples of both cases.  Moreover, as with 
our reasoning for the insignificant BIT variable, the strength of the provisions53 in the PTAs 
may impact on its role as a stimulus for FDI.  Additionally, a possible reason for the 
insignificant coefficients of BIT and PTA variables could be that aggregate results possibly 
mask any relationship that may exist at sub-regional level.   
Turning to host country involvement in PTAs, the coefficient of cumulative PTAs is 
significantly negative, consistent with our result on trade openness.  This negative 
association could be explained as follows - as the ACP countries become more open and 
liberal through signing PTAs, the ease of engaging in trade more than offsets the 
informational and credibility enhancing channel of PTA-FDI relation.  As a corollary to this, 
trade to the ACP countries is preferred over FDI.  Finally, in terms of resource endowments, 
the variables natural resource rent and labor force are both insignificant.  Source country 
GDP is also not significant. 
Model 2 investigated if aggregation of a sample of heterogeneous countries masks any 
regional PTA-FDI relationship.  The PTA variable is categorised by the specific region: 
African, Caribbean and the Pacific.  When compared to model 1, except for natural 
resource rent, labor force, overlap in office hours and number of PTAs, the coefficient signs 
and significance of all other control variables remain intact in model 2.  The coefficients of 
natural resource rent and labor force are now significant and positive, adding support to the 
relevance of resource endowments in attracting FDI.  Moreover, the overlap in office hours 
is also significant and positive, indicating the dominance of the synchronization effect 
whereby a smaller overlap in office hours discourages FDI due to the non-pecuniary 
transaction costs related to the need for frequent interaction between the parent and affiliate.  
Notably, such a need for frequent interaction would likely be more intense with unfamiliar 
foreign locations.  Disaggregation of the PTA variable into the three broad regions reveals 
that the effect of PTAs is different across each of these sub-groups.  For the African group, 
the PTA variable is negative and significant.  This indicates that as African countries 
engage in more PTAs and open up their markets, partner countries decide to trade rather 
than to invest.  The FDI enhancing effect of PTAs either directly or through greater 
                                                          
53 We later extend the analysis by categorizing the PTAs into those that contain investment specific provisions and those that do not (see 
Table 2-12).  
134 
 
credibility and informational-effect channel appears to be rather weak or ineffective for the 
African countries.  One of the reasons for this could be the dominance of an ‘Africa 
perception’ - which Jenkins & Thomas (2002) and Asiedu (2002) explain as the common 
perception of Africa as a region strife with corruption, instability and poor governance.  A 
significant and positive coefficient for investment risk in models 1, 2 and 4, 8, 12 (which 
are specifically for African countries) indicates the importance of stability in foreign 
investor’s decisions.  For the Caribbean countries, PTAs significantly encourage FDI, 
lending support that PTAs attract more FDI.  However, there is no evidence of any PTA-
FDI relation for the Pacific region.  A similar disaggregation of the BIT variable by sub-
region54 (model 3) does not change our initial conclusion (in model 1) of the irrelevance of 
BITs for FDI.   
 
 
Table 2-11: FGLS estimation results - decomposition of sample into specific regions. 
Dependent variable Log (FDI) 
Regressors Model (4): Africa Model (5): Caribbean Model (6): Pacific 
ACP GDP ⱹ 0.588*** 
(0.168) 
-0.612 
(0.526) 
1.704 
(1.744) 
OECD GDP ⱹ 1.232*** 
(0.068) 
0.273 
(0.372) 
3.061** 
(1.527) 
Trade Openness ⱹ -0.004*** 
(0.001) 
-0.010*** 
(0.004) 
0.007 
(0.006) 
Investment Risk ⱹ 0.881*** 
(0.216) 
1.990*** 
(0.757) 
-1.872 
(1.519) 
Natural Resource Rent ⱹ -0.052 
(0.040) 
0.072* 
(0.040) 
-0.531 
(0.337) 
Labor force ⱹ -0.277 
(0.492) 
1.103 
(1.042) 
2.285 
(2.356) 
SMPⱹ 1.216*** 
(0.196) 
1.386*** 
(0.524) 
-1.325 
(1.351) 
Distance ⱹ -0.989*** 
(0.309) 
-0.496 
(0.927) 
-15.066*** 
(1.794) 
Overlap in office hours 0.138*** 
(0.053) 
0.589*** 
(0.224) 
2.034*** 
(0.261) 
NPTA 0.054 
(0.051) 
-0.041 
(0.082) 
-0.085 
(0.140) 
BIT 0.024 
(0.076) 
0.342* 
(0.190) 
 
DTT 0.939*** 
(0.112) 
1.911*** 
(0.280) 
-12.978 
(11.485) 
                                                          
54 In Model 3 it is only possible to estimate the impact of BIT for the African and Caribbean group due to insufficient observations for the 
Pacific group.  In the Pacific group, only one country (PNG) is signatory to a BIT. 
135 
 
PTA -0.301* 
(0.176) 
0.400 
(0.430) 
-19.214* 
(11.532) 
Constant -24.911*** 
(6.115) 
-28.331** 
(14.809) 
67.620** 
(34.009) 
N 1619 438 92 
Significance levels: *10%  **5%  ***1%.  ⱹ Control variables that are expressed in natural logarithms.  The standard errors are in brackets.   
 
 
Models 4, 5 and 6 reported in Table 2-11 are a decomposition of our sample by specific 
region (Africa, Caribbean and Pacific).  Here, we continue to investigate if there are any 
regional trends masked by aggregation of a heterogeneous group of countries.  However, 
we remain cautious about our results because of reduction in sample size, particularly in 
models 5 and 6.   
Model 4 is a sub-sample of African countries which has 1619 observations on 212 country 
pairs.  Interestingly, compared to the base model (model 1), parent country GDP now has a 
significant positive coefficient, implying that increases in parent country GDP is positively 
linked to FDI into the African countries.  The PTA dummy is negative and significant, 
consistent with the findings on the African PTA dummy in model 2.  Moreover, the 
coefficient of overlap in office hours is significant and positive, which indicates that 
simultaneous parent-host communication is important for foreign investors in Africa.  The 
number of PTAs is not significant.  For all other control variables, despite marginal changes 
in coefficient size, the signs and significance are consistent with model 1.  Overall, it seems 
that multinational firms from large economies may invest more in Africa, and that these 
investments are encouraged by a larger office hours overlap between host and source.  A 
PTA between host and source discourages FDI. 
In contrast, the Caribbean sub-sample (model 5 with 438 observations on 57 country pairs) 
results show greater differences when compared to the base model.  Three of the control 
variables (host GDP, distance, and the number of PTAs) that were significant in model 1 
are now insignificant at all conventional significance levels.  For these Caribbean countries 
FDI is unaffected by their individual market sizes, distance, labor force size and willingness 
to grant preferential access, both bilaterally and in general.  However, FDI is attracted by 
their surrounding market potential, availability of natural resources and overlapping office 
hours, all of which are significant and positive. Furthermore, BIT is now significant and 
shows a positive relationship with FDI.   
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Finally, while the regression for the Pacific sub-group (92 observations on 18 country pairs) 
indicates a negative and significant role of PTA in attracting FDI, it provides no significant 
relationship for most of the control variables.  Results show that multinational firms from 
large OECD countries also like to invest in the Pacific but are discouraged by greater 
distance and a small overlap in office hours.  Admittedly, the Pacific subsample is 
relatively small, and we remain cautious on the results from model 6.   
Next, motivated by this mixed bag of results for both the BIT and PTA variables, the 
analysis focused much more closely on the PTA and BIT variable.  We distinguished 
between trade agreements that had foreign investment provisions and dispute settlement 
mechanisms (PTA+IP) and those that do not (PTA-IP).  As mentioned earlier, the presence 
of such provisions in a PTA may matter in terms of affecting FDI.  We investigated for 
such effects in models 7 to 10 (see Table 2-12).  Buthe and Milner (2014) claimed that 
investment provisions provide greater reassurance to foreign investors and should produce 
more investment.  Additionally, dispute settlement mechanisms may also boost investor 
confidence by raising the cost of reneging from commitments (Buthe & Milner, 2014; 
Adams et al., 2003).  While the specific investment provisions in each PTA may differ in 
terms of the degree of commitment to foreign investment and the possible disparity in terms 
of the dispute settlement procedures and mechanisms in each PTA, overall, it is expected 
that PTA’s that have investment and dispute settlement mechanisms in place should attract 
more FDI.   
 
In model 7, this is investigated for the whole ACP group and results are consistent with the 
base model implications on aggregated PTA - neither PTA’s with provisions nor without 
provisions impact foreign investment.  In models 8 to 10, we restrict the sample to specific 
regions (Africa, Caribbean, Pacific) to see if the results are driven by specific sub-groups.   
 
Results show that for the African sub-sample (model 8), only PTAs with provision is 
significant but still negatively signed.  Perhaps the FDI encouraged by investment 
provisions in a PTA is intended to facilitate trade and acts as a substitute for other FDI.  
Both coefficients are insignificant for the Caribbean (model 9) and the Pacific groups 
(model 10). 
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Table 2-12: FGLS estimation results - decomposition of PTA variable by provision. 
Dependent variable Log (FDI) 
Regressors Model (7) 
ACP 
Model (8) 
Africa 
Model (9) 
Caribbean 
Model (10) 
Pacific 
ACP GDP ⱹ 0.432*** 
(0.156) 
0.654*** 
(0.176) 
-0.662 
(0.440) 
-0.216 
(2.399) 
OECD GDP ⱹ 0.019 
(0.279) 
1.222*** 
(0.071) 
-0.986 
(0.810) 
4.672** 
(1.957) 
Trade Openness  -0.004*** 
(0.001) 
-0.004*** 
(0.001) 
-0.007*** 
(0.003) 
0.003 
(0.009) 
Investment Risk ⱹ 0.886*** 
(0.194) 
0.833*** 
(0.219) 
0.882 
(0.608) 
-1.464 
(1.959) 
Natural Resource Rent ⱹ 0.023 
(0.022) 
-0.053 
(0.040) 
0.031 
(0.044) 
-0.368 
(0.448) 
Labor force ⱹ 0.537 
(0.366) 
-0.399 
(0.498) 
4.512*** 
(0.781) 
4.190 
(3.491) 
SMPⱹ 1.194*** 
(0.169) 
1.220*** 
(0.198) 
0.623* 
(0.353) 
-2.095 
(1.707) 
NPTA  -0.055* 
(0.030) 
0.061 
(0.050) 
-0.081 
(0.070) 
-0.121 
(0.183) 
Distance ⱹ -1.137*** 
(0.249) 
-0.909*** 
(0.312) 
-0.560 
(1.001) 
-9.296*** 
(2.345) 
Overlap in office hours 0.027 
(0.038) 
0.125** 
(0.057) 
0.862** 
(0.341) 
0.851*** 
(0.235) 
BIT -0.035 
(0.066) 
0.036 
(0.076) 
0.309* 
(0.171) 
 
 
DTT 1.097*** 
(0.093) 
0.964*** 
(0.116) 
1.413*** 
(0.423) 
-13.644 
(16.863) 
PTA+IP -0.077 
(0.186) 
-0.716** 
(0.291) 
0.077 
(0.662) 
-19.692 
(16.898) 
PTA-IP -0.160 
(0.149) 
-0.259 
(0.188) 
1.067 
(1.029) 
0.113 
(5.408) 
Constant -21.810*** 
(5.199) 
-24.254*** 
(6.203) 
-36.163** 
(16.314) 
-4.752 
(46.326) 
Significance levels: *10%  **5%  ***1%.  ⱹ Control variables that are expressed in natural logarithms.  The standard errors are in brackets.   
 
 
As mentioned earlier, given the popularity of BITs for attracting investment and the 
existing mixed empirical findings on their effects both here and in the literature, we further 
investigated the impact of BITs under alternative specifications.  Since there are few BITs 
in effect in the Pacific group and because the results in Table 2-12 show significant 
differences in the effects of BITs between the African and Caribbean groups, we confined 
attention to these two groups and considered them separately.  The results are presented in 
Tables 2-13 (for Africa) and 2-14 (for the Caribbean group).   
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Starting with the African sample, the signs and significance of the estimated coefficients on 
the control variables in Table 2-13 are consistent with our findings for Africa in Tables 2-
11 and 2-12.  However, there are some differences in the results for the Caribbean sample 
(see Table 2-14) when compared with our findings for the Caribbean group in Tables 2-11 
and 2-12.  Investment risk and natural resource rent are now insignificant, the coefficient of 
labor force is positive and significant and source GDP is negative and significant.  
Moreover, the number of PTAs now has a significant negative effect on FDI, again 
implying that Caribbean countries which are members of more PTAs tend to receive less 
FDI, other things equal, and is consistent with the result on openness.   
Next, in terms of the further investigations on BITs and PTAs, we first focused on the 
interactions between these two variables.  Specifically, we interacted our BIT variable 
separately with PTA-IP and PTA+IP and included both PTA variables and these 
interactions in the regressions in Tables 2-13 (Africa) and 2-14 (Caribbean).  We aimed to 
investigate if BITs mattered when PTAs had no investment specific provisions and how 
such provisions in a PTA relate to a BIT.  Are the two substitutes or do they target different 
types of FDI?  BITs are not the only international treaties that provide foreign investor 
protection.  In the absence of a multilateral protection of investment similar in scope to the 
WTO protections provided to trade in goods and services, BITs and investment provisions 
through trade agreements fill this policy void (Swenson, 2009; Bondietti, 2008).  The 
coverage of PTAs has now extended to include investment clauses.  With the NAFTA as 
the first trade agreement to provide BIT like investment provisions, the number of PTAs 
incorporating investment provisions has grown since then and occupies an important place 
in the regulation of international investment (Bondietti, 2008).   
None of these variables, including the interactions are found to be significant in the 
Caribbean group (see Table 2-14).  However, in Africa (Table 2-13), we now see that the 
effect of a PTA on FDI depends on whether there is also a bilateral BIT in place and 
whether the PTA itself includes investment provisions.  A PTA with investment provisions, 
with or without a BIT, reduces FDI.  However, a PTA without investment provisions 
increases FDI if a bilateral BIT is also in place.  In a region where trade and FDI appear to 
be substitutes, it seems that the investment provisions in a PTA are designed to facilitate 
trade-enhancing FDI at the expense of FDI more generally.  
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Table 2-13: FGLS estimation results - further analysis of the impact of BIT and PTA. 
Regressors Africa 
Model (11) Model (12) Model (13) 
ACP GDP ⱹ 0.716*** 
(0.178) 
0.631*** 
(0.183) 
0.551*** 
(0.188) 
OECD GDP ⱹ 1.150*** 
(0.083) 
1.147*** 
(0.081) 
1.137*** 
(0.081) 
Trade Openness  -0.004*** 
(0.001) 
-0.004*** 
(0.001) 
-0.004*** 
(0.001) 
Investment Risk ⱹ 0.757*** 
(0.218) 
0.802*** 
(0.218) 
0.830*** 
(0.221) 
Natural Resource Rent 
ⱹ 
-0.054 
(0.041) 
-0.063 
(0.042) 
-0.061 
(0.042) 
Labor force ⱹ -0.464 
(0.500) 
-0.471 
(0.495) 
-0.498 
(0.495) 
SMPⱹ 1.242*** 
(0.203) 
1.029*** 
(0.215) 
1.127*** 
(0.224) 
Distance ⱹ -0.776*** 
(0.273) 
-0.793*** 
(0.279) 
-0.766*** 
(0.279) 
Overlap in office hours 0.107* 
(0.061) 
0.107* 
(0.061) 
0.104* 
(0.062) 
DTT 0.911*** 
(0.121) 
0.941*** 
(0.122) 
0.961*** 
(0.122) 
PTA+IP -0.802** 
(0.333) 
-0.770** 
(0.326) 
-0.817** 
(0.328) 
PTA-IP  -0.663*** 
(0.195) 
-0.638*** 
(0.191) 
-0.645*** 
(0.191) 
NPTA 0.016 
(0.051) 
-0.003 
(0.053) 
0.002 
(0.054) 
BIT -0.208 
(0.152) 
-0.235 
(0.150) 
-0.253* 
(0.150) 
NBIT  0.020** 
(0.009) 
 
BIT*PTA+IP 0.241 
(0.279) 
0.308 
(0.276) 
0.343 
(0.276) 
BIT*PTA-IP 0.805*** 
(0.170) 
0.773*** 
(0.171) 
0.782*** 
(0.171) 
N of OECD BITs   0.042** 
(0.020) 
N of non-OECD BITs   0.012 
(0.011) 
BIT* NRR -0.038 
(0.035) 
-0.023 
(0.035) 
-0.021 
(0.035) 
Constant -23.858*** 
(6.163) 
-20.028*** 
(6.200) 
-20.238*** 
(6.211) 
Significance levels: *10%  **5%  ***1%.  ⱹ Control variables that are expressed in natural logarithms.  The standard errors are in brackets.   
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Table 2-14: FGLS estimation results - further analysis of the impact of BIT and PTA. 
Dependent variable Log (FDI) 
Regressors Caribbean 
Model (14) Model (15) Model (16) 
ACP GDP ⱹ -0.278 
(0.463) 
-0.382 
(0.491) 
-0.769 
(0.564) 
OECD GDP ⱹ -2.197*** 
(0.834) 
-2.615*** 
(0.771) 
-2.162*** 
(0.807) 
Trade Openness  -0.007*** 
(0.002) 
-0.006*** 
(0.001) 
-0.005*** 
(0.002) 
Investment Risk ⱹ -0.301 
(0.757) 
-0.323 
(0.731) 
-0.383 
(0.715) 
Natural Resource Rent ⱹ 0.018 
(0.057) 
0.025 
(0.056) 
0.004 
(0.058) 
Labor force ⱹ 3.596*** 
(0.726) 
3.468*** 
(0.700) 
3.579*** 
(0.767) 
SMPⱹ 1.171*** 
(0.390) 
1.257*** 
(0.387) 
1.140*** 
(0.396) 
Distance ⱹ -1.211 
(1.312) 
-1.164 
(1.300) 
-0.767 
(1.317) 
Overlap in office hours 1.210*** 
(0.377) 
1.388*** 
(0.365) 
1.326*** 
(0.388) 
DTT 1.808*** 
(0.494) 
1.741*** 
(0.496) 
1.381*** 
(0.478) 
PTA+IP 0.367 
(0.519) 
0.428 
(0.522) 
0.502 
(0.501) 
PTA-IP  1.663 
(1.107) 
1.658 
(1.121) 
1.056 
(1.143) 
NPTA -0.173** 
(0.073) 
-0.191** 
(0.074) 
-0.206*** 
(0.076) 
BIT -0.250 
(0.900) 
-0.346 
(0.922) 
0.180 
(0.947) 
NBIT  0.019 
(0.030) 
 
BIT*PTA+IP 0.598 
(0.917) 
0.674 
(0.940) 
0.050 
(0.962) 
BIT*PTA-IP 0.166 
(1.160) 
0.100 
(1.190) 
-0.425 
(1.234) 
N of OECD BITs   0.098* 
(0.058) 
N of non-OECD BITs   0.012 
(0.011) 
BIT* NRR -0.038 
(0.035) 
-0.023 
(0.035) 
-0.021 
(0.035) 
Constant -23.858*** 
(6.163) 
-20.028*** 
(6.200) 
-20.238*** 
(6.211) 
Significance levels: *10%  **5%  ***1%.  ⱹ Control variables that are expressed in natural logarithms.  The standard errors are in brackets. 
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Further on, we investigated for any signalling effects of a BIT.  To this point we have 
considered a dummy variable indicating whether or not a BIT covered each bilateral FDI 
relationship.   However, the transmission of a BIT into FDI is also claimed in the existing 
literature to operate through its signalling and commitment effects that affect other FDI 
relationships.  Specifically, when a host country signs a BIT with one source country, it 
signals its intentions to protect foreign investment in general (Neumayer & Spess 2005, 
Tobin & Rose Ackerman 2006).  In model 12 (Table 2-13), we included the total number of 
BITs signed by a host country for our African sample.  The results suggest that an increase 
in the volume of BITs concluded by the African countries does have a positive relation with 
FDI.  Hence, our results support the signalling effect of BITs in African countries.  In 
contrast, the Caribbean sample results (model 15 in Table 2-14) show no significant 
relationship between the total number of BITs and FDI. 
Motivated by this, in model 13 (Table 2-13) and model 16 (Table 2-14), we differentiated 
between BITs concluded with OECD and non-OECD countries.  Given that the parent 
countries included in our sample are all OECD countries, this specification allowed us to 
examine if this signalling effect is confined to BITS with OECD countries or applies more 
generally.  Our results revealed that BITs concluded with OECD countries stimulated more 
FDI while the non-OECD BITs have no impact.  This applies to both the African and 
Caribbean countries.  Hence, our results provide support to the signalling effect of BITs to 
some extent, whereby an increase in the number of BITs with OECD countries provides 
greater confidence to OECD investors.   
Finally, we explored if BITs mattered in the natural resources sector.  Several authors have 
linked the risk of expropriation to the natural resources sector, indicating that BITs may 
play an important role accordingly.  For instance, Aisbett (2007) claimed that one of the 
key ways through which a BIT is anticipated to stimulate FDI is through reduction of 
expropriation risk which tends to be greatest in natural resource extractive industries.  On a 
similar note, Poulsen (2010) also agreed that natural resource investors may take more 
notice of BITs given their vulnerability to discriminatory or even predatory government 
interference, while according to Tobin and Busch (2010) wealthy countries want BITs as an 
institutional check against uncompensated expropriation.  Furthermore, in an investigation 
of the sectoral pattern of expropriation of FDI from 1993 to 2006, Hajzler (2012) revealed 
that most expropriation acts emanated from the resource-based sectors (mainly in mining 
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and petroleum) and high resource output prices increased the likelihood of such acts.  Yet, 
different views emerged in Swenson (2009), Yackee (2009), Tobin and Rose-Ackerman 
(2003) and Hajzler (2014) who highlighted that a BIT may not matter or even discourage 
resource-based investment.  According to Swenson (2009) the natural resource investors 
have less flexibility in FDI decisions.  They are constrained to locate in countries that have 
the natural resources regardless of whether a BIT exists.   
Yackee (2009) drew attention to the prevalence of sophisticated investment contracts which 
he claimed are more common in the natural resources and infrastructure concession sectors 
since they provide more deal-specific provisions than the ambiguous one-size-fits all BIT 
provisions.  Thus, on the one hand, if investors in the natural resources sector (which would 
undoubtedly be large influential investors) are able to protect their interests through 
individual contracts, BITs would have little or no relevance to their investment decisions.  
BITs may even discourage them from investing if it deters or constraints them to abide by 
the stringent provisions.  On the other hand, host countries well-endowed with natural 
resources may also have strong bargaining positions and thus refrain from signing BITs 
(Tobin & Rose Ackerman, 2003).  Likewise, using a sample of 38 developing and 
emerging economies, Hajzler (2014) explained that a likely reason why the average share 
of resource-FDI in total FDI was higher in expropriating countries than in non-
expropriating countries could be due to the capacity and incentive for host governments to 
offer attractive deals to foreign investors.  On this note, a BIT may lose relevance in the 
natural resources sector if the host and parent country find alternative solutions to protect 
their interests and/or refrain from such stringent treaties altogether.  To investigate whether 
BIT matters in the natural resources sector, we introduced an interaction term of the BIT 
(with parent) and natural resources variable (BIT*NRR) in all of the regressions in Table 2-
13 for Africa and Table 2-14 for the Caribbean.  We obtained a negative but insignificant 
coefficient for the BIT*NRR interaction term in both the African and the Caribbean 
samples and hence we can offer no support for the general notion that BITs stimulate FDI 
in resource-rich ACP countries. 
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2.6: Conclusion 
 
 
This study examined the determinants of FDI into the ACP countries, with a particular 
focus on the role of PTAs.  A notable development in the global economy is the surge in 
the number and scope of PTAs.  The research interest on PTAs has very closely tracked 
their evolution over time.  Goods trade had a central role in PTAs formed in the early years 
(also known as the first wave of PTAs formed in the 1950’s-1970’s) and this attracted 
research interest on their trade effects.  With the second-wave of PTAs (1980’s to 1990’s), 
while merchandise trade remained important, the attention shifted onto the role of PTAs in 
multilateral liberalisation.  The more recent PTAs (third-wave) have extended into non-
trade provisions and hence effects on motivations beyond trade are pragmatic.  One of the 
likely non-trade impacts emphasized in the existing literature is the consequences on FDI.  
FDI is broadly claimed as important for economic growth, particularly for capital scarce 
countries such as the ACP group since it enables them to bridge their domestic savings-
investment gap.  However, while global FDI flows notably accelerated from the 1990s, the 
relative share of the ACP group remained low.  Hence, attempts to attract more FDI have 
always remained at the forefront of domestic policy as well as international organisations’ 
reform proposals.  As highlighted in Blonigen (2005), the most fundamental question about 
FDI is why a firm would choose a foreign location rather than opting for exporting or 
licensing arrangements.  In short, an understanding of the factors that underpin the ability 
of a country to attract FDI is important.  The existing literature has largely investigated the 
determinants of FDI using various samples of countries, but the ACP group has received 
relatively little attention.  This study thus extended our understanding on the factors that 
affect the FDI attractiveness of the ACP group.  In addition to estimating the relation in a 
bilateral framework, it included additional determinants of FDI along with the common 
variables identified in the theoretical and empirical literature to be important for FDI.  
These include PTAs, a measure of surrounding market potential, and the office hours 
overlap between source and host.  
While we do not claim our results to be conclusive, our empirical investigations do reveal 
some interesting findings.  In model 1 we estimated the average effect of each explanatory 
variable for the whole ACP group and then regionalised the PTA and BIT variables in 
models 2 and 3, respectively.  Furthermore, in models 4, 5 and 6, we decomposed the ACP 
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sample by specific region, namely the African, Caribbean and the Pacific to further 
investigate any regional patterns masked by aggregation of a heterogenous group of 
countries.  Consistent with the existing literature, our empirical investigations support the 
importance of domestic market size and surrounding market potential in attracting foreign 
investors, for the ACP overall and the African and Caribbean subsamples.  The 
implications from these findings are twofold.  Firstly, it indicates a prevalence of market-
seeking FDI into the ACP group.  It provides evidence that FDI into the ACP is not all 
about natural resources only but market size and consumers matter too.  Secondly, results 
support the importance of regional integration and market enlargement for the otherwise 
fragmented group of countries in our sample.  Additionally, as expected, FDI into the ACP 
group is sensitive to investment risks, which is in line with the existing literature.  The 
negative FDI-trade openness nexus indicates that the more the ACP countries engage in 
trade, the less FDI they attract, a possible reflection of trade and FDI acting as substitutes.  
The finding on the number of PTAs reinforces this claim whereby a negative coefficient on 
this variable may also be due to trade-FDI acting as substitutes rather than complements.  In 
terms of geographical distance and office hours overlap, our results indicate that both these 
variables are relevant for FDI activity in the ACP group.  Greater bilateral distance and 
smaller office hours overlap reduce FDI.  This indicates that it is important for foreign 
investors to firstly, understand the laws, culture and environment of the host ACP countries 
and secondly to frequently communicate with their foreign affiliates.  The presence of a 
DTT has a significant and positive impact on FDI in the ACP and each of its three 
subregions.  While no significant relationship between PTA and FDI was found in model 1, 
categorising the PTA variable by respective region in model 2 uncovered the variability in 
the PTA-FDI nexus across these three regions.  Results revealed a negative and significant 
African PTA-FDI relation, a positive and significant Caribbean PTA-FDI relation and no 
such relation for the Pacific PTA variable.  The PTA variable remained negative and 
significant for the African subsample, providing evidence of trade-FDI substitution. 
A decomposition of the ACP group into its regional subsamples (models 4, 5 and 6) 
revealed differences in the patterns of significant explanatory variables.  While the small 
sample sizes for the Caribbean and Pacific subgroups, particularly the latter, suggest 
caution in drawing inferences, it does suggest that foreign investors in the different regions 
may have quite different motivations. We can offer no support here for any notion that the 
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ACP may benefit from developing a common approach towards and common policies for 
attracting FDI.  
As noted, PTAs provide various channels through which their effects on FDI can be 
realised, one of which is the presence of investment provisions.  We decomposed the PTA 
variable into PTAs with investment and dispute settlement measures and PTAs without 
such provisions and estimated for the ACP overall and separately for each of the three 
subregions.  We found no consistent evidence that bilateral PTAs, with or without 
investment provisions, encouraged FDI.  On the contrary, we found that PTAs of both types 
discouraged FDI in Africa.  Perhaps these investment provisions are designed to attract 
small investments of a trade facilitating type which are insufficient in volume to offset the 
trade-substituting FDI that the PTA displaces.  But resolving this awaits the availability of 
more disaggregated FDI data.  
Similar to the growth in PTAs, the popularity of BITs has also grown because policy 
makers in developing countries believe that signing them will increase FDI (Neumayer & 
Spess, 2005).  The existing empirical evidence on the same is mixed, however.  A strong 
support for the role of BIT is found in Buthe and Milner (2009), Egger and Pfaffermayr 
(2004), and Neumayer and Spess (2005).  Others such as Hallward-Driemer (2003), Aisbett 
(2007), Tobin and Rose Ackerman (2003) do not find positive and significant effects.  We 
included a dummy variable to capture the presence or absence of a BIT between the source 
and host country in our regressions.  Consistent with the majority of studies in the literature, 
this variable turned out to be largely insignificant. We found no evidence that a BIT 
between the source and host country encouraged FDI in the full ACP sample or the African 
sub-sample, but there was positive and significant effect in the Caribbean.  Furthermore, in 
line with the claims in the literature of possible signalling effects of a BIT, we included the 
total number of BITs signed by the host country in our subregional regressions.  We also 
investigated if this signalling is confined to BITs with OECD countries or applies more 
generally.  Results revealed a possible signalling role for BITs, but specifically BITs signed 
with OECD countries.  BITs signed with non-OECD countries had no significant effect on 
FDI from OECD sources.   
We further explored the interactions between BITs and PTAs (with and without investment 
provisions).  In the Caribbean a PTA of either type has no significant effect on FDI, 
regardless of whether a BIT is in place.  In Africa, however, we found that a bilateral PTA 
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with investment provisions, with or without a BIT, reduces FDI; and a bilateral PTA 
without investment provisions does the same, unless a BIT is in place in which case FDI 
increases.  This reinforces the view that the investment provisions in a BIT and a PTA are 
somehow aimed at different types of investments.  We used a similar interaction between 
BITs and a host’s natural resource rent earnings.  We do not find any evidence that BITs 
play a greater role in the natural resources sector. 
In sum, while our findings do indicate that some of the common factors claimed in the 
existing literature to affect the FDI attractiveness of a country are also important for the 
ACP group, they do outline some peculiarities and contrasting relations for other FDI 
determinants.  This falls in line with Asiedu (2002) who highlighted the uniqueness of the 
African countries by providing evidence that factors that mattered for non-African 
countries in attracting FDI either did not matter or had different impacts in a sample of Sub-
Saharan African countries. Many of the ACP countries do not have complete data on most 
of the variables employed in our empirical framework.  Availability of a more complete 
dataset would enable more country pairs to be included in the investigation and facilitate a 
revised estimation in the future.  Also, since the dependent variable (FDI) is included in the 
model in log form, zero or negative FDI stocks are automatically excluded from our 
analysis.  This gives rise to concerns about sample selection bias where sample is not drawn 
randomly from the population but is restricted to positive and non-zero observations.  As 
future research, alternative gravity model estimation techniques that address this sample 
selection bias (such as those recommended by Helpman et al (2008)) can be used to 
improve the results from this chapter.   Moreover, this investigation can also be extended 
by categorising the ACP countries by income group. While our study has explored the 
relationship by different groupings (African, Caribbean, Pacific) and included GDP as an 
indicator of income, it would be interesting to see if there are any differences in the results 
when categorised by different income groups. Also, the findings on the role of natural 
resources can be further complemented by categorising countries by endowment of 
different natural resources and natural resource and non-natural resource countries.  While 
the country panel FDI flows can not be classified as natural resource FDI or non-natural 
resource FDI, country specific studies along these lines can be considered.  FDI decisions 
between a country pair can also be affected by the relative costs of locating FDI in a third 
country.  Future research can consider the flow of FDI between a parent and a group of host 
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coutnries, instead of a bilateral FDI relation.  The formation of PTAs between a group of 
countries provides a choice to FDI parent countries in terms of location.  Hence, while a 
PTA may exist between two countries, the parent country may decide to locate in any one 
of the PTA member countries (the relatively more FDI attractive country) and export tariff-
free to all members of that PTA.  Such export platform FDI behaviour affects bilateral FDI 
flows.  Moreover, a very recent paper (Hofman et al; 2017)55 provides an analysis on the 
contents of PTAs.  In particular, this paper has developed a database which provides 
information on the deep provisions in PTAs.  This information can be used in future 
research to construct indexes of PTAs depth and investigate the nexus of these provisions to 
FDI.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
55 This paper was available after this thesis was submitted for external examination. 
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Chapter 3  
The role of Preferential Trade Agreements in cross-
border worker mobility 
 
 
 
3.1: Introduction 
 
 
While global economic integration has intensified over the years, this process has not 
evolved evenly across the three dimensions of globalisation: trade, international capital 
flows and migration (Mayda, 2008).  The reduction of barriers to trade and capital flows 
has continued to attract the attention of policy makers, both at the national and international 
levels.  International institutions such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and individual country governments have actively 
pursued more liberal policies to facilitate the movement of these factors of production.  By 
contrast, labor mobility56 - though an ongoing phenomenon - remains restricted despite the 
strong economic rationale for such liberalisation.  For example, from a global perspective, 
several empirical investigations have concluded potential gains from labor mobility.  The 
World Bank (2006) estimated a global gain of 0.6 percent of world GDP through higher 
labor mobility.  Other researchers who also arrived at positive global impacts include 
Docquier, Machado, and Sekkat (2015), Walmsley, Louise, and Winters (2002), Moses and 
Letnes (2004), Hamilton and Whalley (1984), and Borjas (1999).  Despite this empirical 
evidence on the global gains from labor migration and the fact that it is often considered a 
factor of development and growth for developing and less developed countries 
(International Organisation for Migration [IOM], 2008), the movement of people (including 
temporary workers) across borders remain highly controlled.   
This relatively slow progress in international labor mobility can be partly attributed to the 
fact that the extent to which labor can be mobilised across borders depend on factors 
                                                          
56 In international services trade, labor mobility is defined as the temporary movement of natural persons (or Mode 4) which the WTO 
defines as the supply of a service by a service supplier of one member through the presence of natural persons in the territory of another 
member (Melo & Regolo, 2009). 
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beyond the control of trade policy frameworks.  Migration has economic, social and 
political implications and therefore overlaps interests of several institutions such as labor 
unions, immigration & border security, industries and non-government organisations.  
Moreover, the diverging views on labor migration - for example between an economist, 
politician and socialist or between countries at different stages of development – have 
influenced individual countries migration policies as well as derailed efforts for a coherent 
global framework to manage this process.  The friction (or social tensions) between the 
natives and immigrants has the potential to influence a society’s attitude towards 
immigration and consequently shape the political perspective as well (Gaston & Nelson, 
2013; Bearce & Hart, 2017).  Above all these mixed perspectives on freer labor mobility, a 
nation’s border security and immigration laws - sovereign to each country, have always had 
and will continue to have primacy on migration issues.  Thus, the multifaceted nature of 
migration perhaps explains the reluctance of countries to adopt more liberal policies on 
labor mobility compared to the flow of goods, services and capital.  The potential risks 
from migration and the current global tensions explain the tight migration policies 
emerging in various countries.  An influx of foreign workers poses threats to domestic 
workers both in terms of job availability and wages which may result in resistance from 
labor unions.  Rising terrorism, international drug and human trafficking have tightened 
border controls along with tougher immigration policies worldwide.  Further, as cited in 
Dowlah (2014) governments’ concerns of potential welfare burden of immigrants may also 
lead to tighter policies.  From the labor-exporting countries’ perspective, concerns of brain 
drain, consequent loss in tax revenues and productivity losses are among the leading 
downsides of emigration (Poot & Strutt, 2010).   
Whilst the above concerns apply to permanent migration, various scholars have deliberated 
on the potential gains and even offsets to these disadvantages, possible from temporary 
migration.  Some of the key prospective positive effects (argued in Poot & Strutt, 2010; 
Saez, 2013; Dowlah, 2014; and Felbermayr, Jung, & Toubal, 2009) are the spill-overs of 
knowledge and technology transfer from return migration, remittances inflows, greater 
investment into education underpinned by motivations to work abroad, and creation of 
trade and investment networks with host countries.  The empirical evidence of and 
motivations for temporary labor mobility due to these effects are inconclusive in the 
migration literature.  Nevertheless, the significance of remittances inflows, services trade 
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and demographic pressures has contributed to the demand for policies to enhance labor 
mobility.  Remittances, defined as money or goods sent to the home country from migrants 
abroad constitutes an important source of foreign exchange reserves for many nations.  
Compared to other flows such as overseas development aid and short-term investment, 
remittances exhibit greater stability.  While several factors determine these remittances, a 
key element is the growth in migration.  In a joint report by the OECD, ILO and the World 
Bank (2015), it was revealed that more than half of the world’s migrants live in the G20 
countries and remittances to and from these G20 countries account for almost 80 percent of 
global remittances flows.  Services trade is also an important source of foreign exchange.  
Services often comprise a very significant part of a country’s economy (Poot & Strutt, 2010) 
and liberalising labor movement can boost services exports.   
With regards to demographic pressures – an aging population, low birth rates and relatively 
higher wages in labor-importing countries, combined with contemporaneous 
unemployment, rising population, poverty and growth uncertainties in labor-export nations 
indicate prospects of economic gains at both ends.  The pull and push factors for labor 
mobility indicate convergence in the economic needs of labor-importing and labor-
exporting countries.  According to Poot and Strutt (2010), the basic economic perspective 
for migration is simple - it enables human resources to locate to where they are most 
productive.  Moreover, as mentioned earlier, several studies (World Bank, 2006; Walmsley 
et al., 2002; Moses & Letnes, 2004; Hamilton & Whalley, 1984; and Borjas, 1999) have 
estimated gains from migration at the global level57.    
Despite these strong economic rationales for liberalising the temporary mobility of workers, 
the opportunities for such mobility through the multilateral approach of the WTO are quite 
limited.  The focus on skilled worker mobility by the WTO provides no outlet for less 
developed and developing countries endowed with semiskilled and unskilled labor.  The 
temporary movement of workers is catered for by the WTO under its General Agreement 
on Trade in Services (GATS) through Mode 458.  It is however very restrictive in scope and 
was more designed to augment services trade, rather than create greater labor mobility 
generally.  Though it does not restrict the movement to skilled service workers, countries 
have nonetheless mainly committed to movement of a narrow range of highly skilled 
                                                          
57 These papers are discussed in section 3.2.3 (Economic gains from migration).   
58 Services trade is categorized under four different modes in the WTO’s GATS (1995).  Mode 1 includes provision of services abroad 
from home country, Mode 2 includes consumption abroad, Mode 3 is commercial presence abroad, and Mode 4 is the movement of 
natural persons to provide services across borders.   
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service workers in order to facilitate Mode 3 (commercial presence abroad).  Furthermore, 
a lack of clarity in definitions (for example of ‘service workers’ and ‘temporary’), 
inflexibility (Goswami & Saez, 2013), WTO’s principle of Most Favoured Nation (MFN) 
treatment59 (Poot & Strutt, 2010) and the reciprocal exchange of concessions (Dowlah, 
2014) are additional factors that explain the relatively slow progress of labor mobility at the 
multilateral level.  Dowlah (2014) posited that the WTO negotiations on Mode 4 appear 
futile despite being a credible window of opportunity.   
The political and social issues associated with the inflow of foreign workers have prompted 
the labor receiving countries to explore alternative options to address their labor market 
concerns rather than seeking foreign workers.  These alternative polices include for 
example, raising female labor participation rates, extending retirement age, shifting towards 
capital intensive production and outward investment (Chia, 2006).  Nevertheless, despite 
these efforts, the scope for foreign workers still remains.  With a lack of global efforts to 
mobilise these workers, both labor exporting and importing countries have resorted to 
alternative policies such as PTAs and BLAs60 to facilitate the movement of labor across 
their borders.  While these alternatives are not substitutes to the multilateral option, they 
have served as credible complements over the years.  Blank (2011) defines BLAs as an 
agreement between two countries that facilitates the exchange, recruitment, welfare, health, 
training, compensation and rights of migrant workers. 
Amidst the rising anti-immigrant sentiments in the developed countries and the Doha 
Round’s failure in liberalising this sector, trade agreements may provide a credible outlet 
for labor movement (Dowlah, 2014).  PTA’s diverge from the WTO’s Mode 4 coverage by 
including workers at all skill levels and across different sectors.  Compared to the narrow 
list of skilled workers catered for in Mode 4, PTA’s have a wider coverage and address 
additional issues related to labor mobility as well.  There are numerous barriers that limit 
the movement of workers to foreign markets.  Included among these are limited visa quotas, 
economic needs tests, complicated and lengthy visa processes, licensing requirements and 
an inadequate recognition of professional qualifications (Nielson & Taglioni, 2003).  PTAs 
provide an effective mechanism to negotiate and ease these barriers with potential 
                                                          
59 The Most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment is one of the principles of the WTO which does not allow WTO member countries to 
discriminate between their member trading partners.  Whatever treatment is accorded to one member trading partner has to be extended to 
all others; however some exceptions such as free trade agreements or special access to developing or less developed countries are 
allowed. (www.wto.org). 
60 A BLA is an agreement between two countries that facilitates the exchange, recruitment, welfare, health, training, compensation and 
rights of migrant workers (Blank, 2011). 
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destination countries.  Figueiredo, Lima and Orefice (2016) and Orefice (2015) elaborated 
on the following ways through which a PTA could encourage migration.  They viewed the 
signing of a PTA as an awareness mechanism.  In other words, when a PTA is signed 
between a host and origin country, individuals obtain information and hence get familiar 
with partner countries.  Furthermore, the inclusion of deeper integration provisions such as 
labor provisions may further stimulate cross-border worker movement.  However, they also 
noted that greater trade flows stimulated through PTAs may reduce the need for foreign 
workers should trade and foreign labor act as substitutes.  Nevertheless, demand may still 
persist in specific non-tradeable sectors such as services and/or other jobs which are not 
attractive to domestic workers.   
The popularity of PTAs as a labor mobility instrument has increased over time.  In an in-
depth examination of over 150 trade agreements, Ebert and Posthuma (2011) revealed that 
the proportion of trade agreements with labor provisions rose from a low of 4.0 percent in 
the 1995-1999 period to an 11 percent share in 2000-04.  This further increased to around 
30 percent in 2005-2009.  Goswami and Saez (2013) documented the following PTAs that 
offer almost full labor mobility – European Economic Area (EEA), European Free Trade 
Association, and Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA).  The 
coverage of skill levels and sectors negotiated under PTAs are also more comprehensive.  
Countries such as the US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and many others have 
negotiated various trade agreements that include mobility of a range of highly skilled to 
semi and low skilled workers in services, manufacturing and agricultural related activities.   
Given the narrow scope for labor mobility through the WTO despite the substantial 
economic importance of the same, the question that arises is how can less developed and 
developing countries increase their temporary labor mobility across borders?  As mentioned 
earlier, PTAs offer an alternative option.  But does the signing of a PTA in fact facilitate 
greater labor mobility amongst PTA partners?  This is clearly an empirical question, yet 
several data constraints have perhaps limited such investigations.  For a prolonged period of 
time, the empirical work on the determinants of migration was mainly confined to country 
specific studies due to a lack of panel bilateral data (Llull, 2016).  Recent advances in the 
availability of data on migration have facilitated country panel studies.  Pedersen, Pytlikova, 
and Smith (2008) and Mayda (2010) are the initial papers that have addressed bilateral 
migration flows for a panel of countries.  The existing migration literature has explained the 
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cross-border movement of people using a number of economic, social, demographic, 
geographical and political factors.  However, a literature search revealed only two very 
recent studies (Figueiredo et al., 2016 and Orefice, 2015) that included trade agreements as 
a determinant of migration in their estimations.  These two pioneering studies have 
however focused on explaining the role of PTAs in broad migration (permanent, temporary 
and for various purposes) and not explicitly on labor mobility.  To the best of my 
knowledge, there is no empirical research on the explicit role of PTAs in bilateral labor 
mobility which undoubtedly, is due to data constraints.  A major drawback of migration 
data is the differences in definitions used across countries in data compilation and the 
impossibility of discriminating between economic and noneconomic migrants.  The OECD 
is the only source that provides annual bilateral migration flow data for a large number of 
countries61.  However, that data is broad with definitional differences across countries62 and 
is also restricted to inflows into OECD countries only.  Hence movements into non-OECD 
countries are not captured.  According to the ILO, the share of migrants to total host 
population varies widely across countries with above 50 percent in the Gulf Corporation 
Countries (GCC) such as United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait and Bahrain.  This study 
uses bilateral labor flow data compiled by the United Nations Economic & Social 
Commission for Asia Pacific (UNESCAP).  The UNESCAP database provides data on 
flows of workers from 10 origin countries into their selected destination countries (a total of 
150 countries) which includes both OECD and non-OECD countries.  Although there are 
only 10 labor origin countries, it more closely fits the construct of interest.  Altogether, 
there are 388 country pairs in our dataset spanning the period 2000 to 2013.  Furthermore, 
we also include additional indicators such as host and origin country inflation, 
unemployment and political stability into our empirical model63.  These determinants are 
outlined as significantly influential in migrants’ decisions (see for example Karamera et al., 
2000; Pederson et al., 2008; and others). 
Hence, the economic rationales and potential benefits from increased labor mobility on the 
one hand and the very limited scope and no credible outlet for countries that have abundant 
semi and unskilled labor on the other hand, inspires this study to explore the role of PTAs 
                                                          
61 The World Bank and the UN population division provide bilateral migration stock data for every 10 years.  Figueiredo et al. (2016) 
used the World Bank data in their study while Orefice (2015) used the OECD data. 
62 The metadata for the migration database shows that the definition for inflow of foreign population differs across countries.  Some 
countries report permanent and temporary flows separately, some only cover permanent flows, some capture inflows for more than a few 
weeks while some use a longer time frame of months or almost a year.  Such inconsistencies severely limit cross-country comparison.  
The concept needed for this study is labor mobility only, while the OECD data includes movements beyond labor.   
63 These three variables are not included in Figueiredo et al. (2016) and Orefice (2015).  
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as an alternative channel for labor movement64.  Accordingly, chapter 3 is structured in the 
following manner.  In section 3.2, we reviewed the current trend in global migration and 
labor migration specifically, along with a review of the potential economic gains from 
temporary migration.  Next, section 3.3 illuminates the existing international economic 
channels through which labor mobility currently takes place.  These include the Mode 4 
provision of WTO, PTAs and BLAs.  In section 3.4, we review the related theoretical and 
empirical literature, section 3.5 explains the empirical model while the results are presented 
and discussed in section 3.6.  Finally, section 3.7 concludes this chapter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
64 While the literature relating to developments in and other issues on migration is mentioned in several parts of this chapter, it must be 
noted that this study is on temporary labor mobility and not permanent migration.  The background details on general migration are 
utilized to develop an understanding of this phenomenon, several aspects of which would also be applicable to temporary labor mobility 
(which is a subset of broad migration).   
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3.2: Key stylized facts 
 
 
3.2.1: Global migration – trends and developments 
 
According to the 2015 International Migration Report (UN, 2016), the number of global 
migrants reached 244 million in 2015, from 222 million in 2010 and 191 million in 2005.  
These absolute statistics reflect a growing trend; however, when viewed as a percent of 
global population, the subdued development is apparent.  For example, in 2015 the number 
of migrants as a percent of global population was only 3.3 percent.  The stylized facts in 
Table 3-1 reveal that relatively better economic condition appears to be the principal 
motivation for these migrants.  The bulk of these international migrations (in 2015) were 
hosted by high-income countries (71 percent).  The high-income OECD countries are a 
major destination (with 51 percent share) compared to the non-OECD high-income 
countries (20 percent).  The middle-income countries hosted 25 percent while the low-
income countries hosted only 4 percent of the world’s migrants.   
 
 
Table 3-1: International migration stock by income group-as at 2015. 
Destination Number of migrants 
(millions) 
As a % of total 
migrant stock 
High-income countries 173 71 
o/w :OECD countries 124 51 
       :Non-OECD countries 49 20 
Middle & low-income countries 71 29 
o/w :Middle-income countries 61 25 
       :Low-income countries 10 4 
(Source: International Migration Report 2015, UN (2016)) 
 
 
In terms of geographic distribution, Europe and Asia (see Table 3-2) hosted the majority of 
the international migrants in 2015, with Asia experiencing the fastest growth (of 53 percent) 
in migrant stock from 2000 to 2015, compared to other regions.  Northern American 
countries hosted 54 million of the world’s migrants in 2015, a 35 percent growth from 2000.  
This is followed by Africa (21 million), Latin America & the Caribbean (9 million) and 
Oceania (8 million).  In terms of specific countries, the International Migration Report 
(2015) revealed that the US hosted the largest number of international migrants (47 million) 
in 2015.  The leading European countries that hosted these international migrants in 2015 
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include Germany, Russian Federation, UK, France, Spain, Italy, and Ukraine.  Germany 
and the Russian Federation positioned as the second and third largest hosts, with 12 million 
migrants each in 2015.  The top five Asian destination countries include Saudi Arabia, 
United Arab Emirates, India, Thailand, and Pakistan. 
 
 
Table 3-2: Geographic distribution of global migrant stock - 2000 & 2015. 
Destination Country Number of migrants 
(millions) 
% Growth 
(2000 to 2015) 
2000 2015 
Europe 56 76 36 
Asia 49 75 53 
Northern America 40 54 35 
Africa 15 21 40 
Latin America & the Caribbean 7 9 29 
Oceania 6 8 33 
(Source: International Migration Report 2015, UN (2016)) 
 
 
The origin of these international migrants is mainly middle-income countries.  As revealed 
in UN (2016), 65 percent of the migrants in 2015 were born in a middle-income country, 25 
percent in high-income and only 10 percent in low-income countries.  Table 3-3 shows that 
Asia is the main supplier of international migrants with 43 percent of the global migrants 
(2015) being Asian born.  This is followed by Europe (25 percent), Latin America & 
Caribbean (15 percent), Africa (14 percent), Northern America (2 percent) and Oceania (1 
percent).   
 
 
Table 3-3: International migration stock by area of origin - 2015. 
Origin Country Number of migrants -
2015 (millions) 
As a % of total 
migrant stock 
Asia 104 43 
Europe 62 25 
Latin America & Caribbean 37 15 
Africa 34 14 
Northern America 4 2 
Oceania 2 1 
(Source: International Migration Report 2015, UN (2016)) 
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Tables 3-2 and 3-3 reveal that the European and Asian countries were the top two hosts and 
origins of international migrants in 2015.  Relatively fewer migrants originated from 
Northern America while it ranked third in terms of hosting these migrants.   
 
 
3.2.2: Key insights on global labor migration  
 
Next, we present an overview of global labor migration with particular focus on its 
composition, economic sectors and distribution by region and by host country income level.  
These insights are sourced from a recent and one-off estimate by the ILO.  The ILO 
estimated the global labor migration stock for 2013, as part of their broader objective of an 
improvement in and production of labor migration statistics at national, regional and global 
levels.  Since the unavailability of comparable yearly data precludes the discussion of trend 
over time, we illustrate the global composition of migrant workers, distribution by broad 
regional groups and income levels of host countries, and the sectoral composition.   
As revealed in ILO (2015) and summarised accordingly in Table 3-4, the total global 
population that was aged above 15 years (which is defined by the ILO as the working age 
group) was 5273 million in 2013.  Of these, 3390 million individuals participated in the 
labor market.  Hence, the global labor force participation rate was 64.3 percent in 2003.  
When analysed in terms of country of origin, 206.6 million of the 5273 million working age 
population were migrants.  Hence, 3.9 percent of the global working age population were 
international migrants.  Further, with respect to the labor market involvement of the 
migrants’ cohort, 150.3 million of the 206.6 million working age migrants participated in 
the labor market.  This shows that the migrants’ labor market participation rate was 72.8 
percent in 2003.  Comparatively, the migrants’ labor market participation rate (of 72.8 
percent) was higher than the non-migrants’ labor market participation rate (of 63.9 percent).   
 
 
Table 3-4: Population, migrant stock, total workers & migrant workers in 2013. 
Total global population (aged 15+ i.e. the working age population)-in millions 5273  
    o/w Total Migrants (aged 15+) -in millions 206.6  
    o/w Total non-migrants (aged 15+) – in millions 5066.4  
Total workers -in millions 3390 
    o/w Migrant workers -in millions 150.3 
    o/w non-migrant workers -in millions 3239.7 
Migrants as a % of total population 3.9 
Migrants as a % of all workers 4.4 
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Migrant workers as a % of migrants  72.8 
Non-migrant workers as a % of non-migrants 63.9 
Total workers as a % of population 64.3 
(Source: Calculated using data from ILO, 2015) 
 
 
In terms of the specific economic areas that absorbed these migrant workers, undoubtedly 
the services sector was the most popular.  According to the WTO, services accounts for two 
thirds of global output and is the most dynamic part of international trade.  The services 
sector therefore provides the most opportunities for these migrant workers.  As per the ILO 
(2015) estimates, of the 150.3 million migrant workers, 106.8 million (71.1 percent) were 
engaged in the services sector.  The manufacturing sector attracted 26.7 million migrant 
workers (17.8 percent) while the remaining 16.7 million migrant workers (11.1 percent) 
were engaged in the agriculture sector. 
When focusing on the destination countries chosen by these migrants, the attraction of 
economically prosperous countries becomes evident.  The ILO (2015) revealed that most of 
the migrant workers (74.7 percent) were living in high-income countries.  The middle-
income and lower-income countries were relatively less attractive.  The upper-middle-
income and lower-middle-income countries hosted 11.7 percent and 11.3 percent of 
migrant workers respectively, while the low-income countries attracted the lowest share of 
2.4 percent of migrant workers.  Interestingly, when viewed in terms of the regional 
distribution of these migrant workers, North America and Europe together hosted 57.7 
percent of global migrant workers (or 24.7 percent and 33.0 percent, respectively).  As 
revealed in Figure 3-1 and discussed in section 3.2.3, these two regions are faced with 
declining population and an increasing old age dependency ratio, providing ideal scope for 
labor sending countries.  The Arab States, well known for attracting foreign workers in 
their lucrative oil, gas, transportation and hospitality sectors absorbed 11.7 percent of 
migrant workers.  The remaining Asia and Pacific countries hosted 16.2 percent, Africa 5.8 
percent while Latin America and the Caribbean merely attracted 2.9 percent of the 2013 
global migrant stock.   
 
 
3.2.3: Economic gains from migration 
 
The economic consequences of migration have generated substantial interest and resulted in 
a huge volume of empirical research that has provided evidence on its positive and negative 
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effects.  Overall, the deliberations in this existing literature on the potential gains and losses 
from migration remain inconclusive.  While some studies have concluded gains, others 
have highlighted the potential negative impacts.   
Firstly, focusing on worldwide effects, various scholars have mainly concluded global 
gains from increased labour mobility.  The World Bank (2006) claimed that a 3.0 percent 
rise in developed-country labour force (from abroad) will substantiate into a gain of $300 
billion.  This gain is approximately four and a half times more than the magnitude of 
foreign aid (Pritchett, 2006).  Other researchers also concluding gains include Hamilton and 
Whalley (1984), Iregui (2005), Moses and Letnes (2004), Docquier et al. (2015), and 
Walmsley et al. (2002).  With the use of a partial equilibrium model and 1977 data, 
Hamilton and Whalley (1984) estimated global gains ranging from 60 to 205 percent of 
world GDP from complete elimination of all immigration restrictions.  With a similar 
assumption of full liberalisation, Iregui (1999) arrived at gains ranging from 15 to 67 
percent of world GDP, Moses and Letnes (2004) settled at 4.3 to 11.2 percent of world 
GDP (1977) while more recently, Docquier et al. (2015) concluded efficiency gains of 11.5 
to 12.5 percent.  While these studies have provided useful insights to the potential effects 
on global efficiency from totally liberalising labor mobility, their assumption of full 
liberalisation provides an overly optimistic estimation.  The World Bank (2006) and 
Walmsley et al. (2002) are based on partial liberalisation only.  Both these studies have 
arrived at similar estimates.  Walmsley et al. (2002) assumed a 3.0 percent increase in the 
workforce in developed countries and concluded a global gain of 0.6 percent of world GDP.  
The different modelling frameworks, assumed parameters and the degree of liberalisation 
explain the significant differences in these global estimations, however, the general 
conclusions of positive gains indicate the costs of restricting the international mobility of 
workers.  These studies indicate that if international labor movement is liberalised, the 
world economy as a whole will gain.   
A review of the more focused studies (based on a panel of countries and/or country specific) 
revealed mixed sentiments on the economic consequences of increased labour mobility.  On 
the downside, some of the potential pitfalls include threats to host workers both in terms of 
job availability and wages, with consequent resistance from labor unions, a potential 
welfare burden for host governments, a brain drain from source countries along with lost 
tax revenues and productivity (Dowlah, 2014; Poot & Strutt; 2010).  Alongside this, 
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geopolitical tensions, rising terrorism, international drug and human trafficking has added 
to demands for more stringent border control policies.  However, on the positive side, there 
are also claims of potential gains and even offsets to these disadvantages, particularly from 
temporary migration.  One of the increasing trends of the last decade has been the shift 
toward temporary forms of migration (Harris & Schmitt, 2001).  Some of the widely 
claimed prospective positive effects (argued in Poot & Strutt, 2010; Saez, 2013; Dowlah, 
2014; and Felbermayr et al., 2009 amongst others) include; 
 reduction in old-age dependency ratios, 
 remittances inflows,  
 human capital development through spill-overs of knowledge from return migration 
and greater investment into education underpinned by motivations to work abroad 
(i.e. brain gain through brain drain), 
 opportunities for trade and investment networks with host countries.   
Further insight into each of these positive effects is discussed next.  
 
 
Reduction in old-age dependency ratios 
A main demographic impact of international migration is its significant contribution to 
population dynamics.  Statistical projections by the relevant organisations have revealed a 
global demographic imbalance, both in terms of its age composition and growth.  For 
example, according to the UN (2015) Africa is projected to be the chief contributor to 
future global population growth between now and 2050.   
 
 
Table 3-5: Net number of migrants (in thousands). 
 Net number of migrants 
(in 000’s) 
Average 
annual 
population 
change (%) 
2000-2005 2005-2010 2010-2015 2020-2050 
Northern America 6174 6296 6179 0.52 
Oceania 574 1078 952 0.99 
Europe 8269 8495 4123 -0.15 
Africa -1581 -1813 -2900 2.05 
Asia -7912 -11369 -6281 0.45 
Latin America & the Caribbean -5525 -2686 -2074 0.54 
(Source: Compiled using data from the UN Department of Economic & Social Affairs, Population Division database available at 
www.un.org/en/development/desa/population) 
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The average annual population change (2020-2050) in the African countries is projected at 
2.05 percent (see Table 3-5) while in contrast, Europe’s population is projected to shrink by 
0.15 percent for the same time period.  Hence, positive net migration can offset potential 
declines in a country’s population, while negative net migration may ease high population 
growth pressures and the consequent increasing demand for jobs, health, education and 
other government services.  As a further support, for the high-income countries, while the 
total births are forecast to outpace deaths by 20 million (i.e. the natural population change) 
between 2015 to 2050, the net gains in migrants over the same time period (i.e. the migrant-
induced population change) is estimated at 91 million (UN, 2015).  As shown in Table 3-5, 
between 2000 and 2015, Northern America, Oceania and Europe recorded positive net 
migration while negative net migration is evident in Africa, Asia, Latin America & the 
Caribbean. 
Moreover, in terms of composition by age, the global population aged over 60 is noted to 
be the fastest growing.  Europe is reported to have the greatest share of its population aged 
over 60 (24 percent).  Rapid population aging is also expected in other parts of the world 
and according to the UN (2016) projections, all major areas except Africa will have nearly 
25 percent of their population aged over 60 by the year 2050.  An economic advantage of 
positive net migration (particularly where the migrants are young) for countries where 
populations are declining/aging (such as in Europe) is a reduction in old-age dependency 
ratios.   
Figure 3-1 reveals the expected rapid growth in the old age dependency ratio, particularly 
for Europe and Northern America.  The ratio for the African countries is projected to 
remain relatively flat from 2015 onwards.  The Oceanic and Asian countries ratios are 
expected to rise, and a similar pattern is evident for the Northern American countries.  
Europe’s old age dependency ratio has remained comparatively higher than other country 
groups since 2000 and is projected to grow sharply over the years.   
While migration cannot reverse aging, it can mitigate the dependency ratios through an 
influx of working age population.  For example, the UN (2016) estimated that without 
migrants, the old-age dependency ratio of Europe in 2050 would increase to 51 persons per 
100 persons of working age, which would however decline to 48 persons per 100 of 
working age if the current migration pattern continues.  Likewise, Northern America and 
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Oceania are also expected to experience an increase in their old-age dependency ratios with 
zero-net migration.   
 
 
Figure 3-1: Old age dependency ratio* 
 
(Source: Compiled using data from the UN Department of Economic & Social Affairs, Population Division database available at 
www.un.org/en/development/desa/population).  *Ratio of population aged 65+ per 100 population 15-64. 
 
 
Remittances inflows 
A popular claim on the positive consequences of labour mobility is its significance in 
generating remittances flows.  Remittances are an important and resilient source of capital 
for developing countries.  For example, when economic slowdowns reduced foreign direct 
investment and foreign aid flows from high-income countries, migrant remittances 
continued to grow (OECD, 2006).  The World Bank (2016) estimates of remittances show 
that global inward remittances flows have surged from US$464 billion in 2010 to US$59365 
billion in 2014.  The inward flows for 2015 are forecast to have reached US$601 billion.  
The importance of remittances is much higher for low-income countries, representing a 
significant portion of their national income.  This is evident from the top ten remittance 
recipient countries in 2014 (see Table 3-6), as a percentage of GDP. 
There is a huge volume of economic literature on the impact of remittances on receiving 
countries (see for example Salas, 2014; Adams & Page, 2005; Acosta, Calderon, Fajnzylber, 
& Lopez, 2008; Catrinescu, Leon-Ledesma, Piracha, & Quillin, 2009; Gupta, Pattillo & 
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Wagh, 2009; Adams & Cuecuecha, 2013; Kumar, 2013; Nyamongo, Misati, Kipyegon, & 
Ndirangu, 2012).  Broadly, some of the welfare effects of remittances gathered from this 
literature include its contribution to education and human capital investment (Salas, 2014; 
Adams & Cuecuecha, 2013) poverty alleviation (Adams & Page, 2005; Acosta et al., 2008; 
Gupta et al., 2009; Adams & Cuecuecha, 2013; Hatemi-J & Uddin, 2014; Rubrico, 2015), 
balance of payment effects (OECD, 2006), and economic growth (Catrinescu et al., 2009; 
Kumar, 2013; Nyamongo et al., 2012; Imai, Gaiha, Ali, & Kaicker, 2014; Giuliano & Ruiz-
Arranz, 2009).  Moreover, through a comparative lens, Dowlah (2014) highlighted that 
remittances have outpaced flows of foreign direct investment as well as foreign aid, making 
it a top source of development capital for many countries. 
 
 
Table 3-6: Top ten remittance recipient countries – 2014. 
Country Remittances 
inflows as 
a % of GDP 
Country Remittances 
inflows as a % 
of GDP 
Tajikistan 42 Liberia 25 
Kyrgyz Republic 30 Haiti 23 
Nepal 29 Comoros 20 
Tonga 28 Gambia 20 
Moldova 26 Armenia 18 
(Source: World Bank: Migration & Remittances Fact book, 2016) 
 
 
Human capital development 
A particularly frequent concern within the literature on the negative economic effects of 
migration is the loss in knowledge capital – termed as ‘the brain drain’.  The brain drain 
effect of migration has long been a development concern, particularly for poorer countries 
(Agrawal, Kapur, McHale, & Oettl, 2011; Maria & Stryszowski, 2009; and others).  
However, contrary to the conventional view of the brain drain, several authors (IOM, 2008; 
Stark, 2004; Stark & Wang, 2002; Beine, Docquier, & Rapoport, 2001; Dustmann, Fadlon, 
& Weiss, 2011; Mayr & Peri, 2008) have argued on the prospect of “brain-gain through 
brain-drain”.  These new insights argued that instead of a winner or loser position from 
migration, origin countries can transform these skill-losses into gains.  While agreeing that 
brain drain may have a direct negative impact on human capital of the origin country, these 
authors emphasised indirect effects with the potential to reduce this negative impact and 
even result in a brain gain.  More explicitly, the IOM (2008) stated that labour migration 
has the potential to enhance human capital development in labour-sending countries by 
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raising skill levels, increasing the competitiveness of the workforce, and strengthening 
global networks.  Additionally, Stark et al. (1998) and others used representative agent 
models and emphasised that not only actual migration but an anticipation of migration itself 
has the possibility of raising human capital formation in the home country.  The main 
proposition of these authors is that the probability of migration strengthens the incentives to 
upgrade skills which results in an overall gain in the human capital of the home country.  
This assertion is further developed in Stark (2004) who explained the possibility of brain-
gain rather than brain-drain using the concept of the socially optimal level of human capital 
investment.  According to Stark, individuals underinvest in human capital when there is 
zero migration due to the ignorance of a human capital externality.  The possibility of 
migrating to another country with relatively higher wages induces individuals (both 
migrating and non-migrating) to choose a much higher level of human capital.  Stark labels 
this as the inducement-effect which he argued could even be strong enough to result in a 
brain-gain for the home country.   
In an earlier work, Stark and Wang (2002) showed that the presence of migration is akin to 
a government subsidy in pushing an economy towards the socially optimal level of human 
capital.  They concluded that migration triggers both – brain drain and brain gain and a 
well-planned migration policy can produce a welfare gain for both migrating and non-
migrating workers.  Furthermore, temporary migration provides a platform for skill-
diffusion from return migrants (Barrett & O’Connell, 2000; Borjas & Bratsberg, 1996; 
Mayr & Peri, 2008; Dustmann et al., 2011).  Motives for return-migration may be visa 
related (short-term approvals), an optimal life-cycle residential location sequence, or 
because initial migration decisions were based on erroneous information (Borjas & 
Bratsberg, 1996).   
In sum, while the issue of brain drain cannot be ignored - particularly in low income 
countries where the endowment of skilled professionals is scarce, and the possibilities of 
return migration are low - there is another growing strand of thought that has emphasised 
the possibility of migration and return-migrants as potential channels of human capital 
development for the origin country.  This different perspective has led to a twist on how the 
migration and human capital nexus is viewed.  Diaspora knowledge networks and return-
migrants are now viewed as essential capital that can be harnessed to convert the 
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conventional and criticised brain drain consequence into a brain gain outcome (Meyer & 
Wattiaux, 2006).   
 
 
Trade, FDI and migration 
The relationship between migration and trade has been extensively studied and while there 
is a growing consensus that both are connected, the deliberation on whether they are 
substitutes or complements to each other is contentious.  On the theoretical front, the 
standard international trade theories provide contrasting implications.  For example, the 
Hecksher and Ohlin model suggests that trade and factor movements are substitutes.  Based 
on this argument then, increased trade should reduce immigration pressure – which is what 
the many supporters of NAFTA as well as the EU’s eastern enlargement suggested (Gaston 
& Nelson, 2013).  However, with developments on the theoretical front, particularly the 
incorporation of increasing returns to scale and monopolistic competition, the implication is 
that trade and migration are complementary (Bruder, 2004).  Meanwhile, as regards further 
theoretical and empirical explorations, while Mundell (1957) concluded them as substitutes 
there are others who claimed them to be complementary (Markusen, 1983; Felbermayr et 
al., 2009; Rauche & Trindade, 2002; Anukoonwattaka & Heal, 2014; Rauch, 2001; Bruder, 
2004).  The idea of substitutability can be traced back to the very early works of Mundell 
(1957) who used standard competitive economic models to show that (i) higher trade 
restriction produces more factor movements and (ii) restricting factor movements 
encourages more trade.  Later on, the ideas developed in Mundell (1957) were challenged 
by Markusen (1983).  The perspective of trade and migration as substitutes indicates that 
the rapid liberalisation of trade that the global economy has experienced over the past 
decades would lessen migration.  More specifically, countries then have a choice between 
admitting goods and admitting people (Anukoonwattaka & Heal, 2014).   
However, in line with the implications of the new trade theories and the empirical works 
mentioned earlier, the trade-migration connection cannot be restricted to substitutes only.  
There is also the possibility of a complementarity relation between trade and migration.  
This line of thought reveals the potential trade-enhancing gains from migration.  In fact, 
many empirical works (such as Rauch, 2001; Felbermayr et al., 2009; Rauche & Trindade, 
2002) have found evidence of this connection.  The main premise of this strand of the 
literature is that migrants can facilitate source-host trade by reducing trade costs due to 
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incomplete information, through the establishment of networks, and simply by creating 
demand due to their preference for home produced goods.  In a meta-analysis of 48 studies, 
Genc, Gheasi, Nijkamp and Poot (2011) revealed that migration increases trade between 
host and origin countries, with a marginally higher impact on exports than imports.  Overall, 
they concluded that an increase in the number of immigrants by 10 percent increased trade 
by 1.5 percent.   
By analogy to trade connections, migrants can also be channelled into possible information 
providers and network to attract more foreign investment (see for example Kugler & 
Rapoport, 2006; Javorcik, Ozden, Spatareanu, & Neagu, 2011; Rauch, 2001; Federici & 
Giannetti, 2008; Docquier & Lodigiani, 2010).  While the related literature exploring the 
migration-FDI nexus have acknowledged the possibility of a substitutability relation, the 
possibility that migration may enhance bilateral FDI has also been expressed.  Migrant 
networks can create trust (Docquier & Lodigiani, 2010) as well as be a source of 
information thus reducing the country risk-premium (Kugler & Rapoport, 2006).  Migrants 
have greater familiarity with their home country and hence are a good source of 
information on market opportunities, market structure, consumer preferences, business 
ethics and commercial codes (Javorcik et al., 2011).  In fact, both Kugler and Rapoport 
(2006), and Javorcik et al. (2011) used data on US FDI abroad and migrants in the US and 
concluded that ethnic networks were important channels of information for FDI purpose.  
Similar assertions surfaced in others such as Federici and Giannetti (2008), and Docquier 
and Lodigiani (2010).  Moreover, in a study on the significance of ethnic Chinese networks 
in facilitating bilateral FDI, Tong (2005) found evidence of a positive relation which held 
not only for the Southeast Asian economies but also for countries in other regions.   
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3.3: International economic migration channels: what currently 
exists? 
 
 
International migration is a complex reality and while international cooperation is critical to 
ensure safe, orderly and regular migration (UN, 2016) there is no coherent global regime in 
place for managing these flows (Panizzon, 2010).  The economic virtues of greater labour 
mobility are well understood; however, migration is also a socially and politically sensitive 
issue.  As revealed in Pritchett (2006) several countries have tightened immigration policies 
in response to various geopolitical tensions while at the multilateral level, the WTO 
negotiations are more focused on specific sets of skilled labour movement.  Labour 
mobility is therefore in a policy deadlock at the WTO’s multilateral level negotiations 
(Doha 2001 round) and countries have resorted to other mechanisms to include labour 
issues into international relations (Ebert & Posthuma, 2011).  Hence, besides the limited 
provision for labour mobility through the WTO’s GATS Mode 4, countries have engaged in 
bilateral labour agreements and international trade agreements.  These bilateral agreements 
(discussed below) offer the advantage of forming more customised polices to suit 
respective countries labor market conditions, social, cultural aspects along with greater 
flexibility (Chanda, 2009).   
 
 
3.3.1: WTO’s GATS Mode 4 for labour mobility 
 
Labour movement at the multilateral level appears in the WTO’s General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (GATS) which was created in 1995.  GATS is a multilaterally agreed 
framework applicable to all WTO members for the trade in services.  It provides four 
modes through which service trade may take place.  These include cross-border supply 
(Mode 1, e.g. distance education received from abroad), consumption abroad (Mode 2, e.g. 
an international student), commercial presence (Mode 3, e.g. a foreign bank) and presence 
of natural persons (Mode 4, e.g. foreign consultant present in destination country).  Thus, 
labour mobility is catered for through Mode 4.  The movement of natural persons 
provisioned for in Mode 4 is defined by the WTO as service suppliers from one country 
(who may be independent or who work for a service supplier) moving abroad to provide the 
service.  It does not concern people seeking access to the employment market in the partner 
country or other issues such as citizenship or residence.  GATS Mode 4 does not override a 
168 
 
country’s migration policies, but is implemented within that context (IOM, World Bank, 
WTO, 2004).  The purpose is mainly to facilitate services trade between countries, given 
that not all services can be provided from the home country.  Some services may require 
the service providers to move across borders.  Therefore, Mode 4 service suppliers can be 
defined as service providers moving for a specific purpose, are confined to one sector and 
are temporary (Nielson & Taglioni, 2003).   
Similar to the flexibility provided under the WTO’s trade rules (GATT), countries are 
permitted to exclude some provisions and practise flexibility in their commitments under 
GATS.  For example, a country may exclude selected sensitive sectors or a particular mode 
of supply, limit the market access or adopt specific conditions or requirements for market 
entry.  The agreement allows the process of services liberalisation to occur with 
consideration of the national policy objectives and development level of member countries.  
While the other three modes of services supply have achieved deeper liberalisation, Mode 4 
remains highly restricted with countries hesitant to expand on their commitments 
(Carzaniga, 2003).  In fact, a main criticism of GATS from the less developed and 
developing countries is its failure in producing any meaningful market access to them in the 
mode of supply (i.e. Mode 4) that is of the greatest interest to them (Chanda, 2009).  From 
the perspective of these countries, the potential economic returns from labor mobility are 
large enough to keep demand for such liberalisation high on their list of negotiations 
(Dawson, 2013).   
Table 3-7 presents some key features on Mode 4 commitments which reveal the restrictive 
position that countries have adopted in terms of liberalising labour mobility and other 
issues of concern with Mode 4.  Clearly, definitional issues, greater emphasis on skilled 
service personnel, narrower list of commitments compared to other modes, stringent entry 
barriers through economic needs test among other caveats have contributed to the slow 
progress on labor liberalisation through this channel.  In particular, the focus on higher skill 
levels is a disadvantage for developing and less developed countries that have semi-skilled 
to unskilled labor in abundance but are unable to access foreign markets for their workers 
through Mode 4.   
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Table 3-7: An evaluation of Mode 4 commitments. 
Skill levels  Technically covers all skill levels but commitments are limited 
to the higher skilled (managers, executives, specialists). 
 More emphasis on intra-corporate transferees. 
 General terms such as managers or business visitors are not 
defined, making possible considerable scope for interpretation 
and discretionary action by officials. 
Horizontal 
rather than 
sectoral 
commitments 
 Same conditions applied to all service sectors with no greater 
access given in sectors of particular relevance. 
More restrictive  Comparatively fewer commitments on mode 4 than the other 3 
modes. 
 Very few cases of full commitments and fewer cases of partial 
commitments compared to the other modes. 
 Sectors where mode 4 is important has fewer commitments. 
Length of stay  No standard definition on temporary movement. 
 Only one third of commitments include specified duration of 
stay: mainly for intra-corporate transferees (2-5 years) and 
business visitors (3 months). 
Economic Needs 
Test 
 Sector specific ENT appears in medical, dental, entertaining, 
financial services and generally applies to specialist personnel, 
highly qualified professionals, managers, executives. 
 23 countries have exempted ENT for certain categories of 
natural persons (generally those that facilitate mode 3 and 
managerial or other experts with specialised company 
knowledge). 
 Few countries comply with the requirement for information as 
to ENT criteria. 
Other 
restrictions 
 Quotas on number of foreign suppliers. 
 Proportion of total employment met by foreigners or the 
proportion of senior staff (found in 80 cases). 
 Pre-employment requirements. 
 Technology transfer requirements. 
 Restrictions on geographic and sectoral mobility or between 
firms. 
MFN 
Exemptions 
 38 MFN exemptions relevant to mode 4 (32 are preferential 
agreements and others are reciprocal). 
 Examples of measures include granting of work permits, 
waiving of ENTs, improved access for certain services. 
 Beneficiary countries not clearly and always identified. 
Wage purity and 
strike clauses 
 50 countries have scheduled conditions relating to domestic 
wage legislation, working hours, social security. 
 Right to suspend commitments in the event of labour dispute (in 
22 cases). 
(Source: Nielson & Taglioni, 2003).  This information is from Nielson and Taglioni (2003), who originally sourced it from the WTO 
Secretariat (1998), Chanda (1999) and Young (2000). 
 
170 
 
Moreover, as summarised in Table 3-7, the number of commitments in Mode 4 are 
relatively smaller than the number of commitments in the other three Modes.  According to 
Self and Zutshi (2003), two particular reasons for the limited commitments in Mode 4 are 
firstly, enforcement concerns and secondly protection of the domestic labour market.  They 
outlined that although the GATS provides the flexibility to governments to enforce 
measures to control movement of people into their country, concerns that bound 
commitment may affect this flexibility remain.  Further, policies that generate fears of job 
stability and wage declines have the scope to reduce the political popularity of any regime, 
prompting governments to prioritise labour market protection despite the economic logic of 
liberalisation.   
Meanwhile, given the existing caveats on Mode 4, WTO member countries have tabled 
their proposals in several sequential negotiation phases on how these limitations can be 
improved.  Some of the suggestions include the need for greater clarity and development of 
common definitions, more transparency, separate GATS visa to facilitate entry rather than 
the detailed and lengthy normal visa procedures, and more market access (Nielson & 
Taglioni, 2003).  Nevertheless, further opening of Mode 4 has achieved very little progress 
at these WTO negotiations, the latest being the Doha 2001 round.  As mentioned in Dowlah 
(2014), negotiation on services is more complicated than in goods and the application of 
WTO principles such as reciprocal exchange of conditions and national treatment have 
stalled further liberalisation.   
 
 
3.3.2: Labour mobility through Bilateral Labour Agreements  
 
Bilateral labour agreements (BLAs) provide yet another mechanism to achieve cross-border 
movement of workers.  Blank (2011) defines BLAs as an agreement between two countries 
that facilitates the exchange, recruitment, welfare, health, training, compensation and rights 
of migrant workers.  Thus, a BLA is not simply designed to express demand or supply for 
foreign workers, but it extends into addressing other economic and social issues related to 
labor.  Managing labor flows through BLAs allows greater involvement from the respective 
partner countries’ governments (OSCE 66 , ILO, IOM, 2006).  Moreover, the inherent 
policies in these agreements have the advantage of being linked to the specific demand and 
supply conditions in both the partner countries.  From the perspective of the origin 
                                                          
66 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. 
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countries, BLAs offer a mechanism to negotiate on wages, living conditions, job security 
and other labor related issues for their citizens’ temporarily working abroad.   
 
 
Table 3-8: BLAs by region from 1990-2014. 
Year Africa Asia Europe & Americas Total 
1990-1994 0 0 11 11 
1995-1999 2 4 4 10 
2000-2004 1 6 23 30 
2005-2009 17 32 10 59 
2010-2014 2 18 6 26 
Total 22 60 54 136 
(Source: ILO, 2015) 
 
 
The use of BLAs can be traced back to the early 1900s with the agreement between France 
and Italy signed in 1904 being the first BLA (ILO, 2015).  BLAs have been used for both 
skilled and unskilled labour movement.  They have increased in number over the years 
however there is no single institution which monitors or provides information on global 
BLAs.  Hence, it is impossible to capture the trend in BLAs or to include them in multi-
country estimations; however, some studies in the migration literature (see for example 
Blank, 2011; Hars, 2002) have explored their usage by certain countries to some extent.  
Moreover, labour related global organisations such as the ILO and IOM have also showed 
interest in the development of BLAs.   
Table 3-8 shows the BLAs by region and for each five-year interval from 1990 to 2014.  
The Asian region has a relatively larger number of BLAs from the 1990 to 2014 period, 
however as revealed by ILO (2015) if the BLAs signed prior to 1990 were included, then 
the total for Europe and Americas would dominate all other areas.  Strikingly, Table 3-8 
reveals a surge in BLAs signed after 2000 until 2009, after which the volume of BLAs 
declined.  The rise in BLAs in the 2000-2004 period was clearly driven by Europe and the 
Americas, whereas in the next five-year interval, Africa and Asia also increased their 
involvement in BLAs.  Table 3-9 provides some examples of countries67 that have signed 
BLAs extracted from the Compendium of Good Practice Policy Elements in Bilateral 
Temporary Labour Arrangements (2008)68.  Given the countries listed in Table 3-9, it is 
evident that Canada, Italy, Spain and South Africa have signed several BLAs.  Most of 
                                                          
67 It must be noted that Table 3-9 provides only some examples of countries that have BLAs and is not an exhaustive list.  
68 This is an outcome of an expert symposium on Good Practice Policies in Bilateral Temporary Labour Arrangement held in Madrid, 
Spain (in October 2008).  Participants included EC, ILO, IOM, OSCE, OECD amongst others. 
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South Africa’s BLA partner countries are from within the same African region.  The scopes 
of these BLAs vary widely.  They are mainly sector specific with different operational 
procedures.  For example, the Canadian and Spanish BLAs are mainly for the agriculture 
sector, the UK BLAs are for the health care workers, Greece has signed BLAs covering 
agriculture and fisheries while South Africa mainly focused on the mining sector 
(Stephenson & Hufbauer, 2011).  Therefore, BLA’s have been extensively used to mobilise 
semi-skilled to unskilled workers, which are not catered for under the WTO’s GATS.  
However, the effectiveness of these BLAs in managing cross-border movement of workers 
remains unknown with little research on their impact.  The effectiveness also depends, to a 
large extent on whether these policies enshrined in the BLAs are actually implemented.  As 
reported in (OSCE, ILO, IOM, 2006), almost 25 percent of the BLAs in OECD countries 
are not implemented.   
 
 
Table 3-9: Bilateral Labour Agreements - some examples. 
Country Partners 
Argentina Bolivia, Peru 
Canada Barbados, Colombia, Guatemala, Jamaica, Mexico, Trinidad & Tobago, 
Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States 
 
France Mauritius 
Guatemala Mexico 
Greece Albania, Bulgaria, Egypt 
Italy Egypt, Albania, Tunisia, Colombia, Ecuador, Morocco, Moldova, Sri 
Lanka 
 Japan Philippines, Indonesia 
Mauritius China 
Portugal Bulgaria, Cape Verde, Romania, Ukraine 
Spain Bulgaria, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Mauritania, 
Morocco, Romania, Senegal, Phillipines 
 
Sri Lanka Qatar, Jordan, Libya, United Arab Emirates 
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South Africa Cuba, Iran, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Mauritania, 
Morocco, Senegal, Tunisia, Mozambique, Lesothos, Botswana, 
Swaziland, Malawi 
UK India, Philippines, Spain 
(Source: ILO, IOM, OSCE (2008)) 
 
 
3.3.3: Labour mobility through trade agreements  
 
Given the impasse on cross-border labour mobility in the Doha Round (2001), countries 
have shown an increasing interest to include such provisions in international trade 
agreements (Dowlah, 2014).  PTAs were initially designed to facilitate the flow of goods 
between countries, however, a striking development of these PTAs is their expansion into 
other areas such as labor flows.  There are a number of ways that PTAs accommodate labor 
mobility and differ from the Mode 4 provision of the WTO.  As revealed in Grover and 
Saez (2013), PTAs provide a wider scope compared to Mode 4 by including both skilled 
and/or unskilled labor, and also extend into a larger set of sectors (services, manufacturing, 
agriculture).  The NAFTA is often referred to as an ideal example.  Through the “temporary 
movement of business people” provision, NAFTA provides opportunities for temporary 
labour mobility across Canada, USA and Mexico.  This movement is facilitated through a 
NAFTA visa (TN-non-immigrant visa).  Table 3-10 provides key coverage of some leading 
trade agreements with labour mobility provisions.   
 
 
Table 3-10: Labour mobility provisions in selected trade agreements. 
Trade Agreement                    Labour mobility provisions 
NAFTA  Temporary movement of business people across US, 
Mexico, Canada. 
 Has own trade NAFTA visa (TN visa). 
 TN visa uncapped for Canadians since 1994 and Mexicans 
since 2004. 
 TN visa permits work for 1 year with unlimited renewals. 
 Development of mutually acceptable standards, criteria for 
licensing and certification of professionals. 
US-Chile  Entry for professional workers. 
 Special visa (H-1B1 visa). 
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US-Singapore  Capped at 1400 professional visas (for Chile) and 5400 
visas (Singapore) per year. 
 Stays up to 18 months with unlimited extensions. 
EU Chile  Temporary movement of natural persons under 33 
categories of professional service providers. 
 Subject to necessary academic qualification and experience. 
EU-CARIFORUM  Temporary movement of natural persons under 28 
categories of professional service providers. 
 Expanded to include a few categories of workers beyond 
Mode 4.  These include contractual service suppliers, 
independent professionals, and graduate trainees. 
 Subject to necessary academic qualification and experience. 
Canada-Chile  Access for professionals as well as semiskilled foreign 
workers. 
 Covers 72 categories. 
 No specified length of stay. 
Canada-Colombia 
Canada-Peru 
 Access for professional workers (As per Mode 4) and 50 
categories of semi-skilled workers. 
 No specified length of stay. 
Japan-Mexico  
Japan-Chile 
 Access to traders, investors, Information Technology, 
business visitors, intra corporate transferees, independent 
professionals. 
 Time limit of three years (except for business visitors). 
Japan-Indonesia  
Japan-Philippines 
 An expanded list of professional workers compared to 
Mode 4 coverage. 
 Includes nurses and health care workers and independent 
professionals. 
 Stay up to 3 years. 
(Source: Dowlah, 2014; Stephenson & Hufbauer, 2011) 
 
 
As revealed from Table 3-10, while some trade agreements have mirrored the WTO’s 
Mode 4 in setting up their labour provisions, others have expanded their provisions.  The 
developed countries have a clear interest in the mobility of professional service providers 
and are more focused on using Mode 4 to facilitate their multinational corporations whereas 
developing countries interest lie in the movement of independent service suppliers and not 
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mainly employees of multinational corporations (Stephenson & Hufbauer, 2011).  
Accordingly, many of the trade agreements have incorporated provisions that not only 
include a wider category of workers but also provide longer-term stays with unlimited visa 
renewals.  Nevertheless, as argued in Stephenson and Hufbauer (2011), the issue of labour 
mobility in trade agreements is still evolving.  With the current impasse on this issue at the 
WTO level and given the economic significance of labor mobility, the use of PTAs as a 
labor mobility instrument may grow further over time.  Such trend is evident in a study by 
Ebert and Posthuma (2011) who examined over 150 trade agreements and revealed that the 
proportion of trade agreements with labor provisions rose from a low of 4 percent in the 
1995-99 period to an 11 percent share in 2000-04.  This further increased to around 30 
percent in 2005-09.   
In sum, while the GATS Mode 4 provides a credible window of opportunity for mobilising 
workers across borders, countries have remained hesitant to further develop this provision.  
On the one hand, while developing and less developed countries have emphasised the 
importance of foreign labor markets for their abundant semi-skilled to unskilled labor, the 
developed countries on the other hand have mainly exploited Mode 4 to assist the flow of 
skilled personnel in order to facilitate their foreign direct investment activities.  In addition 
to this mismatch in interests, issues such as the WTO’s principles of MFN treatment and 
reciprocity have further derailed any progress on Mode 4.  Alternatively, countries have 
resorted to arrangements at bilateral or regional level.  The use of PTAs to mobilise 
workers provides countries with the advantage to link worker mobility with trade and/or 
multinational activity, as well as provides them with bargaining power when negotiating 
with partners.  Countries can trade their interests with their partner countries with a focus 
on specific industry needs and their labour market characteristics.  Moreover, when 
compared to PTAs and GATS Mode 4, BLAs provide scope for greater flexibility since 
they are formed between two countries only.  The involvement of a smaller number of 
players (i.e. only two countries) implies a less cumbersome process of revision and 
amendments to provisions.  Moreover, these agreements can be designed to respond to 
economic cycles, be firm based, and members can utilise joint efforts in monitoring foreign 
workers (Stephenson & Hufbauer, 2011).  However, on the downside, neither trade 
agreements nor BLAs can achieve a market reach as large as that of the WTO (Dawson, 
2013).  Moreover, Dawson (2013) also underlined human and administrative costs and lack 
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of resources as potential setbacks for developing countries to fully participate in the 
negotiation process of these alternative arrangements.  Nevertheless, statistical evidence on 
the shift in PTAs towards inclusion of labor provisions and the growing use of BLAs 
indicate that nations are investing in alternative mechanisms to obtain, secure and develop 
their access to foreign labor markets.   
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3.4: Literature Review 
 
 
3.4.1: Selected theories on migration 
 
Broadly, there are multiple reasons that motivate people to migrate.  While some 
individuals move abroad for work (i.e. economic migrants), others may be motivated by the 
desire to join their families, or the movement could be a result of forced migration, such as 
refugees.  Various schools of thought across multiple disciplines have emerged to explain 
these different motivations for migration.  Migration is too diverse and multifaceted to be 
explained in a single theory (King, 2012).  As mentioned in Massey, Arango, Hugo, 
Kouaouci, Pellegrino and Taylora (1993), there is no single coherent international 
migration theory, but a set of fragmented perspectives guided by different concepts and 
assumptions.  Migration research itself has attracted attention from various disciplines such 
as economics, sociology, anthropology, human geography, demography, politics, history 
and international relations (O’Reilly, 2012).  Given this multi-disciplinary interest and 
multi-motivated nature, migration has been theorised from a diverse number of viewpoints.  
For example, the neoclassical theory explains the movement from an individual’s economic 
decision perspective (Massey et al., 1993), while the classical assimilation theory is a 
sociological perspective on migration (Lee, 2009).  Hence, these theories - while not 
contentious with each other - supplement the viewpoints on migration and are therefore 
useful in their own way.  On this note, we highlight the basic tenets of five of these schools 
of thought that explain migration.   
 
 Neoclassical theory,  
 New Economics of Labor Migration (NELM) theory, 
 Dual Labor Market Theory,  
 World Systems theory,  
 Network theory, 
 Institutional theory.   
 
The Neoclassical, New Economics of Labor, and Dual Labor Market theories concentrate 
on the labor market elements – hence providing an explanation for the economic migrants 
who are the focus of this paper.  The latter three (World Systems, Network and Institutional) 
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are much broader perspectives and provide additional insights on the factors that may 
encourage migration, including economic migration.  Hence, these general insights are also 
useful and applicable in the construction of the explanatory variables for our empirical 
model (which explains temporary labor migration) since they outline additional (non-
economic) variables that may facilitate this movement.   
 
Neoclassical theory 
The neoclassical theory is an economic approach to migration and is also labelled as the 
oldest and most popular school of thought by Massey et al. (1993).  This theory focuses on 
individuals as the decision-making agents.  These individuals are rational, risk-neutral and 
seek to maximise their utility (Karpestam & Frederik, 2013; Zickute & Kumpikaite-
Valiuniene, 2015; Hagen-Zanker, 2008).  The imbalance in the demand and supply of labor 
across countries results in wage differentials (Massey, 2013).  Labor abundant countries 
have relatively lower wages while labor scarce countries have higher wages.  Hence, the 
wage disparity creates migration opportunities for individuals willing to move abroad for 
these higher incomes.  The central argument of the neoclassical view is therefore the 
relative difference in income that drives migration of workers across borders.  Some 
examples of the neoclassical theories mentioned in Zickute and Kumpikaite-Valiuniene 
(2015) include Ravenstein (1889), Heckscher (1949) and Ohlin (1993) migration theory, 
Todaro (1969) and Harris-Todaro (1970) rural-urban migration theory.  The analytical 
rigour, ability to produce a discernible set of testable hypotheses and useful tools for 
analysing both the causes and effects of migration underpin the popularity of the 
neoclassical theory in the current migration literature (Kurekova, 2011).  Nevertheless, the 
narrow perspective of the neoclassical thought with wage difference as its central argument 
attracted many criticisms as well.  
 
New Economics of Labor Migration (NELM) theory 
The New Economics of Labor Migration (NELM) is also an economic perspective on 
migration.  This theory augmented the neoclassical thinking (discussed earlier) by 
broadening the decision-making agent from an individual to larger units (families or 
households) and including risk and diversification into the decision making process.  
Households therefore manage the risks to their income by diversifying labor into local and 
foreign markets (Massey et al., 1993).  Through a collective decision, they send one or few 
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members to work abroad while others remain in domestic markets (Hagen-Zanker, 2008).  
Migration therefore is a household decision and not purely an individual utility maximising 
outcome (Kurekova, 2011), with the costs of migration and income from foreign 
employment (remittances) shared within households.   
The inclusion of risk into decision making is a major highlight of the NELM stream, 
particularly for poor countries where market (e.g. insurance, capital) failures or weak 
markets make individuals more vulnerable to uncertain events such as drought, hurricane, 
or crop failure (Hagen-Zanker, 2008), and at the same time also inhibits their ability to 
finance consumer purchases or production activities (Massey & Espinosa, 1997).   
 
Dual Labor Market Theory 
While the neoclassical and NELM theories explained migration as an outcome of individual 
or household decision, the dual labor market theory - also an economic viewpoint - posits 
that migration arises from the labor demands of modern industrial societies (Massey et al., 
1993).  Accordingly, it is not the push factors such as low wages (as in the previous two 
theories) but rather the labor need (hence a demand side perspective) of the receiving 
countries that generates migration.  This theory divided the labor market into two segments 
- a well-paying primary sector and an unskilled lower paying secondary sector.  The 
reluctance of the local workers to accept the lower paying jobs in the secondary sector 
creates demand for foreign workers.  As mentioned in Hagen-Zanker (2008) and on the 
basis of the multifaceted nature of migration, the focus of this theory is narrow with 
emphasis only on the demand side of foreign labor.  The characteristics of the labor sending 
economies and other determinants (both from origin and host country perspective) are not 
adequately linked to migration in this theory.  
 
World Systems theory 
The World Systems theory has a broader perspective in that it does not narrowly confine 
the phenomenon of migration to labor markets within nations only but has linked it to the 
structure of the world market instead.  This theory aligns much more closely to the process 
of globalisation (such as the emergence of multinational firms, international relations, 
global integration etc.) whereby driven by capital accumulation motives (such as the search 
for new raw materials, land, labor, markets etc.), there are movements across countries.  
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Migration is viewed as a response to capitalist developments whereby the spreading of the 
global economy into peripheral regions is the catalyst for international movement (Massey 
et al., 1993).  Hence, it is the dynamics of market creation and the structure of the global 
economy that creates migration (Hagen-Zanker, 2008), a quite different and much broader 
perspective than the three theories reviewed earlier.  While the World Systems Theory does 
focus on economic motives (such as multinational firms, search for factors of production) it 
brings in additional non-economic elements into explaining migration.  These include the 
links developed between countries due to their past colonial relations.  The cultural, 
transportation, lingual and communication links developed through such linkage facilitate 
migration (Gallup, 1997). 
 
Network theory and Institutional theory  
Additional theories such as the network theory and institutional theory emerged to explain 
the development of migration over time and highlight the support elements that ease this 
process, rather than the initiation of migration which was the main focus of the theories 
discussed earlier.  According to the network theory, previous migrants (through their ties of 
friendship, family, community links) form a source of social network that potential 
migrants can rely on for information and other support such as temporary accommodation 
and employment search (Massey & Aysa, 2005; King, 2012).  On these grounds, the 
network theory is also referred to as social capital theory in the literature (see for example 
Massey & Espinosa, 1997).  More precisely, the potential value of the relationship with 
these previous migrants is viewed as a form of social capital which individuals can draw on 
when deciding to migrate or even after they have moved abroad.  These pioneer migrants 
act as an integrating device for new migrants who would otherwise face higher costs of 
migration (Hagen-Zanker, 2008) and therefore have a multiplier effect (i.e. perpetuate 
movement) on migration (King, 2012).  Hence, the network theory adds a dynamic 
perspective to the process of migration and emphasises the role of relationships between 
individuals and/or societies that facilitate this movement.  The intuition from this theory is 
relevant broadly across a variety of different motivated movements (such as student, 
worker, and/or refugee migration).   
Finally, the institutional theory emphasises the role of private institutions and voluntary 
organisations that emerge in response to migratory flows and further facilitate migration.  
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This theory argues that with the onset of migration, institutions that provide a range of 
migration related services emerge.  These institutions can be profit-making or voluntary, 
and as these institutions become well established and popular, they form a social capital for 
migrants (Gallup, 1997).   
In summary, a number of theories emerged from the early 1960s to the present to explain 
migration through a variety of mechanisms.  Evidently, migration is a multifaceted and 
complex phenomenon and no single theory sufficiently explains this process.  While some 
theories narrowly explain a specific migration motive (for example the Neoclassical and 
Dual Labor Market Theory focus on labor migrants), other schools of thought can be more 
generally applied to understand several other motivated migration such as family 
reunification, education, refugee movements etc.  Moreover, researchers from a variety of 
disciplines (such as sociology, anthropology, human geography, demography, politics, 
history and international relations) have utilised and developed migration theories from 
their perspective.  Hence, the evolution of thought on migration is diverse, cuts across 
multiple disciplines and is influenced by a mix of political, economic, sociological and 
other factors.     
 
 
3.4.2: Empirical literature 
 
The earlier empirical works on the determinants of migration were mainly country specific 
studies due to data constraints.  However, with advancements in migration data this stream 
of research has broadened into country panel studies.  This section reviews both (country 
specific and country panel) types to highlight the (pull and push) factors that motivate an 
individual to move across borders.  Various macroeconomic, social, demographic, political 
and geographical characteristics have been utilised in these empirical works to understand 
what drives migration.  However, the inclusion of PTAs has only surfaced in two very 
recent papers; Orefice (2015) and Figueiredo et al. (2016). 
Mayda (2010) and Pederson et al. (2008) claim to be the pioneering cross-country studies 
on the determinants of migration.  Some of the other works include Ramos and Surinach 
(2013), Llull (2016), Cuaresma, Moser, and Raggl (2013), Ortega and Peri (2009), Kim and 
Cohen (2010), and Fagiolo and Santoni (2016).   
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Mayda (2010) investigated the determinants of bilateral migration inflows into 14 OECD 
countries between 1980 and 1995.  In a panel regression framework, the migration inflow 
(from country i into country j at time t) as a ratio of the population (in country i at time t) 
was used as the dependent variable.  The explanatory variables included the GDP per 
worker in the migrant originating country, GDP per worker in the host country, distance 
between the home and host country, common border, colonial relationship, the share of 
young population in the home country, and dummies for host and home country specific 
effects.  The paper concluded that a 10 percent increase in the host country’s per worker 
GDP resulted in a 20 percent increase in the immigration rate.  Further, doubling the great-
circle distance between the source and host country decreased the number of emigrants by 
41 per 100,000 individuals in the origin country, while a common land border did not play 
a relevant role.  The impact of a common language, though of the right sign, was not 
statistically significant and the same was concluded for past colonial relationships.  The 
share of the origin country’s population who is young resulted in a positive and significant 
impact on emigration rates.   
In the same vein but with particular focus on network and selection effects69, Pederson et al. 
(2008) investigated the determinants of immigration flows into OECD countries in 1990-
2000.  Their paper operationalised the dependent variable analogous to Mayda (2010) while 
the control variables included cultural similarity, colonial past, common language, distance, 
trade, relative size of population, political situation (represented using the freedom house 
index), income distribution, GDP per capita in the home country, unemployment in the 
home and host countries, stock of foreigners from the home country in the host country as a 
ratio of the host country population, and public social expenditure to GDP ratio in the host 
country.  The latter two variables capture the network and selection effects respectively.  
The authors concluded a large positive network effect, however, they found no evidence for 
selection effects.  Further, linguistic, closeness, and current business ties were noted as 
important positive factors.   
Mayda claims to be the first paper to use OECD migration data for explaining migration 
flows.  Pederson et al. (2008), a precursor to Mayda also used data from the OECD 
                                                          
69 Network effects arise when previous migrants in a country encourage potential migrants and selection effects are where the decision of 
migrants to move into a particular country is influenced by the ease with which they can gain access to the respective destination 
country’s welfare schemes and provisions (Pederson et al., 2008). 
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migration database, together with additional data sourced from the individual countries in 
the sample.   
Ramos and Surinach (2013) estimated a gravity model of migration between 16 of the 
European Union’s neighbouring countries (ENC) and the EU.  They concluded a positive 
effect of relative GDP per capita, origin country population, common language, and 
colonial relationship on bilateral migration stock while the population of the host country 
and distance had significant negative coefficients.   
Llull (2016) explored the determinants of bilateral migration after constructing a database 
of bilateral migrant stocks from data obtained from the National Statistics Offices of 24 
OECD countries.  The findings revealed that relatively higher income opportunities (real 
GDP per capita of host), population of the origin country and gravitational variables such as 
common language, border, colonial relationship facilitated greater cross-border movement 
of people.   
Cuaresma et al. (2013) arrived at similar findings in their gravity model specification.  In 
addition to GDP per capita, population, and geographical and cultural contiguity variables, 
they also found that the stock of migrants from the origin country already present in the 
host country also positively influenced migration.   
Ortega and Peri (2009) merged the migration flows data from Mayda (2010) with the 
OECD International Migration data for 14 OECD countries to explain the economic and 
legal determinants of international migration.  Consistent with Mayda (2010) and others, 
Ortega and Peri (2009) confirmed that differences in the level of per capita income between 
the destination and origin countries and colonial relations have a positive and significant 
role in migration.  They however did not find any role for common border or common 
language.  Moreover, by utilising a list of immigration laws by country and year for their 
sample of countries, the authors developed indices of migration policy tightness from the 
reforms mentioned in the immigration laws.  As expected, their findings revealed that 
tighter non-asylum migration policies significantly reduced immigration inflows while the 
tightness of asylum laws had negative but insignificant impacts.  Moreover, with the use of 
dummy variables they also concluded significant positive effects of the Maastricht treaty 
but not for the Schengen Agreement.   
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Kim and Cohen (2010) quantified the determinants of migration inflows into 17 OECD 
countries and outflows from 13 OECD countries in two separate gravity models.  They 
extended the debate on the predictors of migration by including additional 
demographic/social variables such as the infant mortality rates and urbanisation.  In their 
inflows specification, they concluded significant positive effects of origin population, infant 
mortality rate of host, urban population of both origin and host, land area of destination, 
common border, language and colony.  Significant negative effects were arrived at for 
distance, land area and infant mortality rate of origin.  For migratory outflows, they 
outlined urban population of origin and host, infant mortality rate, land area of origin and 
the common gravitational variables (common border, colonial links, common language) as 
relevant positive variables while infant mortality rate of host and distance were found to be 
negative.   
Fagiolo and Santoni (2016) used migration data sets on 191 countries from Abel (2013) and 
concluded that an increase in origin population, violence in origin country, common border, 
common language and past colonial relation boosted emigration flows.  They also found a 
positive income (at destination) and migration relationship while income at origin country 
was also positive, albeit comparatively smaller.  Regarding the role of migrant networks, 
the study found that an increase in the stock of migrants at destination increased bilateral 
migration flows.   
Among the country specific studies reviewed are the works of Clark, Hatton, and 
Williamson (2007), Karemera, Oguledo, and Davis (2000), Sulaimanova and Boston (2014), 
Hatton (2005), Ahmad, N. Hussain, Sial, M. Hussain, and Akram (2008), Gallardo-Sejas, 
Pareja, Llorca-Vivero, and Martínez-Serrano (2006), Freguglia, Goncalves, and Silva 
(2014), Cheng and Yang (1998).  Clark estimated a model to explain variations in 
immigration into the US by source country from 1971-1998.  The paper concluded that a 10 
percent increase in a source country's income per capita reduces the immigration rate by 4.4 
percent.  Migrant stock was also concluded as having a positive impact, while in terms of 
migration policy, an increase of 10 percent in the family quota raised immigration from a 
country by 0.3 percent.  The same proportionate increase in employment visas raised it by 
1.4 percent.  Meanwhile, a 10 percent increase in the refugee allowance raised immigration 
by 0.5 percent, while the effect of the diversity quota was minimal.  By contrast, the effects 
of the Immigration Reform and Control Act were relatively large.  The inclusion of 
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migration policy as a control variable is an important contribution of this paper, and the 
consequent results point to its relevance.  Such inclusion is relatively more feasible in 
country specific studies.   
Karemera et al. (2000) and Sulaimanova and Boston (2014) are broader studies compared 
to Clark (2007) since they cover immigration into two countries.  Karemera et al. (2000) 
focused on immigration into the US and Canada from 1976 - 1986.  In their paper, 
migration policy is also addressed, however, with the use of a dummy variable.  The 
findings are that while distance impairs migration flows to North America, population 
growth in the countries of origin leads to increased migrant flows.  Population growth in 
US and Canada however reduce migration inflows.  In response to the level of economic 
development in the two destinations, immigration flows are positively associated for the 
case of USA, while having no relevance for Canada.  Meanwhile, economic developments 
in the source countries decrease immigration in both cases.  The estimated coefficient for 
unemployment in the USA model is less than 1, while in the Canadian model it has an 
unexpected sign and is not statistically significant.  Tighter migration policy restricts 
immigration in both cases.   
Sulaimanova and Boston (2014) presented empirical evidence on the determinants of 
emigration from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan from 1998 to 2011.  Their results underlined 
per capita GDP as the main macroeconomic determinant of migration.  Moreover, higher 
labor force size of origin, higher wages in host and depreciation of the domestic currency 
exerted a positive and significant effect on migration.  Higher remittances received and 
improvement in per workers value-added in agriculture discouraged individuals from 
moving abroad.   
Meanwhile, Ahmad et al. (2008) studied the macroeconomic determinants of international 
outward migration from Pakistan.  Using time series data from 1973 to 2005, they found 
that a higher domestic unemployment, lower real wages and high inflation rate drove locals 
out of the country.  Moreover, lucrative inward remittances (an indication of better 
economic conditions overseas) also further motivated locals to move abroad.  In Hatton 
(2005), three different migration flows are investigated for the UK economy, from 1976 to 
2000.  This paper investigated the impacts on immigration, emigration and net immigration.  
In the immigration model unemployment has a negative effect, GDP is positive, relative 
Gini coefficient (a measure of income inequality) has a positive sign but is not statistically 
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significant, the migrant stock has a large and significant positive effect, and the dummies 
for EU enlargement of 1986 takes a relatively smaller coefficient compared to the 1995 
dummy.  The relaxation of migration policy (approximated using a dummy variable) has 
strong positive effect.  The emigration model has similar results as above except with the 
opposite signs.  The impact of income inequality is more pronounced in the emigration 
equation. 
Gallardo-Sejas et al. (2006) studied the determinants of immigration into 13 European 
destination countries from 139 origin countries.  Their results supported the following host 
and origin variables as significant; population, GDP per capita, language, young population, 
education, inflation and the GINI coefficient.  Moreover, they found that while the 
unemployment rate of the origin country mattered, the unemployment rate in the 
destination country and the presence of a common border were insignificant.   
Marfouk (2007) examined the forces driving highly-skilled emigration from Africa to the 
OECD countries and found that both economic and non-economic factors mattered.  In 
particular, income difference, past colonial relations, linguistic similarity, population 
growth and social welfare program at destination country encouraged migration.  The 
factors that discouraged this worker mobility included distance and higher unemployment 
at destination.  A further insight provided by this researcher is the impact of the 
immigration policies70 of the five traditional immigration OECD nations (Australia, Canada, 
NZ, USA and the EU).  They found that the immigration policies of the first four countries 
(collectively) encouraged workers to emigrate while the policies of the EU were found to 
be neutral.   
Furthermore, on a national level, Freguglia et al. (2014) analysed the determinants of 
interstate skilled labor mobility in the Brazilian labor market for the period 1995-2006.  
The study identified wage differences, more work experience, economically prosperous 
states, larger population agglomeration and urban amenities as essential push factors.  
Hence, these results confirm that better economic conditions and livelihood drive workers 
to move from one location to another.  Cheng and Yang (1998) tested the determinants of 
highly skilled migration to the US from 104 countries for the year 1988.  Consistent with 
                                                          
70 The proxy for immigration policy utilized is however questionable.  The study used a dummy variable strategy.  Hence if the 
destination country is the EU, it was categorized as a dummy variable reflecting EU policies, and if the destination country was either 
Australia, NZ, Canada or the US, it was assigned as another dummy variable, reflecting the significant selective programs that existed in 
those countries.  These dummies may very well capture other effects apart from migration policies.   
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their expectations, they found that economic interaction and educational articulation 
between the origin country and the US facilitated the inflow of foreign workers.  Economic 
interaction is defined by the authors as economic interdependency between the origin 
countries and the US through trade relations, foreign investment, multinational corporations 
etc.  All of these are hypothesized to increase the origin country workers’ knowledge (via 
networking and as employees of foreign corporations at home) of opportunities abroad, the 
inherent disparities in living and working conditions while at the same time developing 
their skills through employment with these foreign operations on their soil.  Educational 
articulation referred to students or workers from origin countries attaining education or 
training in the US or the replication of the US education/training systems in the origin 
countries which heightens the similarity in knowledge and hence facilitates the absorption 
of these foreign workers abroad71.  Furthermore, while differences in living conditions and 
job opportunities enhanced labor migration into the US, research opportunities, political 
conditions and children’s education opportunities were concluded to be irrelevant.   
As mentioned earlier, Orefice (2015) and Figueiredo et al. (2016) are the only papers that 
have included PTAs in their empirical works.  Orefice (2015) claims to be the first study 
that considered PTAs as a determinant of migration.  The investigation utilised data on 
bilateral migration from 198 origin countries into a sample of 29 OECD destination 
countries over the period 1998-2008.  The main premise of Orefice (2015) is that the 
presence of a PTA between the origin and the host country facilitates migration.  Moreover, 
the findings also revealed that migration related provisions in PTAs are also significantly 
influential in encouraging cross-border movement of people.  Figueiredo et al. (2016) used 
the World Bank data on bilateral migration stocks for every 10 years for 200 countries to 
investigate the role of PTAs as a determinant of migration.  The study confirmed the 
positive and significant role of PTAs and the migration related provisions of PTAs in 
stimulating greater migration.  Additionally, relative GDP, population of origin country, 
initial migrant stock, and gravitational factors (common colony, border, language) also 
encouraged migration while destination population and distance discouraged cross-border 
movement.   
                                                          
71 US FDI, imports and exports to the US, number of students from origin country in the US, foreign students in origin country, book 
imports, and periodical imports were used to proxy for economic interaction and education articulation.  
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The main propositions of the literature reviewed here are that favourable economic, 
geographic and demographic characteristics of destination countries motivate migration 
while at the same time, relatively better prospects in origin countries may retain individuals 
in their home countries.  For instance, Sulaimanova and Boston (2014) revealed that 
improvements in agricultural output and remittances discouraged migration.  While the 
economic, geographic and demographic explanatory variables included in these studies are 
broadly consistent, selected studies have also emphasized the importance of migration 
policy and previous migrants in the destination countries.  Moreover, more recently, 
Orefice (2015) and Figueiredo et al. (2016) have also added PTAs to these traditional 
determinants of migration.   
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3.5: Research method and data 
 
 
 
The objective of this empirical analysis is to explain the variation in labor mobility from 
country i (origin) into country j (host) at time t using a set of independent variables, with 
specific focus on the role of PTAs.  We adopt an augmented gravity model approach.  
Apart from modelling bilateral trade and FDI flows, this technique has also been used for 
migration flows (see for example Karemera et al., 2010; Vanderkamp, 1977; Garcia, 
Pindolia, Lopiano, & Tatem, 2014; Greenwood, 2005; Lewer & Berg, 2008).  As 
mentioned in Greenwood (2005), in a gravity model migration is hypothesized to be 
positively related to the size of the host and source country, while negatively associated 
with the geographical distance between them.  The model is augmented in the sense that 
additional variables expected to influence bilateral migration are added.  The model to be 
estimated is as follows: 
ln (𝐿𝐹)𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑛𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐶𝑖,𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑛𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑀𝑗𝑡
+ 𝛽7𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐿𝑛𝐷𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽9𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽10𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑗
+ 𝛽11𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑗𝑡+𝛽12𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽13𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑗𝑡 +  𝛽14𝑃𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖𝑗 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 
(1) 
The dependent variable in equation 1 (𝑙𝑛(𝐿𝐹)𝑖𝑗𝑡) is bilateral labor mobility which is 
defined as people moving from country i into country j at time t on a work visa.  The 
country from which labor originates is referred to as the origin country (i) while the 
destination of these workers is the host country (j).  The data is sourced from the 
UNESCAP Labor Migration Outflow database and includes labor outflows from a total of 
10 origin countries into 150 host countries.  Altogether, there are 388 country pairs 
spanning the period 2000-201372.  The main explanatory variable in equation 1 is the 
existence of a PTA (𝑃𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑡) between the origin and host country in year t, denoted using a 
dummy variable.  This data is sourced from the WTO’s trade agreements database available 
at www.wto.org.  We later expand our analysis and investigate if the presence of labour 
provisions in each of these trade agreements generates greater labour mobility between the 
origin and host countries.  Information on the specific provisions of a PTA is obtained from 
the accompanying text of each PTA available on the WTO’s website.  The rest of the 
                                                          
72 See Table 25 in the Appendix for the list of country pairs. 
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explanatory variables include relative GDP per capita (RGDPCi,jt), population of origin and 
host country (Popit, Popjt), inflation, political stability and unemployment rates in the origin 
and host country (INFit, INFjt, Polit, Poljt, UNEMit, UNEMjt, respectively) and standard 
gravity variables between each country pair such as distance (Dij), the existence of a 
common language (Langij), common border (Borderij) and past colonial relationship (Colijt).  
The data on the macroeconomic and demographic indicators (GDP, population, 
unemployment, inflation) are sourced from the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators, political stability  data are from the World Governance Indicators of the World 
Bank, while the gravity variables (distance, border, language, colonial relation) are from 
CEPII.  Finally, αij captures country-pair fixed effects, αt are time fixed effects whereas εijt 
is the stochastic error term.  Table 3-11 provides a summary of the explanatory variables 
included in specification 1 and their expected relation with labor mobility, after a 
discussion of these expectations.   
Though workers leaving on a temporary work permit are preferred, it is not possible to 
distinguish between temporary and permanent migrant workers.  It is noted that workers 
may later apply for permanent residence while working abroad which categorises them as 
permanent migrants.  International trade policies, either through the WTO provisions or 
through any form of trade agreements cater for temporary mobility and not the permanent 
movement of people.  These international instruments are not designed to handle permanent 
migration issues.  Data that specifically focuses on movement of workers on a temporary 
basis is not available.  The UNESCAP data is the closest measure of labor mobility across 
borders and preferred over the OECD migration data.  The OECD database is the only 
comprehensive source of bilateral migration data for a group of 34 OECD member 
countries.  This database shows the inflows of foreign population from a total of 200 home 
countries into the 34 OECD member countries.  While this migration data can be a proxy 
for labor mobility, the main drawback is that it is limited to a narrow group (34 countries) 
of industrialised OECD member countries as the host countries.  According to the ILO, the 
share of migrants to total population varies widely across countries with above 50 percent 
in the Gulf Corporation Countries such as United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait and 
Bahrain.  The adoption of the OECD database would preclude these countries as the host 
countries from the sample.  Hence while the OECD database has the disadvantage of a 
narrow group of host countries, the UNESCAP database has the downside of a narrow 
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group of origin countries.  Further, the OECD migration data is broader with definitional 
differences across countries.  It measures flows beyond labor, such as asylum seekers (in 
some countries), family migrants, international students etc.  The UNESCAP data covers 
only individuals leaving on work permits.  Hence, the UNESCAP data (sourced from the 
UNESCAP Labor Migration database) is adopted as it provides the closest approximation 
to temporary worker mobility.   
Relative GDP per capita (calculated as the ratio of host to origin GDP per capita at time t) 
is used as a proxy to capture the migration incentives resulting from income differentials 
between the host and origin country.  It is assumed that the per capita GDP reflects the 
general income in the respective country and hence a comparatively better earning 
propensity in the foreign country will induce more workers to move (Gregoriou et al., 2010; 
Karamera et al., 2000; Orefice, 2015; Figueiredo et al., 2016; and others).  The relationship 
to the dependent variable is expected to be positive.   
The population (of origin and host country) controls for the size of these respective 
countries.   A more populated origin country indicates a larger supply of workers who may 
move abroad (Pederson et al., 2010).  Karamera et al. (2000) concluded the population of 
origin country to be the single most significant determinant of migration flows.  Figueiredo 
et al. (2016) also provided evidence of a significant positive relationship between the origin 
country population and migration.  Hence, this supply factor is expected to have a positive 
relation to labor mobility.  The impact of the host country population on opportunities for 
foreign workers can be explained in the following ways.  Firstly, growth in the host country 
population increases the possibility that the employment needs will be provided by 
domestic labour instead.  This therefore reduces the absorption capacity of the host 
countries (Karamera et al., 2000) and would dampen demand for foreign workers.  
However, from another perspective, a growing host country population may also stimulate 
more demand for goods and services and thus create job opportunities for foreign workers.  
Moreover, if the population growth is driven by an increasing life expectancy of individuals, 
then an aging population will also stimulate demand for foreign workers particularly in the 
services sector.  Accordingly, the expected sign of the coefficient of this variable is 
ambiguous.   
Other macroeconomic indicators included in our specification are the unemployment and 
inflation rates of the host and origin countries.  The inflation-labor mobility relation can be 
192 
 
viewed as follows: On the one hand, increases in origin (host) country inflation may 
indicate economic instability and thus motivate (discourage) individuals to move to more 
stable (unstable) economies  (see for example Karamera et al., 2000).  On the other hand, 
increased origin (host) inflation could also signal an expanding economy and reduce 
(increase) the incentives to move abroad.  Given these mixed possibilities, the expected 
sign of inflation is ambigious.  The unemployment rates reflect the labor market conditions 
of the respective country.  A rising unemployment rate in destination countries would 
indicate less job opportunities and dampen demand for foreign workers whereas higher 
source country unemployment rates would push individuals to seek jobs abroad (Karamera 
et al., 2000; Pederson et al., 2008).  Hence, origin country unemployment coefficient is 
expected to be positive while host country unemployment is expected to be negatively 
related to labour mobility.  Additionally, political instability in host countries would 
discourage inward migration (Karamera et al., 2000; Greenwood & McDowell, 1992).  
With regards to political stability in the origin country, while a more politically stable 
economy may encourage individuals to remain in their country, the same could positively 
influence their decisions to seek jobs abroad.  Accordingly, the host country political 
stability coefficient is expected to be positive while the expected relation between the 
origin country political stability and cross-border labor mobility is ambiguous.   
As mentioned earlier, the presence of a PTA between the home and host country (denoted 
using a dummy variable strategy) is the main variable of interest in this study.  As 
summarised in Orefice (2015) and Figueiredo et al. (2016), a PTA can generate greater 
labor mobility through the following two ways.  Firstly, a PTA reflects formation of an 
international/diplomatic relation between countries.  This information and network effect 
may contribute to greater movement of workers across borders.  Secondly, the inclusion of 
labor provisions in PTAs73 may also facilitate labor movement among member countries.  
Nevertheless, given that a PTA is a direction towards greater trade liberalisation, it can also 
be argued that such freer trade may reduce the need for foreign workers.  Both theoretical 
and empirical research on the relation between trade and migration provide mixed results.  
While some have regarded them as substitutes, others have argued that trade and migration 
are complementary74.  Hence, from the perspective of trade-migration acting as substitutes, 
a PTA may discourage the need for foreign workers whereas a complementary relation will 
                                                          
73 We later expand our analysis and decompose the PTA variable into those that contain labor provisions (such as visa related issues, 
GATS and/or GATS type provisions on movement of natural persons, provisions for specific type of labor etc.) and those that do not.   
74 See Section 3.2.3: Economic gains from migration for a detailed discussion on the relation between trade and migration. 
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stimulate greater labor mobility.  Based on the arguments presented here, the a priori 
relationship of PTAs to labor mobility is therefore ambiguous.    
The rest of the bilateral variables included in our model are geographical distance, language, 
past colonial relationship, and common border.  These variables incorporate the monetary 
and nonmonetary costs of migration.  The physical distance between two countries relates 
to both these costs of moving across borders.  Greater distance implies higher transportation 
costs to reach a destination as well as costly return home visits (Gregoriou et al., 2010; 
Mayda, 2010; Pederson et al., 2008; Greenwood & McDowell, 1992; and others).  
Moreover, greater remoteness may also result in unfamiliarity (nonmonetary cost) with a 
foreign nation.  Hence, distance and labor mobility are expected to be negatively related.  
The great circle distance75 between the two most important cities (based on population) of 
each country pair is used as the physical distance between two countries.  The presence of a 
common border, common language and past colonial relationship between countries are 
expected to stimulate more labour mobility between countries.  Each of these three 
determinants is incorporated as a dummy variable, assuming the value of 1 if present and 0 
otherwise.  A common border - where two countries are on the same land block albeit 
separated by a border – reduces both monetary and non-monetary costs of migration in the 
following ways.  First, it makes countries more accessible in terms of land transport instead 
of air and secondly, it enhances the ability to make more frequent trips back home.  Finally, 
countries located very close together may also have cultural or language similarity.  A 
common language and sharing of past colonial relationship indicate greater familiarity and 
ease of communication for the foreign workers.  As emphasised in Greenwood and 
McDowell (1992), occupational skills are not perfectly transferable between countries and 
the ease with which a potential migrant can transfer or adopt these occupational skills in a 
different country would influence the migration decision.  On this note, past colonial 
relations may influence cultural distance by providing better information on potential 
destination and thus lowering migration costs (Pederson et al., 2008).  Likewise, as 
suggested in Massey et al. (1993), migration is likely between past colonial powers because 
the cultural, linguistic, administrative, investment, transportation and communication links 
                                                          
75 In the Wikipedia, the great-circle or orthorhombic distance is defined as the shortest distance between two points on the surface of a 
sphere, measured along the surface of the sphere (as opposed to a straight line through the sphere's interior). The distance between two 
points in Euclidean space is the length of a straight line between them, but on the sphere there are no straight lines.  Through any two 
points on a sphere which are not directly opposite each other, there is a unique great circle. The two points separate the great circle into 
two arcs. The length of the shorter arc is the great-circle distance between the points.   
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that were established early have facilitated specific transnational markets and cultural 
systems.   
Table 3-11: Explanatory variables and their expected signs. 
Dependent variable: log(bilateral Labor Flow) 
Explanatory variables Expected sign of coefficient 
Relative GDP per capita*  + 
Population (origin country)* + 
Inflation (origin country) +/- 
Unemployment (origin country) + 
Population (host country)* +/- 
Inflation (host country) +/- 
Unemployment (host country) - 
Political stability (host country) + 
Political stability (origin country) +/- 
Bilateral  variables  
PTA +/- 
Common border + 
Distance* - 
Common Language + 
Past Colonial Relationship + 
*Variables expressed in log form for all estimations 
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3.6: Results and discussion 
 
 
Table 3-12 presents the summary statistics of all non-dummy variables used in our 
estimation.   Results show that there is great variability in bilateral labor mobility in our 
sample of countries.  Selected countries (such as Bangladesh and Philippines) experienced 
significant (absolute) labor outflows mainly to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi 
Arabia.  The largest bilateral labor flow in our sample was between Bangladesh and the 
UAE in 2008.  The UAE has attracted significant numbers of skilled and unskilled workers 
over the past few decades due to its economic attractiveness, political stability and modern 
infrastructure (Malit & Youha, 2013).  Moreover, while the host countries are 
comparatively richer (in terms of average GDP per capita) than the origin countries, the 
origin countries are more populated.  On average, the host countries are politically more 
stable than the origin countries.  In terms of geographical proximity, the largest bilateral 
distance is between the Philippines and Brazil.   
 
 
Table 3-12: Summary statistics. 
Variables  Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Maximum Minimum 
Ln Bilateral Labor Flow 5.813 2.880 12.946 0 
Ln Bilateral Distance 8.684 0.688 9.843 6.264 
Ln Relative GDP per capita 1.113 0.168 1.583 0.671 
Ln GDP per Capita (host country) 9.218 1.262 11.821 6.200 
Ln GDP per Capita (origin country) 8.317 0.052 9.612 7.223 
Ln Population (origin country) 11.356 1.250 14.062 9.409 
Ln Population (host country) 8.698 2.282 14.152 2.305 
Unemployment (host) 8.285 5.818 0.2 38.6 
Political Stability (host) -0.0005 0.997 1.668 -3.185 
Political Stability (origin) -1.139 0.738 0.462 -2.812 
Inflation (host) 6.103 10.893 -10.068 324.997 
Unemployment (origin) 4.509 2.862 0.2 11.900 
Inflation (origin) 6.569 4.508 -1.710 24.997 
Notes: GDP per capita, population unemployment, inflation and political stability are host/origin country specific variables and averaged 
over the host/origin countries respectively and not as country pair variables.  Distance and labor flow are averaged as country pair 
variables. 
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The average inflation of host countries is lower than that of the group of origin countries.  
The peak of 324.99 percent in the host country inflation rate reflects the hyperinflation 
experienced in Angola in the early 2000’s.  Higher international food prices, strong 
domestic demand due to rapid money growth and domestic currency depreciation are some 
of the reasons for Angola’s triple digit inflation rates (Klein & Kyei, 2009).  The minimum 
inflation rate of -10.07 percent reflects the inflation rate of Iraq in 2007.  Following tighter 
monetary policy and the subsequent appreciation of the exchange rate during 2006 and 
early 2007, Iraq’s inflation rate declined (Grigorian & Kock, 2010).  Finally, the host 
countries’ average unemployment rate is larger than that of the origin countries in our 
sample, however there is great variability.  While some nations have very low 
unemployment rates of 0.2 percent, there were significant unemployment in countries such 
as Lesotho (38.6 percent in 2003) and the Philippines (11.9 percent in 2004).  
Unemployment (driven by structural problems in the public sector and a small private 
sector) has been identified as the most important problem for the Lesotho economy which 
has prompted many nationals to seek employment in neighbouring countries (Shale, 2013).  
Moreover, significant increases in the Philippines labor force participation rate each year 
have undermined efforts to reduce their unemployment rate (Montalvo, 2006).   
Next, we investigated the underlying stochastic process of our time variant variables using 
the Im-Pesaran-Shin (IPS) test.  The IPS test calculates a standardised t-bar test statistic 
based on the averaged augmented Dickey Fuller statistics for panels (Im et al., 2003).  It 
tests the null hypothesis of each series in a panel containing a unit root against the 
alternative that allows for some (but not all) of the individual series to have unit roots 
(Baltagi, 2008).  As presented in Table 3-13, the null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected 
for all variables except for relative GDP per capita.  Given that the dependent variable (log 
labor flow) and the residuals76 from the estimation of our model are both stationary, the 
presence of this non-stationary variable does not raise concerns of spurious correlation.  
Nevertheless, as a robustness check, we re-estimated the base model using the first-
differenced form of the non-stationary variables77.   
 
 
 
 
                                                          
76 See Table 26 in the Appendix for results. 
77 See Table 27 in the Appendix for results.  The coefficient of relative GDP per capita remains positive and significant despite a decline 
in magnitude.   
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Table 3-13: Panel unit root test results– Im, Pesaran and Shin (IPS). 
Variables  IPS W 
statistic 
Average 
DF 
statistic 
Variables  IPS W 
statistic 
Average 
DF 
statistic 
Ln Labor Flow▫ -5.96*** -
2.84*** 
Inflation (host 
country) 
-21.32*** -4.36*** 
Ln Relative GDP 
per capita▫ 
-1.82 -2.07 Unemployment 
(origin country) 
-5.167*** -3.83*** 
Ln Population 
(origin country)  
-5.96*** -
4.19*** 
Unemployment 
(host country) 
-73.66*** -8.83*** 
Ln Population 
(host country) ▫ 
-33.59*** -
5.12*** 
Political stability 
(host country) 
-26.69*** -5.64*** 
Inflation (origin 
country) 
-2.87*** -
3.08*** 
Political stability 
(origin country) 
-2.16** -2.94** 
Significance levels: *10%  **5%  ***1%. ▫ Includes constant and trend.  Automatic lag selection based on Schwarz Information Criterion.   
 
 
Table 3-14 presents the results of the Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) 
estimation of our Fixed Effects Model (FEM).  The Hausman specification test (χ2 = 274.5, 
p =0.00) rejected the null hypothesis that a Random Effects Model (REM) provides 
consistent estimates and hence a FEM was chosen.  Moreover, the residuals from the OLS 
estimation of our FEM revealed the presence of autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity78 
resulting in the selection of the FGLS estimation method.  The FGLS technique allows 
estimation of efficient coefficients in the presence of autocorrelation and/or 
heteroscedasticity79 (Medvedev, 2011; Tadesse & White, 2011).   
 
Starting with Model 1, along with the other determinants of labor mobility, we investigated 
the role of a PTA between the origin and host country.  Our results support that a common 
PTA between the origin and host country facilitates greater labor mobility.  Consistent with 
Figueiredo et al. (2016) and Orefice (2015), we obtained a positive and significant 
coefficient for the PTA variable which suggests that the presence of a PTA facilitates cross-
border worker movement.  At this juncture however, we do not separate these PTAs into 
those that contain labor specific provisions and those that do not.  Such disaggregated 
analysis is conducted in Model 2.  In terms of relative difference in income (relative GDP 
per capita) between the host and origin country, our results provide evidence that relatively 
higher income opportunities abroad are significantly influential in stimulating cross-border 
                                                          
78 The Breusch Pagan test results (χ2 = 41.92, p =0.00) rejected the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity at the 5 percent level of 
significance.  The Woodridge test for autocorrelation also indicated the presence of serially correlated residuals (F (1,372) = 129.8, 
p=0.00).  See Table 29 in the Appendix for results. 
79 Alternatively, clustering  standard errors by country pair would also account for the problem of heteroskedasticty and autocorrelation 
(Cameron & Trivedi, 2010). 
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labor movements.  Similar findings of a positive income-migration nexus were concluded 
by Lllul (2016), Figueiredo et al. (2016), Mayda (2010), Ramos & Surinach (2013) and 
others.  Hence, we conclude that relatively higher income is an important determinant of 
labor migration in our sample.   
 
 
Table 3-14: FGLS estimation results. 
Dependent variable: log(bilateral Labor Flow) 
Explanatory 
variable 
Model 1 
 
Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Log Relative GDP 
per capita 
7.384*** 
(0.669) 
7.391*** 
(0.665) 
 
7.769*** 
(0.675) 
6.032*** 
(0.692) 
7.349*** 
(0.778) 
8.306*** 
(0.842) 
Log Population 
(host) 
0.921*** 
(0.087) 
0.930*** 
(0.087) 
 
0.669*** 
(0.096) 
0.754*** 
(0.091) 
0.751*** 
(0.096) 
1.084*** 
(0.098) 
Log Population 
(origin) 
4.837*** 
(0.461) 
4.905*** 
(0.461) 
4.588*** 
(0.435) 
4.466*** 
(0.465) 
4.660*** 
(0.466) 
4.681*** 
(0.575) 
Log Distance -0.901 
(2.167) 
-0.741 
(2.164) 
-0.994 
(2.093) 
-0.823 
(2.224) 
-0.936 
(2.203) 
1.174 
(2.167) 
Common language -2.862 
(3.061) 
-3.061 
(3.055) 
-2.157 
(2.924) 
-3.644 
(3.149) 
-2.723 
(3.118) 
-8.362 
(4.275) 
Common Border 0.606 
(1.756) 
0.709 
(1.754) 
0.520 
(1.711) 
0.439 
(1.795) 
0.926 
(1.768) 
2.197 
(1.757) 
Colonial 
relationship 
0.094 
(1.023) 
0.036 
(1.020) 
0.616 
(0.978) 
0.004 
(1.060) 
0.097 
(1.049) 
0.358 
(1.097) 
PTA 0.145* 
(0.077) 
 0.143* 
(0.077) 
0.143* 
(0.076) 
0.143* 
(0.079) 
0.193** 
(0.092) 
PTA_Labor 
provision 
 0.205** 
(0.082) 
    
PTA_No labor 
provision 
 -0.023 
(0.102) 
     
Inflation (host)   0.000 
(0.001) 
  0.007*** 
(0.002) 
Unemployment 
(host) 
   -0.033*** 
(0.005) 
-0.031*** 
(0.005) 
 
Inflation (origin)   -0.004 
(0.002) 
  -0.001 
(0.003) 
Unemployment 
(origin) 
   0.033*** 
(0.009) 
0.040*** 
(0.009) 
 
Political Stability 
(host) 
    -0.018 
(0.027) 
 
Political Stability 
(origin) 
    0.182*** 
(0.029) 
 
Migrant stock       0.639** 
(0.282) 
Constant -49.614*** 
(17.859) 
-
51.745*** 
(17.843) 
-
43.612** 
(17.237) 
-44.154** 
(18.288) 
-45.878** 
(18.130) 
-60.297** 
(18.272) 
 N 4260 4260 4040 4090 3886 2465 
Notes: Significance levels: *10% **5% ***1%.  Standard errors are reported in brackets.  Country and time fixed effects are included in 
all models, but results are not reported here due to space constraints.  Country fixed effects are jointly significant at 1% level of 
significance, and the time fixed effects are also significant at 1%.   
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Turning to the demographic variables, the estimated coefficients on both host and origin 
population are significant and positive.  As expected, a higher population in the origin 
country has a positive relation to bilateral labor flows.  A higher origin country population 
implies a greater pool of potential migrant workers available.  In fact, growing population 
pressures (in developing and less developed countries) have been identified as a 
contributory factor in labor migration (OECD, ILO, World Bank, 2015).  Meanwhile, the 
coefficient of host country population – which was expected to be either positive or 
negative – is positive and significant.  Hence, our results support that a growing population 
in the host country is increasing the absorption capacity of these countries rather than 
crowding out the need for foreign workers.  We provided three reasons for this positive 
relation.  First, a higher host population may increase the demand for goods and services 
and create a greater need for foreign workers.  A second point is that despite a growing host 
population, opportunities may still exist in low-prestige jobs (which Chia (2006)) refers to 
as the 3D jobs: dirty, demanding, and dangerous) that are viewed unfavourably by native 
workers.  Thirdly, as has already been discussed in section 3.2.3, a striking feature of the 
demographic trend in many developed countries is population aging.  While noting that we 
do not analyze the impact of population in terms of its composition, population growth 
driven by population aging also creates demand for foreign workers either directly as 
service providers or for social security support.   
Unlike more general migration equations, here the other gravity variables – distance, 
common language or border and past colonial relations - do not appear to be significant for 
labor mobility, similar to Mayda (2010) and Ortega and Peri (2009).  This may be 
attributed to the fact that most of the bilateral labor flows that occur in our sample are 
between countries that do not have such proximity advantage or lingual and/or cultural 
similarities.  For example, some destination countries such as Saudi Arabia, United Arab 
Emirates and Brunei Darussalam have attracted large flows of migrant workers mainly due 
to their economic advantages rather than geographical and/or other similarities.  But we 
should not discount the possibility that temporary migrant workers are less concerned about 
the distance and unfamiliarity of their host country.  However, on suspicions of collinearity, 
we added the distance and common border variables one at a time80.  While distance 
remained correctly signed but insignificant, the presence of a common border is positive 
                                                          
80 See Table 28 in the Appendix for the regression results. 
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and significant, indicating that countries that are on the same land block albeit separated by 
a border ease cross-border movement.   
In the second estimation (Model 2), we focused much more closely on the PTA variable 
and categorized PTAs into those that contain labor provisions and those that do not.  At this 
point, it must be mentioned that while the specific labor provisions may differ in terms of 
their effectiveness in stimulating labor mobility, we do not weight the PTA’s as such.  As 
mentioned and empirically evidenced in Figueiredo et al. (2016) and Orefice (2015), the 
presence of labor provisions such as visa related issues, recognition of professional 
qualifications, and other guidelines on the movement of natural persons will ease the 
process of entering a foreign market for work.  Our investigation also produces similar 
results in that PTAs that contain labor provisions are positive and significant while PTAs 
without such provisions are negatively signed and insignificant.  The irrelevance of PTAs 
with no labor provisions may suggest that it is not the awareness transmission mechanism 
of PTAs that stimulate greater labor mobility in our case but rather it is the presence of 
labor provisions that matter.   
In Model 3, we included inflation of the host and origin country into our estimation while 
unemployment81 in both sets of countries is introduced in Model 4.  Notably, the number of 
observations decline in Models 3 and 4 due to missing inflation and/or unemployment data 
for some countries.  As suggested in the related literature (see for example Karamera et al. 
(2000); Ahmad et al. (2008); and Gallardo-Sejas et al. (2006)), inflation is a malaise of the 
local economy.  On this note, inflationary pressures in the origin country could act as a 
push factor for migrant workers (i.e. workers try to avoid economic instability).  However, 
increased inflation in the origin country may also indicate a growing economy and thus 
motivate workers to remain in their home country.  Meanwhile for the destination country, 
a higher inflation would reduce its attractiveness and thus discourage migrants from 
moving into unstable economies or a higher inflation may indicate a growing economy and 
this increase demand for foreign workers.  Rather surprisingly, we do not find any 
significant inflation-labor mobility relation.  Both, inflation of the host country and 
inflation of the origin country are insignificant. However, the coefficient for the 
unemployment rate is significant for both the host and origin countries (see Model 4).  One 
                                                          
81 We introduced unemployment, inflation, political stability and migrant stock one at a time in our estimations due to its effect on the 
sample sizes.  The sample decreases when these variables are incorporated due to unavailability of the respective data for some countries.   
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might expect unemployment rates to be particularly relevant to labor mobility and this 
indeed proves to be the case.  Both these coefficients are also very similar in magnitude but 
have opposite signs.  For the origin country unemployment, we obtained a positive and 
significant coefficient which indicates that migrant workers are sensitive to domestic labor 
market conditions.  An increase in the unemployment rate in their domestic market pushes 
them to seek jobs in foreign markets.  A negatively signed and significant coefficient for 
the host country unemployment indicates that workers decisions to move into foreign 
markets are affected by the availability of jobs in those markets.  As expected, our results 
show that a high unemployment rate in destination countries deters such movement.  But 
since these are migrants on work visas, it may also reflect deliberate visa-policy actions, at 
least on the part of the host government. 
In Model 5, we explored if political stability and absence of violence82 (in host and origin 
country) mattered for labor mobility.  As evidenced in Karamera et al. (2000) political 
instability in host countries discourages inward migration.  Countries with political turmoil 
and crisis would be less attractive for potential migrants (Greenwood & McDowell, 1992).  
However, our estimation results in Model 5 show that host country political stability is not 
relevant in terms of labor mobility.  Next, turning to origin country political environment, 
our results show a positive and significant relation between political stability and labor 
mobility.  While on the one hand, it is recognized that politically stable and violent free 
origin country may encourage individuals to remain in their country rather than move 
abroad (i.e. a negative relation with labor mobility), on the other hand it could also enhance 
their ability for the same (i.e. a positive relation with labor mobility).  Our results indicate 
the latter, which we explain as follows: leaving behind family members is always a difficult 
decision for migrant workers (see for example Stohr (2013); Graham, Jordan, & Yeoh 
(2015); Mazzucato et al. (2015); Siriwardhana et al. (2015)) which would no doubt be 
heightened (lessened) in more (less) politically unstable and violent economies.  As a 
corollary to this, migrants would feel more secure to leave behind family members and 
work abroad when their home country is politically stable.   
                                                          
82 A higher index indicates better outcomes.   
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Finally, in Model 6 we investigated for any diaspora83 effects on bilateral labor mobility.  
The cost of migrating may be relevant to the presence of previous migrants in a respective 
destination country.  These social networks form an ideal source of information on jobs and 
other aspects of a destination country which may facilitate the social and cultural transition 
for new migrants (Greenwood & McDowell, 1992).  Moreover, having friends and family 
from the same origin also lowers the monetary and psychological cost of migrating 
(Ruyssen, Everaert, & Rayp, 2012).  Consistent with the findings of Pederson et al. (2008), 
Fagiolo and Santoni (2016), Clark (2007), and Hatton (2005), our results also provide 
support to the positive role of previous migrants in facilitating cross-border labour mobility.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
83 The term diaspora refers to the much earlier migrants who have settled abroad and are valued highly by new migrants for their 
entrepreneurial, professional skills and social networks (Chia, 2006).  We used the migrant stock in 2001 (from the OECD database) to 
measure for network effects.  Due to missing data, there is a significant drop in our sample size.   
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3.7: Conclusion 
 
 
Our primary objective in Chapter 3 was to examine the link between PTAs and 
international labor mobility.  Cross-border movement of workers is an important aspect of 
globalisation.  International mobility of workers can be a positive force for economic and 
social development as they offer a mechanism to rebalance labor markets in areas of origin 
and destination (UN, 2015).  The general conclusion to be drawn from the several empirical 
investigations on the global effects of greater worker liberalisation is that the world as a 
whole would benefit if the restrictions on labor mobility across borders were reduced.  
However, labor mobility remains restricted.  The WTO has a very narrow provision for 
skilled labor movement only but the developing and less developed countries have a greater 
interest in mobilising their unskilled/semi-skilled workers, which they have in abundance.  
Given this slow progress, policy makers have resorted to alternative options such as BLAs 
and PTAs.  A notable development of PTAs is their expansion into deeper integration 
provisions, some of which include specific labor provisions.  Thus, based on the argument 
that PTAs may stimulate labor mobility, we investigated for any such role in this study, 
using data from UNESCAP which includes workers leaving for foreign markets on a work 
visa.  A literature search produced only two very recent papers (Orefice, 2015 and 
Figueiredo et al., 2016) that investigated the role of PTAs, and then not specifically on 
labor mobility but on overall migration.  Orefice (2015) and Figueiredo et al. (2016) used 
data from the OECD and the World Bank database, respectively. Their data covers a larger 
set of labor origin countries but excludes some important non-OECD labor host countries 
and covers broad migration.  While our data includes only a limited number of origin 
countries, it focuses specifically on migrant workers and includes a larger set of labor host 
countries.   
Consistent with Orefice (2015) and Figueiredo et al. (2016), our empirical investigations 
confirmed the positive role of PTAs in stimulating international labor mobility.  We found 
consistent evidence that a bilateral PTA between the origin and host country encouraged 
cross-border worker movement in our sample of countries.  Labor mobility is not the core 
objective of PTAs, but these agreements have been extended to accommodate labor 
provisions.  We included a dummy variable to capture the presence or absence of these 
labor provisions and found that significant positive effect attaches entirely to those PTAs 
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with labor provisions.  A PTA without labor provisions has no significant effect on worker 
migration.  There are two implications from these findings.  First, while PTAs are not a 
substitute for the global labor mobility efforts of the WTO, they can be utilised by countries 
to facilitate movement of their workers across countries.  A PTA between a host and origin 
country indicates better diplomatic relations and familiarity amongst all partner countries 
(Orefice, 2015).  Second, the content of PTAs also matters.  Agreements at a bilateral level 
provides both countries the flexibility and scope to design policies to suit to their specific 
labor market conditions and to implement the required monitoring and regulation as joint 
policy initiatives.  Global efforts have not opened corridors for unskilled or semi-skilled 
workers which developing and less developed countries have in abundance.  Our results 
provide evidence that PTAs provide an opportunity for policy makers to exploit such 
opportunities. 
In terms of the economic determinants of labor migration included in our empirical 
investigations, our results confirmed the importance of relative GDP per capita and host or 
origin unemployment.  But we did not find any significant role of host or origin inflation.  
Consistent with the existing literature, we found that relatively higher income opportunities 
positively impact bilateral worker migration.  Workers, like other migrants, tend to move to 
countries where incomes are higher on average.  In terms of unemployment, while a higher 
rate of unemployment in the host country reduces bilateral worker mobility, a higher rate of 
unemployment in the source country increases it.  Our results suggest that migrant workers 
are sensitive to job availability in both host and origin country.  The coefficients are very 
similar in magnitude, so that parallel movements in unemployment in the two countries 
would leave worker migration largely unaffected.   
 
For geographic and other similarities, similar to Mayda (2010) and Ortega and Peri (2009), 
we do not find any relationship between distance, common border, language or colonial 
relationship and bilateral labor mobility.  Likewise, host country political stability is not 
significant either.  But origin country political stability stimulates labor mobility.  Workers 
are more contented to leave behind family members and work abroad when their home 
country is politically stable.  To this end, our results suggest that labor mobility is mainly 
driven by economic determinants while host political condition, geographical and other 
similarities are less pronounced.  Perhaps individuals migrating temporarily for work are 
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less concerned than more permanent migrants about the costs and political conditions in the 
host country and are more attracted by the relatively higher income and temporary work 
opportunities.  These findings indicate that the origin countries do not need to confine 
furthering economic relations with only familiar, closer and politically stable countries in 
order to exploit foreign labor market opportunities.  Even distant, but economically 
advantaged countries with job opportunities can be potential destinations. 
 
In terms of demographic variables, our results revealed that a larger host or origin 
population encourages bilateral worker migration.  This can be thought of as a supply effect 
in the origin country.  In the host country it means that whatever labor force effects are 
associated with the higher host country population are not strong enough to crowd out the 
demand for foreign workers.  Opportunities for foreign workers may still exist, perhaps in 
specific sectors, occupations or in certain jobs rejected by natives.  Also, to the extent that 
population growth is driven by population aging, demand for foreign workers may arise as 
service providers or for social security support.  Our results also indicate the relevance of 
previous migrants in facilitating bilateral worker migration.  This suggests that social 
networks form a useful source of information and support for potential migrants.  Such 
networks may provide information on possible work opportunities and other host country 
information such as transport, accommodation and other support services.  They may also 
facilitate the social and cultural transition for new migrants.  On this note, origin country 
efforts to maintain and facilitate communication between past migrants and potential 
migrant workers would benefit labor origin countries.    
For a prolonged period of time, lack of panel bilateral migration data had severely limited 
empirical work on the determinants of migration.  While the  recent advances in the 
availability of data on migration have facilitated country panel studies, the differences in 
definitions used across countries in data compilation and the impossibility of discriminating 
between economic and noneconomic migrants limits investigations by type of migrant. 
Moreover, definitional differences of migrants in the migration data of different countries 
and coverage of only member countries in existing migration data (such as the OECD) are 
further limitations.  As future research, development of an indicator to measure migration 
policy and including this explicitly in the empirical investigation would enrich the existing 
literature.  Morevoer, the absence of data on BLA’s has also limited our ability to compare 
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the impacts of PTA’s and BLA’s.  Also, since the dependent variable (bilateral labor flow) 
is included in the model in log form, zero flows are automatically excluded from our 
analysis.  This gives rise to concerns about sample selection bias where the sample is not 
drawn randomly from the population but is restricted to positive and non-zero observations.  
As future research, alternative gravity model estimation techniques that address this sample 
selection bias (such as those recommended by Helpman et al (2008)) can be used to 
improve the results from this chapter.  Moreover, Hofman et al; 2017 has developed a 
database which provides information on the deep provisions in almost 279 PTAs.  This 
information can be used in future research to construct indexes of PTAs depth, particularly 
for labor related provisions and investigate the nexus of these provisions to bilateral labor 
mobility   
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5.0 Appendix 
A: Appendices to Chapter 1 
 
 
A.1: Composition of Fiji governments revenue from taxation 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the percentage share of Value Added Tax (VAT), customs duties, 
income tax and others, averaged from 2000 to 2015.  Almost half of Fiji’s taxation revenue 
is generated from VAT alone.  Customs duties and income tax represent the other half of 
taxation revenue.   
Figure 1: Average (2000-2015) percentage share of government taxation revenue for 
Fiji 
 
Source: RBF Quarterly Review (March 2017) 
 
 
A.2: The transition from the European Economic Community (EEC) into the 
European Union (EU). 
 
The EEC was formed in 1957 by six countries, which later evolved into the EU in 1993.  
Table 1 summarises this development.   
 
Table 1: The timeline of the EEC into EU membership 
Year Enlargement  Total 
membership 
1957 EEC formed by Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands 
6 
1973 Denmark, Ireland UK joined the EEC 9 
Customs 
duties
24%
Income tax
30%
VAT
42%
others
4%
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1981 Greece joined the EEC 10 
1986 Spain and Portugal joined the EEC 12 
1993 EU was formed among the 12 existing EEC members 12 
1995 Austria, Finland, Sweden joined the EU 15 
2004 Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, 
Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia joined the EU 
25 
2007 Bulgaria, Romania joined the EU 27 
2013 Croatia joined the EU 28 
(Source: http://europa.eu) 
 
 
A.3: Main exports from selected ACP sub-regional groups to the EU 
 
The importance of the EU market for exports originating in the ACP countries varies at 
sub-regional level.  Eastern & Southern Africa (ESA), South African Developing 
Community (SADC) and West Africa have percentage shares greater than 20 percent in 
total ACP exports to the EU.  Table 2 provides the main exported items from each of these 
sub-groups that are over US$200 million in value.   
 
 
Table 2: Exported items (over US$200m) from ESA, SADC and West Africa to the EU 
Eastern & Southern Africa 2000-2015 average 
Exports items over USD 200M USDM 
[TOTAL] Total all products 36419 
[333] Petroleum oils, oils from bitumin. materials, crude 20724 
[334] Petroleum oils or bituminous minerals > 70 % oil 2635 
[343] Natural gas, whether or not liquefied 1612 
[292] Crude vegetable materials, n.e.s. 729 
[071] Coffee and coffee substitutes 646 
[845] Articles of apparel, of textile fabrics, n.e.s. 642 
[061] Sugar, molasses and honey 593 
[667] Pearls, precious & semi-precious stones 479 
[054] Vegetables 454 
[037] Fish, aqua. invertebrates, prepared, preserved, n.e.s. 424 
[682] Copper 419 
[121] Tobacco, unmanufactured; tobacco refuse 404 
[562] Fertilizers (other than those of group 272) 380 
[342] Liquefied propane and butane 309 
[057] Fruits and nuts (excluding oil nuts), fresh or dried 258 
[684] Aluminium 241 
[841] Men's clothing of textile fabrics, not knitted 227 
[344] Petroleum gases, other gaseous hydrocarbons, n.e.s. 200 
West Africa 2000-2015 average 
Exports items over USD 200M USDM 
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[TOTAL] Total all products 31401 
[333] Petroleum oils, oils from bitumin. materials, crude 17041 
[292] Crude vegetable materials, n.e.s. 4359 
[343] Natural gas, whether or not liquefied 2206 
[071] Coffee and coffee substitutes 779 
[334] Petroleum oils or bituminous minerals > 70 % oil 730 
[682] Copper 485 
[061] Sugar, molasses and honey 355 
[057] Fruits and nuts (excluding oil nuts), fresh or dried 337 
[845] Articles of apparel, of textile fabrics, n.e.s. 318 
[054] Vegetables 298 
[037] Fish, aqua. invertebrates, prepared, preserved, n.e.s. 297 
[121] Tobacco, unmanufactured; tobacco refuse 272 
[773] Equipment for distributing electricity, n.e.s. 271 
[841] Men's clothing of textile fabrics, not knitted 268 
[571] Polymers of ethylene, in primary forms 232 
[684] Aluminium 201 
[075] Spices 200 
SADC 2000-2015 average 
Exports items over USD 200M USDM 
[TOTAL] Total all products 32117 
[292] Crude vegetable materials, n.e.s. 5223 
[333] Petroleum oils, oils from bitumin. materials, crude 5001 
[057] Fruits and nuts (excluding oil nuts), fresh or dried 1564 
[121] Tobacco, unmanufactured; tobacco refuse 1443 
[071] Coffee and coffee substitutes 1334 
[037] Fish, aqua. invertebrates, prepared, preserved, n.e.s. 1198 
[061] Sugar, molasses and honey 1091 
[334] Petroleum oils or bituminous minerals > 70 % oil 978 
[343] Natural gas, whether or not liquefied 751 
[841] Men's clothing of textile fabrics, not knitted 608 
[773] Equipment for distributing electricity, n.e.s. 579 
[054] Vegetables 577 
[845] Articles of apparel, of textile fabrics, n.e.s. 538 
[683] Nickel 514 
[667] Pearls, precious & semi-precious stones 492 
[342] Liquefied propane and butane 482 
[682] Copper 461 
[074] Tea and mate 445 
[684] Aluminium 420 
[034] Fish, fresh (live or dead), chilled or frozen 353 
[562] Fertilizers (other than those of group 272) 350 
[268] Wool and other animal hair (incl. wool tops) 331 
[075] Spices 279 
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[651] Textile yarn 239 
[582] Plates, sheets, films, foil & strip, of plastics 233 
(Source: UNCTAD stat) 
 
 
A.4: Estimated income transfer under the Sugar Protocol for ACP sugar exporting 
countries 
 
The EU has provided lucrative returns to ACP sugar exporters under the Sugar Protocol in 
the form of guaranteed market, import quotas and prices that were almost three times more 
than the world market sugar price.  The income transfers from this arrangement is 
summarised in Table 3.   
 
 
Table 3: Income transfer for sugar exporting ACP countries under the Sugar Protocol. 
ACP country Estimates of 
income transfer 
using constant 1987 
prices: Mcdonald 
(1996) 
Estimates of income 
transfer using 
constant 2001 prices: 
Milner et al. (2003) 
Estimates of 
income transfer 
using 2000-2002 
average prices: 
LMC/OPM (2004) 
 US$M % of 
GDP 
% of 
Exports 
US$M % of 
GDP 
% of 
Exports 
US$M % of 
GDP 
% of 
Exports 
Mauritius 75.3 1.8 2.9 180.7 4.0 6.5 205.6 5.2 8.0 
Fiji 25.4 1.2 2.0 48.8 2.9 4.9 69.5 4.7 7.3 
Guyana 24.5 3.5 3.4 60.9 8.7 8.9 61.3 10.1 11.4 
Jamaica 18.2 0.3 0.6 46.4 0.6 1.4 53.2 0.8 1.8 
Swaziland 18.1 1.4 n.a 56.4 4.3 5.0 57.4 5.3 8.6 
Barbados 7.7 0.4 0.6 16.2 0.6 1.2 24.7 1.1 2.3 
Trinidad & Tobago 6.7 0.1 0.2 14.7 0.2 0.3 20.1 0.3 0.5 
Belize 6.2 1.0 2.0 14.8 1.9 3.3 17.1 2.5 4.9 
Zimbabwe 4.6 0.1 0.1 19.9 0.2 0.9 20.9 0.3 1.3 
Malawi 3.2 0.1 0.6 12.2 0.7 2.7 13.8 1.1 4.0 
St. Kitts & Nevis 2.4 1.0 2.0 0 0 0 7.3 2.4 5.4 
Madagascar 1.7 0. n.a 4.9 0.1 0.4 10.3 0.3 0.8 
Congo 1.6 0 0.1 0.7 0 0.1 5.4 0.2 0.3 
Côte d'Ivoire 1.6 0 0 3.3 0 0.1 7.7 0.1 0.2 
Tanzania 1.6 0 0.1 4.5 0 0.3 4.3 0.1 0.9 
Total 198.6   490.1   584.2   
(Source: Gilson et al. (2005)) 
 
 
A.5: Sectoral contribution to Fiji’s GDP 
 
Table 4 shows the percentage contribution from each sector to the Fijian economy since 
2011 to 2015.   
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Table 4: Percentage Contribution to Fiji’s GDP (constant (F$M) basic price of 2011) 
Sector 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Agriculture 8.2 8.0 8.2 7.8 8.1 
Forestry & Logging 0.6 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.7 
Fishing & Aquaculture 2.1 2.0 1.9 1.8 1.8 
Mining & Quarrying 1.6 1.5 1.0 0.8 0.8 
Manufacturing 14.1 13.6 13.8 13.2 12.8 
Electricity, gas 1.9 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.9 
Water 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 
Construction 2.7 2.4 2.7 2.7 2.8 
Wholesale & Retail 11.7 11.6 11.4 11.1 11.1 
Transport 6.3 6.7 7.4 8.9 8.8 
Accommodation & Food service 6.4 6.4 6.2 6.1 6.4 
Information & Communication 5.9 6.0 5.9 5.7 5.8 
Financial & Insurance activities 9.2 9.1 9.1 9.8 9.6 
Real Estate 5.0 5.0 4.9 4.6 4.5 
Professional, scientific & technical activity 2.2 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 
Administrative & Support 2.3 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.2 
Public Administration 7.6 8.3 8.4 8.5 8.6 
Education 7.1 7.2 7.2 7.0 6.9 
Human Health & Social Work 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.2 
Arts, entertainment 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 
Other services 2.0 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.9 
(Source: Fiji Islands Bureau of Statistics Key Economic Indicators, 2017) 
 
 
A.6: Trade agreements formed by the Fijian economy. 
 
Fiji is signatory to a number of trading arrangements.  These include the Melanesian 
Spearhead Group (MSG), Pacific Island Countries Trade Agreement (PICTA), Pacific 
Agreement on Closer Economic Relations (PACER), South Pacific Regional Trade & 
Economic Agreement (SPARTECA) and the interim EU-EPA.  Table 5 provides 
information on these agreements. 
 
 
Table 5: Fiji’s Trade Agreement details 
MSG: Melanesian Spearhead Group The Melanesian Spearhead Group Trade Agreement 
(MSGTA) came into effect in 1993 with Fiji signing 
up to the agreement in 1998. The agreement aims to 
promote regional integration through the facilitation 
of a free flow of goods and services and the removal 
of trade barriers.   Members include the Solomon 
Islands, Vanuatu, Papua New Guinea, Fiji 
PICTA: Pacific Island Countries Trade Agreement PICTA is a free trade agreement between the 14 
Forum Island Countries (FIC)*. The agreement was 
signed in 2001, Fiji ratified it in 2002 and it came 
into force in 2006. The trade agreement aims to 
eliminate trade barriers, both tariff and non-tariff 
240 
 
barriers and promote trade with fair competition and 
hence expansion of world trade. 
PACER: Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic 
Relations 
PACER was signed in 2001 and aims to create a 
single regional economy. PACER works to increase 
opportunities and competitiveness, to promote 
economic and technical assistance between nations 
and to also minimize effects and costs.  Members 
include the 14 FIC and Australia and New Zealand. 
SPARTECA: South Pacific Regional Trade & 
Economic Agreement 
SPARTECA is a regional trade agreement between 
Australia, New Zealand and countries of the South 
Pacific Forum signed in 1981. The agreement aims to 
address the unequal trade relationship between 
Australia and New Zealand and Forum Island 
Countries (FIC). The agreement progressively allows 
duty free and unrestricted access to Australia and 
New Zealand markets, with as many products as 
possible. The agreement therefore works to foster 
greater penetration of exports from FICs into 
Australia and New Zealand markets.  
Interim EU-EPA Fiji entered into an Interim Economic Partnership 
Agreement (IEPA) with the European Community in 
2009 with the expiration of the Cotonou Agreement 
in 2007. The IEPA is now active while the terms of 
the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) between 
PACP and the European Community are being 
negotiated. The IEPA protects Fiji’s sugar exports to 
the European Community while the negotiations are 
being carried out.  
(Source: www.wto.org) 
 
 
 
A.7: Derivation of equations in section 1.4.1 
 
Equation (2)  
 
Solve the optimisation problem in (1)84 by setting the Lagrangean; 
 


1






 
j
juL 





 
j
jj Eu     
 
which yields the following FOC: 
 



ju
L     jj
j
j uu 








 


1
11
        (i) 
From (i) solve for 
ju .  This yields; 
 
                                                          
84 The term in the brackets denotes the equation number that is used to represent that equation in the main document. 
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 
  1
1
1
1
1

































 j
j
j
j
u
u        (ii) 
 
Then substitute (ii) into 
j
jju and simplify to get; 
 

j
jju = 
 
 

























 j
j
j
ju
1
1
1
1








      (iii) 
 
Set Eu
k
kk   and using (iii) obtain; 
 
 
  E
u
k
k
j
j




























1
1
1
1








      (iv) 
 
In (iv), make the first term the subject of the expression and substitute into (ii) to get; 
 
 
  


k
k
j
j Eu
1
1
1




          (v) 
 
Since 
jj
j uE  , then substituting (v) into this results in (2) reproduced below; 
 
jE
 
 
E
k
k
j






 

1
1






        (2) 
 
Total differentiation of (2) produces (4). 
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Equation (6)  
 
Maximise (5) subject to its constraint by setting the following Lagrangian: 
   jjDjjMjjj EDPMPDML  
1
 
 
Get the First Order Condition (FOC): 



jM
L   011
1
 
 M
jjjj PMDM 
       (i) 
 



jD
L   011
1
 
 D
jjjj PDDM 
        (ii) 
 




L
0 jj
D
jj
M
j EDPMP        (iii) 
 
Divide (i) and (ii) to get; 
 



1
1


j
j
D
M
D
j
M
j
P
P
        and solve for jM to get; 
 
jM = jD
1
1








 
D
j
M
j
P
P
         (iv). 
Plug (iv) into the constraint in (5) and solve for jD  to get (6). 
 
From Equation (7) to (10); 
 
Multiply both sides of (6) to get the value of jD .  Then, total differentiation of (6), noting zˆ
denotes a proportional change  
z
z  for any variable z results in (7) reproduced below; 
 
 

 1ˆˆ 

D
jjj PED -    





  11 



D
j
M
j PP       (7) 
Differentiation of each term in (7) gives; 
 

1

D
jP =
D
jPˆ
1

         (i) 
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   





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Denote the term 
 
   









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M
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M
j
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=
M
ja (share of imported j in total expenditure on j)  
 
and 
 
    












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
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

11
1






D
j
M
j
D
j
PP
P
=
D
ja  (share of domestic produced j in total expenditure on j) to 
get; 
 
   





  11 



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M
j PP =     DjDjMjMj PaPa ˆˆ
1



      (ii) 
 
 
Substitute (i) and (ii) into (7), to get (8) and then rearrange to get (9).  Noting that zˆ =  
z
z  
for any variable z, then z is obtained by moving z to the right hand side (RHS) of the 
resultant expression.  Hence this yields (10). 
 
From Equation (12) to (16); 
 
Solve the consumer optimisation problem in (11) the Lagrangean for which is; 
 
 Mjijij
n
i
ij EcPcL 





 


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FOC; 
 



ijc
L     ijij
n
i
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



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
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
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From (i) solving for ijc  yields; 
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Then substitute (ii) into ij
i
ij cP and simplify to get; 
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Then set 
M
Jkj
n
k
k EcP 
1
 and using (iii) obtain; 
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In (iv), make the first term of the expression the subject and substitute into (ii) to get; 
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          (v) 
Multiply both sides of (v) by ijP  to get value of import demand for variety i of j and get (12). 
 
Total differentiation of (12) gives; 
 
  jjijiij REtPX ˆˆˆ
1



         (i) 
 
Solving each term in (i) for variety h results in; 
 
 

1
ijitP =   hjtˆ1            (ii) 
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and let 







n
k
kjk tP
1
 
jRˆ  = 
  
  





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1
1
1


   and given that jR  is the aggregate consumer prices for j, then the 
derivative of this is equivalent to an average of changes in component product prices 
weighted by their respective market shares.  Hence; 
 


=
iji
iji
i
ij
tP
tP
m

   where 
iji
iji
tP
tP
= ijtˆ   and for variety l  from the EU, lj
EUl
lj tm ˆ

  where ijm is 
the market share of variety i in total imports of product j.  This gives (14).  Substitute (ii) 
and (14) into (i) and rearrange to get (13).  Noting that zˆ =  
z
z  for any variable z, then 
z is obtained by moving z to the right hand side (RHS) of the resultant expression.  This 
produces (15). 
 
 
Equations 27 to 29 
 
Along the same line, equations 27 to 29 are derived, where the change in the aggregate 
consumer prices for j now also reflects changes in prices of imports from the ROW and the 
Region.  Hence using  
jRˆ  = 
  
  






1
1
1


   and given that  = jR  which is the aggregate consumer prices 
for j, then the derivative of this is equivalent to an average of changes in component 
product prices weighted by their respective market shares.  Hence; 
 


=
iji
iji
i
ij
tP
tP
m

 + 
kji
kji
i
kj
tP
tP
m

 + 
gji
gji
i
gj
tP
tP
m

  where 
iji
iji
tP
tP
= ijtˆ  is the change in prices 
on EU imports weighted by market share of variety i of product j from the EU )( ijm ; 
kji
kji
tP
tP
= kjtˆ  is the change in prices on ROW imports weighted by market share of variety k 
(ROW variety) of product j )( kjm  ;and 
gji
gji
tP
tP
= igtˆ  is the change in process of imports from 
the Region weighted by market share )( gjm of variety g of product j from the Region.  
Substituting this derivative of jR (which now also reflects changes in prices of ROW and 
Regional imports) into (i) above produces equation 27 which captures the change in 
demand for imports from the EU with an EU-EPA plus external tariff reform: 
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∆Xhj =
[
 
 
 
−[σ − 1][1 − mhj]t̂hj + [σ − 1] ∑ mljt̂lj
l∈EU
l≠h
+ ∑ mkjt̂kj + ∑ mgj t̂gj +
g∈Reg
 
k∈ROW
Êj
]
 
 
 
Xhj 
Hence, change in demand for imports from the ROW and change in demand for imports 
from the Region are derived in the same manner to give equations 28 and 29: 
 
∆Xhj =
[
 
 
 
−[σ − 1][1 − mhj]t̂hj + [σ − 1] ∑ mkj t̂kj
k∈ROW
k≠h
+ ∑ mljt̂lj + ∑ mgj t̂gj +
g∈Reg
 
l∈EU
Êj
]
 
 
 
Xhj 
 
∆Xhj =
[
 
 
 
 
−[σ − 1][1 − mhj]t̂hj + [σ − 1] ∑ mgj t̂gj
g∈Reg
g≠h
+ ∑ mlj t̂lj + ∑ mkjt̂kj +
k∈ROW
 
l∈EU
Êj
]
 
 
 
 
Xhj 
 
 
Equation (16) 
 
The total substitution effect (grouped by Region and ROW) can be found by looking at the 
change in the sum of the value of imports from each group i.e.  ∑ Xiji∉EU  
 ∑ Xiji∉EU
̂
 =∑
Xij
Ej
i∉EU
Ej
∑ Xkjk∉EU
X̂ij = ∑ miji∉EU
1
1−Mj
[Êj − R̂j] =
[Êj−R̂j]
1−Mj
∑ miji∉EU  
where ∑ Xiji∉EU = Ej[1 − Mj] is used.   Since  ∑ miji∉EU = 1 − Mj, then 
 ∑ Xiji∉EU
̂ = Êj − R̂j = [σ − 1]∑ mljt̂ljl∈EU +Êj which yields (16). 
 
 
Equation (18) and (22); 
 
Solve the Producers optimisation problem identified in (17), the Lagrangean for which is; 
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j
D
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This gives the following FOC’s; 
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L        0111    FjFjDj QQQ      (ii) 
247 
 
 
Divide (i) and (ii) to obtain; 
 
 

F
j
D
j
P
P  
  1
1




F
j
D
j
Q
Q
 and make
D
jQ  the subject.  This gives; 
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Substitute (iii) into the resource constraint in (17).  This allows solving for 
F
jQ and yields 
(18).  Then substitute (18) into (iii) and simplifying produces (22). 
 
 
From Equation (19) to (21); 
 
Total differentiation on (18) produces (19).  Differentiating each component in (19) yields; 
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Substitute (i) and (ii) into (19), and then rearrange to get (20).  Then z is obtained by 
moving z to the right hand side (RHS) of the resultant expression.  Hence this yields (21). 
 
 
From Equation (23) to (25); 
 
Total differentiation on (22) produces (23).  Differentiating each component in (23) yields; 
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Substitute (i) and (ii) into (23), and then rearrange to get (24).  Noting that zˆ =  
z
z  for 
any variable z, then z is obtained by moving z to the right hand side (RHS) of the 
resultant expression.  Hence this yields (25). 
 
 
Equation (26)  
 
Market equilibrium implies demand equals supply which also holds for change in demand 
and change in supply.  Then, put (9) = (24) to get; 
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Solving for 
D
jPˆ in (i) and with some rearrangement produces (26). 
 
A.8: Substitution Elasticities 
 
Table 6 provides the elasticity values used in our empirical framework.  The second column 
reports the elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported goods while the 
elasticity of substitution between imports sourced from different source markets is provided 
in column 3, by commodity.  These import substitution elasticities were sourced from 
GTAP while the elasticity of export substitution (value of 0.2) was sourced from Devarajan 
et al. (1999). 
 
Table 6: Substitution elasticities* 
GTAP Commodities Elasticity of 
substitution (domestic 
and imported goods) 
Elasticity of import 
substitution between 
countries 
Paddy rice 5.05 10.10 
Wheat 4.45 8.90 
Cereal Grains n.e.c 1.30 2.60 
Vegetables, fruit, nuts 1.85 3.70 
Oil seeds 2.45 4.90 
Sugar cane, sugar beet 2.70 5.40 
Plant-based fibers 2.50 5.00 
Crops n.e.c 3.25 6.50 
Bovine cattle, sheep and goats 2.00 4.00 
Animal products n.e.c 1.30 2.60 
Raw milk 3.65 7.30 
Wool, silk-worn cocoons 6.45 12.90 
Forestry 2.50 5.00 
Fishing 1.25 2.50 
Coal 3.05 6.10 
Oil 5.20 10.40 
Gas 17.20 34.40 
Minerals n.e.c 0.90 1.80 
Bovine meat prods 3.85 7.70 
Meat products n.e.c 4.40 8.80 
Vegetable oils and fats 3.30 6.60 
Dairy products 3.65 7.30 
Processed rice 2.60 5.20 
Sugar 2.70 5.40 
Food products n.e.c 2.00 4.00 
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Beverages and tobacco products 1.15 2.30 
Textiles 3.75 7.50 
Wearing apparel 3.70 7.40 
Leather products 4.05 8.10 
Wood products 3.40 6.80 
Paper products, publishing 2.95 5.90 
Petroleum, coal products 2.10 4.20 
Chemical, rubber, plastic products 3.30 6.60 
Mineral products n.e.c 2.90 5.80 
Ferrous metals 2.95 5.90 
Metals n.e.c 4.20 8.40 
Metal products 3.75 7.50 
Motor vehicles and parts 2.80 5.60 
Transport equipment n.e.c 4.30 8.60 
Electronic equipment 4.40 8.80 
Machinery and equipment n.e.c 4.05 8.10 
Manufactures n.e.c 3.75 7.50 
Electricity 2.80 5.60 
Gas manufacture, distribution 2.80 5.60 
Water 2.80 5.60 
Construction 1.90 3.80 
Trade 1.90 3.80 
Transport n.e.c 1.90 3.80 
Water transport 1.90 3.80 
Air transport 1.90 3.80 
Communication 1.90 3.80 
Financial services n.e.c 1.90 3.80 
Insurance 1.90 3.80 
Business services n.e.c 1.90 3.80 
Recreational and other services 1.90 3.80 
Public Admin, Defense, Education 1.90 3.80 
Dwellings 1.90 3.80 
(Source: Dimaranan, B., McDougall, R., & Hertel, T. (2006). Center for Global Trade Analysis).  *The elasticity of export transformation 
(value 0.2) was sourced from Devarajan et al. (1999).   
 
 
A.9: Import categories. 
 
The Harmonised System 6 (HS6) imports data was used for our analysis.  This is an 
internationally standardised system of names and codes to classify traded products and is 
organised into 22 broad sections and 99 chapters with approximately 300 items under each 
chapter.  While the analysis was conducted at this detailed level, the results are presented in 
section 1.5 by grouping these products into 9 broad categories.  Table 7 provides 
information on the items included under each broad category. 
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Table 7: Items included under each broad category 
Food & Live Animals Beverages & Tobacco 
Live animals: animal products Beverages, spirit and vinegar 
Meat and edible meat offal Tobacco & tobacco substitutes 
Fish and crustaceans  
Dairy produce Mineral fuels and products 
Product of animal origins n.e.c* Mineral products 
Vegetable products Ores, slag, and ash 
Edible vegetables, certain roots & tubers Mineral fuels, mineral oils and products 
Edible fruits & nuts  
Coffee, tea, mate and spices Animals, vegetable oils and fats 
Cereals Residues and waste from the food industries 
Product of the milling industry, malt, 
starch 
Animal or vegetable fats and oils 
Oils, seeds, oligeneous fruits  
Vegetable plating materials Chemicals & Related Products 
Prepared foodstuffs Products of chemical or allied industries 
Sugar & sugar confectionary Organic chemicals 
Cocoa & cocoa preparations Pharmaceutical products 
Cereal, flour, starch, milk preparations Fertilizers 
Preparation of vegetables, fruits, nuts Tanning or dyeing products 
Miscellaneous edible products Essential oils, perfumery, cosmetic toilet pre 
 Soap, organic surface-active agents, washing  
Manufactured Goods chiefly by material Albuminoidal substances, glues, enzymes 
Plastics & articles Explosives, pyrotechnic products, matches 
Rubber & articles Miscellaneous chemical products 
Raw hides, skins, leather furskins  
Articles of leather, saddlery, harness Machinery & Transport Equipment 
Fur-skins and artificial fur, manufactures 
thereof 
Machinery, mechanical appliances, electrical 
equipment 
Wood & wood articles, charcoal, cork Electrical machinery, equipment and parts 
Cork & articles of Vehicles, aircraft, vessels, railway 
Manufactures of straw Vehicles other than railway, tramway, parts 
Wood pulp/other fibrous cellulosic 
material 
Aircraft, spacecraft, and parts 
Paper & paper board Ships, boats, and floating structures 
Printed books, papers, pictures  
Textiles & textile articles Miscellaneous Manufactured Articles 
Wool, fine or coarse hair Photographic or cinematographic good 
Cotton Articles of apparel & clothing accessories 
Other vegetable textile fibres, paper yarn Footwear, headgear, umbrellas, walking 
sticks 
Man-made filaments, strip and the like of 
man-made textile materials 
Headgear and parts 
Man-made staple fibres Toy umbrellas, sun umbrellas, walking sticks 
Wadding, fels and nonwovens, special 
yarns 
Prepared feathers and down and articles 
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Carpets and other textile floor coverings Optical, cinematographic, photographic 
goods 
Special woven fabrics, tufted textile fabrics Checking, medical, surgical equipment 
Impregnated, coated, covered, laminated 
textile 
Clocks, watches, parts 
Knitted or crocheted fabric Musical instruments 
Other made up textile articles Miscellaneous manufactured articles 
Articles of stone, plaster, cements Toys, games and spot requisites 
Ceramic products  
Glass and glassware Commodities n.e.c* 
Natural or cultural pearls Arms and ammunition 
Base metals and articles of Miscellaneous manufactured articles 
Articles of iron or steel Work of art, collectors’ pieces and antiques 
Copper & articles thereof Commodities & transaction not classified 
according to kind 
Nickel & articles thereof  
Aluminium & articles thereof  
Lead & articles thereof  
Zinc & articles thereof  
Tin & articles thereof  
Other base metals  
Tools, implements, cutlery, spoons  
Miscellaneous articles of base & metal  
Note:  For our analysis we used the HS6 (Harmonised System for classifying imported goods at 6-digit level).  The HS is organised into 
99 chapters and 21 sections, with around 300 items under each chapter.  The representation of the 6 digits is as follows: the first two 
digits is the chapter in which the good falls, the next two represents the group in that chapter, and the last two digits identify more 
specific description of the good.  For presentation of results, we aggregated the products by broad category shown in this table using the 
Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) as a guide.  *n.e.c is not elsewhere classified.   
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A.10: Imports and tariff revenue results disaggregated by HS6 chapter 
 
Table 8 shows the base year imports, and the EU-EPA impact on imports and tariff revenue disaggregated by the HS6 chapter level (99 chapters) 
under the assumption of full liberalisation, while Table 9 provides results under partial liberalisation.  There are approximately 300 items 
included under each of these chapters.   
 
Table 8: Base year imports and EU-EPA impact on tariff and imports disaggregated by chapter level under full liberalisation. 
   Full 
Liberalisation 
Base Year Imports F$M Tariff revenue impact F$M Impact on imports F$M 
Chapter PRODUCT 
DESCRIPTION 
Region EU ROW Direct: 
from 
Existing 
EU 
imports 
Indirect: 
from 
Region 
Indirect: 
from 
ROW  
Total 
tariff 
revenue 
effect  
Change in 
imports 
from EU 
Change 
in 
imports 
from 
REG 
Change in 
imports 
from 
ROW  
1 Live animals - - 3,314,256 - -  - - - - 
2 Meat and edible 
meat offal 
- 30,026 54,021,826 -4,504 - -1,200 -5,704 6,233 - -6,233 
3 Fish and 
crustaceans, 
molluscs and other 
aquative 
invertibrates 
1,330,708 270,360 248,506,637 -40,554 - -8,465 -49,019 56,091 -299 -55,792 
4 Dairy produce; 
birds' eggs; natural 
honey; edible prod 
of animal origin 
- 40,743 68,480,719 -5,801 - -1,080 -6,880 8,034 - -8,034 
5 Products of animal 
origin n.e.s 
- - 261,635 - - - - - - - 
6 Vegetable Products 486 - 30,103 - - - - - - - 
7 Edible vegetables 
and certain roots 
and tubers 
- 23,738 47,470,773 -1,187 - -32 -1,219 1,186 - -1,186 
8 Edible fruit and 
nuts; peel of citrus 
4,988 984 13,933,742 -49 - -3 -52 49 -0 -49 
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fruit or melons 
9 Coffee, tea, mate 
and spice 
549,411 97,832 11,659,137 -4,943 - -464 -5,406 4,897 -220 -4,677 
10 Cereals 203,112 1,065 144,577,847 -53 -0 -2 -55 53 -0 -53 
11 Products of the 
milling industry; 
malt; starches, 
wheat gluten 
92 961 8,863,155 -48 - -2 -50 48 -0 -48 
12 Oil seeds and 
oleaginous fruits; 
5,636,655 - 2,652,300 - - - - - - - 
13 Lac; gums, resins 
and other vegetable 
saps and extracts 
- - 525,289 - - - - - - - 
14 Vegetable plaiting 
materials; vegetable 
products 
5,214 - 19,552 - - - - - - - 
15 Animal or 
vegetable fats & 
oils 
- 706,579 61,718,268 -101,354 - -17,460 -118,814 104,564 - -104,564 
16 Prepared foodstuffs 5,738,022 1,162 26,618,684 -372 -9 -138 -519 531 -94 -437 
17 Sugar and sugar 
confectionery 
- 144,130 27,297,219 -46,122 - -10,877 -56,999 33,991 - -33,991 
18 Cocoa and cocoa 
preparations 
- 718,764 6,630,241 -229,856 - -33,830 -263,686 153,617 - -153,617 
19 Preparations of 
cereals, flour, starch 
or milk 
329 287,121 17,538,688 -73,454 -0 -15,161 -88,615 58,831 -1 -58,830 
20 Preparations of 
vegetables, fruits, 
nuts  
2,044 4,612,348 19,815,827 -1,345,444 - -231,721 -1,577,165 854,117 -88 -854,029 
21 Miscellaneous 
edible preparations 
312 733,917 26,628,392 -95,318 -0 -29,293 -124,611 100,428 -1 -100,427 
22 Beverages, spirits 
and vinegar 
3,286 2,385,975 26,529,178 -716,918  -9  -271,151  -988,078  1,477,280 -183 -1,477,097 
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23 Residues and waste 
from the food 
industries; 
2,138 25,039 3,330,630     34,475 -22 -34,453 
24 Tobacco and 
manufactured 
tobacco substitutes 
- 25,617 21,341,515 -8,038  -1  -2,797  -10,835  1,919 - -1,919 
25 Mineral Products 26,551 900,662 1,229,637,05
0 
-1,281   -    -483  -1,764     
26 Ores, slag and ash 6,433 13,958 14,978,931 - - - -    
27 Mineral fuels, 
mineral oils and 
products 
   -45,033 - -4,357 -49,390 33,750 -1 -33,752 
28 Products of the 
chemical or allied 
industries 
   -698 - -29 -727 523 -0 -523 
29 Organic chemicals 138 20,705 10,115,957 -1,087 - -90 -1,177 805 -0 -805 
30 Pharmaceutical 
products 
44,759 2,100,297 51,126,975 - - - - - - - 
31 Fertilisers - 6,659,361 14,669,653 - - - - - - - 
32 Tanning or dyeing 
extracts; 
11,025 834,668 16,464,598 -134,653 -0 -11,290 -145,943 85,135 -57 -85,079 
33 Essential oils and 
resinoids; 
perfumery,cosmetic
,toilet prep 
33,189 10,622,651 33,859,532 -895,216 -62 -78,380 -973,658 943,109 -924 -942,185 
34 Soap, organic 
surface-active 
agents, washing 
prep artificial 
waxes, candles, 
dental waxes 
198,298 59,642 21,269,822 -11,913 -14 -4,692 -16,619 15,272 -141 -15,131 
35 Albuminoidal 
substances; glues, 
enzymes 
- 108,935 8,240,689 -16,319 - -1,633 -17,952 11,151 - -11,151 
36 Explosives; 
pyrotechnic 
products; matches; 
75,579 173,829 10,522,312 -8,691 - -594 -9,285 6,413 -46 -6,368 
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37 Photographic or 
cinematographic 
good 
169 31,846 4,867,382 -1,592 -0 -115 -1,707 2,373 -0 -2,373 
38 Miscellaneous 
chemical products 
6,482 628,167 28,862,722 -31,932 -0 -857 -32,789 23,362 -5 -23,356 
39 Plastics & articles 
thereof 
83,755 583,193 133,654,241 -98,286 -4 -8,450 -106,739 61,806 -39 -61,767 
40 Rubber and articles 
thereof 
269,381 1,686,670 43,518,772 -369,949 -137 -51,541 -421,627 222,611 -1,369 -221,242 
41 Raw hides & skins, 
leather, furskins & 
articles 
- 28,460 2,540,211 -1,423 - -199 -1,622 3,987 - -3,987 
42 Articles of leather; 
saddlery and 
harness 
13,892 87,776 8,008,338 -13,227 -0 -5,409 -18,636 32,563 -56 -32,507 
43 Furskins and 
artificial fur; 
manufactures 
thereof 
- - 6,284 - - - - - - - 
44 Wood & articles of 
wood: charcoal, 
cork  
1,003,511 14,729 12,078,044 -2,329 -0 -289 -2,618 2,959 -227 -2,732 
45 Cork and articles of 
cork 
- - 31,179 - - - - - - - 
46 Manufactures of 
straw, of esparto or 
of other plaiting 
- - 155,579 - - - - - - - 
47 Pulp of wood or of 
other fibrous 
cellulosic material 
- - 533 - - - - - - - 
48 Paper and 
paperboard 
5,170 5,015,804 22,615,152 -206,563 -18 -21,164 -227,745 112,424 -258 -112,166 
49 Printed books, 
newspapers, 
pictures 
- 1,135 87,996 -285,814 - -15,149 -300,963 338,885 -77 -338,807 
50 Textiles &textile 
articles 
- 47,572 4,771,236 -57 - -5 -62 107 - -107 
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51 Wool, fine or 
coarse animal hair 
- 822,983 29,975,596 -2,379 - -226 -2,604 4,514 - -4,514 
52 Cotton - - 178,343 -41,149 - -3,838 -44,987 76,762 - -76,762 
53 Other vegetable 
textile fibres; paper 
yarn 
- 105,700 11,313,628 - - - - - - - 
54 Man-made 
filaments; strip and 
the like of man-
made textile 
materials 
6,978 1,051,794 42,797,097 -5,285 - -502 -5,787 10,036 - -10,036 
55 Man-made staple 
fibres 
645 49,976 3,455,593 -52,590 - -4,918 -57,508 98,380 -16 -98,363 
56 Wadding, 
nonwovens; special 
yarns 
592 204 2,813,298 -2,517 - -645 -3,163 4,745 -1 -4,745 
57 Carpets and other 
textile floor 
coverings 
160 2,458 5,523,832 -31 - -8 -39 54 -0 -54 
58 Special woven 
fabrics; tufted 
textile fabrics 
- 28,022 7,084,779 -123 - -12 -135 235 -0 -235 
59 Impregnated, 
coated, covered or 
laminated textile 
- 8,106 12,106,025 -1,401 - -136 -1,537 2,675 - -2,675 
60 Knitted or 
crocheted fabric 
1,237 25,745 12,785,731 -405 - -39 -444 776 - -776 
61 Articles of apparel 
and clothing 
accessories: knitted 
or crocheted 
13,378 70,466 22,244,511 -8,238 -0 -6,047 -14,286 19,017 -2 -19,015 
62 Articles of apparel 
and clothing 
accessories; not 
knitted or crocheted 
910,511 32,633 19,426,519 -13,542 -2 -9,731 -23,276 32,088 -19 -32,069 
63 Other made up 
textile articles; sets 
61 11,292 14,322,452 -10,443 -108 -7,292 -17,843 24,114 -1,080 -23,035 
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64 Footwear, 
headgear, 
umbrellas, walking 
sticks 
145 6,841 1,218,867 -1,939 -0 -1,337 -3,275 4,402 -0 -4,402 
65 Headgear and parts 
thereof 
44 363 1,667,659 -2,156 - -779 -2,935 2,630 -0 -2,630 
66 Toy Umbrellas, sun 
umbrellas, walking-
sticks, seat-sticks, 
253 16 573,001 -36 - -8 -44 51 -0 -51 
67 Prepared feathers 
and down and 
articles 
296 30,860 6,877,576 -2 - -0 -3 3 -0 -3 
68 Articles of stone, 
plaster, cement 
720 172,839 11,553,714 -3,225 - -291 -3,516 4,526 -0 -4,526 
69 Ceramic products 307 75,664 13,428,578 -15,725 - -1,138 -16,863 22,033 -1 -22,031 
70 Glass and glassware 13,790 454,858 28,173,620 -3,783 - -286 -4,069 5,643 -0 -5,643 
71 Natural or cultured 
pearls 
24,355 142,317 57,080,075 -453 -0 -3 -457 669 -0 -669 
72 Base metals & 
articles of base 
metal 
252,203 887,253 69,486,877 -7,116 - -555 -7,671 10,647 -5 -10,643 
73 Articles of iron or 
steel 
599 148,588 11,715,747 -86,940 -4 -16,803 -103,747 115,213 -417 -114,796 
74 Copper and articles 
thereof 
- - 46,516 -7,590 - -596 -8,186 11,191 -1 -11,190 
75 Nickel and articles 
thereof 
26,866 80,109 21,917,613 - - - - - - - 
76 Aluminium and 
articles thereof 
26,866 80,109 21,917,613 -15,244 - -1,411 -16,655 19,125 -23 -19,101 
78 Lead and articles 
thereof 
- - 639,511 - - - - - - - 
79 Zinc and articles 
thereof 
- - 371,475 - - - - - - - 
80 Tin and articles 
thereof 
- - 369,565 - - - - - - - 
259 
 
81 Other Base metals; 
cermets; articles 
thereof 
- - 13,066 - - - - - - - 
82 Tools, implements, 
cutlery, spoons 
11,959 832,501 12,908,132 -41,625 - -2,930 -44,555 58,658 -54 -58,604 
83 Miscellaneous 
articles of base 
metal 
4,785 154,727 11,966,057 -7,840 -0 -788 -8,628 11,592 -5 -11,588 
84 Machinery & 
electrical 
appliances; 
Electrical Equipmnt 
798,465 20,260,972 300,536,517 -1,053,245 - -97,443 -1,150,688 1,469,570 -3,894 -1,465,676 
85 Electrical 
machinery and 
equipment and parts 
thereof 
2,153,745 5,533,538 208,006,308 -283,717 -0 -36,679 -320,397 374,400 -3,837 -370,563 
86 Vehicles, aircraft, 
vessels, railway 
8,590 - 2,073,445 - - - - - - - 
87 Vehicles other than 
railway or tramway 
rolling stock & 
parts 
187,944 3,553,347 148,247,859 -790,323 -20 -371,115 -1,161,458 2,108,660 -2,670 -2,105,990 
88 Aircraft, spacecraft, 
and parts thereof 
5,726 10,752,763 42,609,547 -537,638 - -75,120 -612,758 1,502,596 -202 -1,502,394 
89 Ships, boats and 
floating structures 
201,660 334,990 24,965,778 -100,959 -227 -82,094 -183,279 285,398 -2,287 -283,111 
90 Optical, 
photographic, 
cinematographic, 
medical, surgical 
equip 
142,652 1,448,249 48,810,639 -52,742 - -2,299 -55,041 75,969 -221 -75,748 
91 Clocks and watches 
and parts thereof 
31,189 74,057 6,554,794 - - - - - - - 
92 Musical 
Instruments 
- 33,929 893,533 -49 - -0 -49 71 - -71 
260 
 
93 Arms & 
Ammunition 
- 8,644 194,155 -2,766 - -864 -3,630 3,243 - -3,243 
94 Misc. manufactured 
articles 
3,459 426,975 29,525,673 -115,246 -1 -35,112 -150,360 138,915 -16 -138,899 
95 Toys, games and 
sports requisites 
8,884 213,575 14,210,285 -11,019 - -713 -11,733 15,689 -10 -15,679 
96 Miscellaneous 
manufactured 
articles 
41,331 81,782 26,398,195 -7,255 -0 -2,279 -9,535 10,278 -16 -10,262 
97 Works of art, 
collectors' pieces 
and antique 
- 3,374 145,902 -169 - -12 -181 247 - -247 
99 Commodities and 
Transactions Not 
Classified 
according to kind 
352,090 748,884 19,609,794 -3,386 - -300 -3,686 4,895 -86 -4,809 
  TOTAL 20,677,941 89,184,977 3,924,125,840 -8,090,369  -617  -1,592,751  -9,683,737  11,323,296 -18,973 -11,304,322 
  Total excluding 
aircraft 
20,672,215 78,432,214 3,881,516,293 -7,552,731  -617  -1,517,631  -9,070,979  9,820,697 -18,771 -9,801,928 
  Total excluding 
mineral fuels 
20,651,390 88,284,315 2,694,488,790 -8,045,336  -617  -1,588,394  -9,634,347  11,289,543 -18,973 -11,270,570 
  Total excl mineral 
fuels & aircraft 
20,645,664 77,531,552 2,651,879,243 -7,507,698  -617  -1,513,274  -9,021,589  9,786,947 -18,771 -9,768,176 
 
 
 
Table 9: Base year imports and EU-EPA impact on tariff and imports disaggregated by chapter level under partial liberalisation. 
   Partial Liberalisation Tariff revenue impact F$M  Effect on imports F$M 
HS 
code 
Product description Direct: from 
Existing EU 
imports 
Indirect: 
from 
Region 
Indirect: from 
ROW  
Total tariff 
revenue effect 
Change in 
imports from 
EU (total 
substitution) 
Change in 
imports from 
REG 
Change in 
imports from 
ROW 
1 Live animals - - - -    
2 Meat and edible meat offal -222 - -77 -299 307  -307 
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3 Fish and crustaceans, 
molluscs and other 
aquative invertibrates 
-11,072 - -2,371 -13,443 15,310 -281 -15,028 
4 Dairy produce; birds' eggs; 
natural honey; edible prod 
of animal origin 
-5,749 - -968 -6,717 7,972 - -7,972 
5 Products of animal origin 
n.e.s 
- - - - - - - 
6 Vegetable Products - - - - - - - 
7 Edible vegetables and 
certain roots and tubers 
-4 - -0 -4 3 - -3 
8 Edible fruit and nuts; peel 
of citrus fruit or melons 
-45 - -2 -47 45 -0 -45 
9 Coffee, tea, mate and spice -4,822 - -245 -5,066 4,651 -196 -4,455 
10 Cereals -53 - -0 -53 53 - -53 
11 Products of the milling 
industry; malt; starches, 
wheat gluten 
-40 - -2 -42 40 - -40 
12 Oil seeds and oleaginous 
fruits; 
- - - - - - - 
13 Lac; gums, resins and other 
vegetable saps and extracts 
- - - - - - - 
14 Vegetable plaiting 
materials; vegetable 
products 
- - - - - - - 
15 Animal or vegetable fats & 
oils 
-101,354 - -18,114 -119,468 104,178 - -104,178 
16 Prepared foodstuffs; 
beverages, spirits & 
Vinegar; Tobacco & Subs 
- - - - - - - 
17 Sugar and sugar 
confectionery 
- - - - - - - 
18 Cocoa and cocoa 
preparations 
- - - - - - - 
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19 Preparations of cereals, 
flour, starch or milk 
- - - - - - - 
20 Preparations of vegetables, 
fruits, nuts  
-19,764   -    -4,793  -24,557  15,644 - -15,644 
21 Miscellaneous edible 
preparations 
- - - - - - - 
22 Beverages, spirits and 
vinegar 
- - - - - - - 
23 Residues and waste from 
the food industries; 
- - - - - - - 
24 Tobacco and manufactured 
tobacco substitutes 
-7,729   -    -2,958  -10,687  30,615 - -30,615 
25 Mineral products -1,281 - -483 -1,764 1,919 - -1,919 
26 Ores, slag and ash - - - - - - - 
27 Mineral fuels, mineral oils 
and products 
-3,504 - -358 -3,862 2,628 - -2,628 
28 Products of the chemical or 
allied industries 
-698 - -29 -727 523 -0 -523 
29 Organic chemicals -1,087 - -90 -1,177 805 -0 -805 
30 Pharmaceutical products - - - - - - - 
31 Fertilisers - - - - - - - 
32 Tanning or dyeing extracts; -16,313 -0 -712 -17,025 11,079 -1 -11,078 
33 Essential oils and 
resinoids; perfumery, 
cosmetic, toilet prep 
-895,216 -62 -78,380 -973,658 943,109 -924 -942,185 
34 Soap, organic surface-
active agents, washing prep 
artificial waxes, candles, 
dental waxes 
-636 - -56 -692 928 - -928 
35 Albuminoidal substances; 
glues, enzymes 
-16,319 - -1,633 -17,952 11,151 - -11,151 
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36 Explosives; pyrotechnic 
products; matches; 
- - - - - - - 
37 Photographic or 
cinematographic good 
-1,592 -0 -115 -1,707 2,373 -0 -2,373 
38 Miscellaneous chemical 
products 
-27,906 -0 -762 -28,667 20,093 -9 -20,084 
39 Plastics & articles thereof -71,227 -0 -4,588 -75,815 44,597 -5 -44,592 
40 Rubber and articles thereof -325,826 -107 -48,738 -374,671 194,823 -1,069 -193,754 
41 Raw hides & skins, leather, 
furskins & articles 
-1,423 - -199 -1,622 3,987 - -3,987 
42 Articles of leather; 
saddlery and harness 
-13,227 -0 -5,409 -18,636 32,563 -56 -32,507 
43 Furskins and artificial fur; 
manufactures thereof 
- - - - - - - 
44 Wood & articles of wood: 
charcoal, cork  
- - - - - - - 
45 Cork and articles of cork - - - - - - - 
46 Manufactures of straw, of 
esparto or of other plaiting 
- - - - - - - 
47 Pulp of wood or of other 
fibrous cellulosic material 
- - - - - - - 
48 Paper and paperboard -192,826 - -13,820 -206,646 104,518 -114 -104,404 
49 Printed books, newspapers, 
pictures 
-285,814 - -15,149 -300,963 338,885 -77 -338,807 
50 Textiles &textile articles -57 - -5 -62 107 - -107 
51 Wool, fine or coarse 
animal hair 
-2,379 - -226 -2,604 4,514 - -4,514 
52 Cotton -41,149 - -3,838 -44,987 76,762 - -76,762 
53 Other vegetable textile 
fibres; paper yarn 
- - - - - - - 
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54 Man-made filaments; strip 
and the like of man-made 
textile materials 
-5,285 - -502 -5,787 10,036 - -10,036 
55 Man-made staple fibres -52,590 - -4,918 -57,508 98,380 -16 -98,363 
56 Wadding, felt and 
nonwovens; special yarns 
-2,517 - -645 -3,163 4,745 -1 -4,745 
57 Carpets and other textile 
floor coverings 
-31 - -8 -39 54 -0 -54 
58 Special woven fabrics; 
tufted textile fabrics 
-123 - -5 -128 236 -0 -106 
59 Impregnated, coated, 
covered or laminated 
textile 
-1,401 - -136 -1,537 2,675 - -2,675 
60 Knitted or crocheted fabric -405 - -39 -444 776 - -776 
61 Articles of apparel and 
clothing accessories 
-2,755 - -2,029 -4,784 6,342 - -6,342 
62 Articles of apparel and 
clothing accessories 
-1,049 -1 -761 -1,811 2,422 -11 -2,412 
63 Other made up textile 
articles; sets 
-1,102 - -802 -1,904 2,534 - -2,534 
64 Footwear, headgear, 
umbrellas, walking sticks 
-310 - -91 -401 874 - -874 
65 Headgear and parts thereof -2,156 - -779 -2,935 2,630 -0 -2,630 
66 Toy Umbrellas, sun 
umbrellas, walking-sticks, 
seat-sticks, 
-36 - -8 -44 51 -0 -51 
67 Prepared feathers and 
down and articles 
-2 - -0 -3 3 -0 -3 
68 Articles of stone, plaster, 
cement 
-3,225 - -291 -3,516 4,526 -0 -4,526 
69 Ceramic products -15,725 - -1,138 -16,863 22,033 -1 -22,031 
70 Glass and glassware -3,783 - -286 -4,069 5,643 -0 -5,643 
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71 Natural or cultured pearls -453 -0 -3 -457 669 -0 -669 
72 Base metals & articles of 
base metal 
-7,116 - -545 -7,660 10,647 -5 -10,643 
73 Articles of iron or steel -1,141 - -172 -1,312 1,704 - -1,704 
74 Copper and articles thereof -7,590 - -596 -8,186 11,191 -1 -11,190 
75 Nickel and articles thereof - - - - - - - 
76 Aluminium and articles 
thereof 
-15,244 - -1,411 -16,655 19,125 -23 -19,101 
78 Lead and articles thereof - - - - - - - 
79 Zinc and articles thereof - - - - - - - 
80 Tin and articles thereof - - - - - - - 
81 Other Base metals; 
cermets; articles thereof 
- - - - - - - 
82 Tools, implements, cutlery, 
spoons 
-41,625 - -2,930 -44,555 58,658 -54 -58,604 
83 Miscellaneous articles of 
base metal 
-7,840 -0 -788 -8,628 11,592 -5 -11,588 
84 Machinery & electrical 
Equipmnt 
-1,051,802 - -93,584 -1,145,385 1,464,821 -1,754 -1,463,067 
85 Electrical machinery and 
equipment and parts 
thereof 
-283,717 -0 -36,679 -320,397 374,400 -3,837 -370,563 
86 Vehicles, aircraft, vessels, 
railway 
- - - - - - - 
87 Vehicles other than railway 
or tramway rolling stock & 
parts 
-378,771 -16 -177,621 -556,408 1,042,514 -268 -1,042,247 
88 Aircraft, spacecraft, and 
parts thereof 
-537,638 - -75,120 -612,758 1,502,596 -202 -1,502,394 
89 Ships, boats and floating 
structures 
-1,155 - -242 -1,397 4,011 -2 -4,009 
90 Optical, photographic, 
cinematographic, checking, 
medical, surgical equip 
-52,742 - -2,299 -55,041 75,969 -221 -75,748 
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91 Clocks and watches and 
parts thereof 
- - - - - - - 
92 Musical Instruments -49 - -0 -49 71 - -71 
93 Arms & Ammunition -2,215 - -729 -2,944 2,612 - -2,612 
94 Misc. manufactured 
articles 
-115,246 -1 -35,112 -150,360 138,915 -16 -138,899 
95 Toys, games and sports 
requisites 
-11,019 - -713 -11,733 15,689 -10 -15,679 
96 Miscellaneous 
manufactured articles 
-7,255 -0 -2,279 -9,535 10,278 -16 -10,262 
97 Works of art, collectors' 
pieces and antique 
-169 - -12 -181 247 - -247 
99 Commodities and 
Transactions Not 
Classified according to 
kind 
-3,386 - -300 -3,686 4,895 -86 -4,809 
  TOTAL -4,668,002  -188  -647,692  -5,315,883  6,888,617 -9,263 -6,879,354 
  Total excluding aircraft -4,130,364  -188  -572,573  -4,703,125  5,386,151 -9,061 -5,376,960 
  Total excluding mineral 
fuels 
-4,664,498  -188  -647,335  -5,312,021  6,886,118 -9,263 -6,876,726 
  Total excl mineral fuels 
& aircraft 
-4,126,859  -188  -572,215  -4,699,263  5,383,523 -9,061 -5,374,332 
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A.11: Tariff revenue impacts with an EU-EPA and external tariff reform. 
 
Table 10: Tariff revenue impact of the EU-Fiji EPA & external tariff reform. 
Aggregated import category 
Scenario 1: Full liberalisation 
(a)                                        
Loss from 
existing 
EU 
imports 
(F$) 
(b)                                         
Loss due to 
ROW 
substitutio
n (F$) 
(c)                                         
Loss due to 
Regional 
Substitutio
n (F$) 
(d)                                        
Total (F$) 
Food & Live Animals -1,847,704 -16,878,246 -594,173 -19,320,123 
Beverages & Tobacco -724,956 -2,998,106 -497 -3,723,559 
Mineral Fuels and Products -46,314 -1,813,162 0 -1,859,476 
Animals, Vegetable Oils & Fats -101,354 -17,460 0 -118,814 
Chemicals & Related Products -1,100,509 -2,833,268 -22,092 -3,955,868 
Manufactured Goods -1,283,512 -14,200,850 -141,660 -15,626,021 
Machinery & Transport -2,765,882 -9,522,444 -21,680 -12,310,006 
Misc. Manufactured Articles -206,563 -6,472,638 -994 -6,680,195 
Commodities nec -13,576 -765,860 -1,285 -780,720 
Total -8,090,369 -55,502,034 -782,380 -64,374,783 
 
Scenario 2: Partial liberalisation 
Food & Live Animals -41,770 -1,551,105 -11,294 -1,604,169 
Beverages & Tobacco -7,729 -16,636 0 -24,365 
Mineral Fuels and Products -4,785 -1,600,469 -104 -1,605,358 
Animals, Vegetable Oils & Fats -101,354 -18,114 0 -119,468 
Chemicals & Related Products -958,174 -317,027 -2,262 -1,277,463 
Manufactured Goods -1,101,123 -4,886,526 -20,890 -6,008,539 
Machinery & Transport -2,253,083 -5,516,643 -1,680 -7,771,406 
Misc. Manufactured Articles -186,958 -2,223,726 -833 -2,411,517 
Commodities nec -13,025 -765,742 -1,285 -780,052 
Total -4,668,002 -16,895,987 -38,348 -21,602,337 
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B: Appendices to Chapter 2 
 
 
B1. The ACP group 
 
The ACP group comprises of 79 states from Africa, Caribbean and the Pacific.  These 
countries are listed in Table 11. 
 
Table 11: List of ACP countries. 
Angola - Antigua and Barbuda - Belize - Cape Verde - Comoros - Bahamas - Barbados - 
Benin - Botswana - Burkina Faso - Burundi - Cameroon - Central African Republic - Chad 
- Congo (Brazzaville) - Congo (Kinshasa) - Cook Islands - Cte d'Ivoire - Cuba - Djibouti - 
Dominica - Dominican Republic - Eritrea - Ethiopia - Fiji - Gabon - Gambia - Ghana - 
Grenada - Republic of Guinea - Guinea-Bissau - Equatorial Guinea - Guyana - Haiti - 
Jamaica - Kenya - Kiribati - Lesotho - Liberia - Madagascar - Malawi - Mali - Marshall 
Islands - Mauritania - Mauritius - Micronesia - Mozambique - Namibia - Nauru - Niger - 
Nigeria - Niue - Palau - Papua New Guinea - Rwanda - St. Kitts and Nevis - St. Lucia - St. 
Vincent and the Grenadines - Solomon Islands - Samoa - Sao Tome and Principe - Senegal 
- Seychelles - Sierra Leone - Somalia - South Africa - Sudan - Suriname - Swaziland - 
Tanzania - Timor Leste - Togo - Tonga - Trinidad and Tobago - Tuvalu - Uganda - 
Vanuatu - Zambia – Zimbabwe. 
(Source: www.acp.int) 
 
 
B2. CUSFTA, NAFTA & MERCOSUR 
 
Three trade agreements that have received considerable research interest include the CUSFTA, 
NAFTA and the MERCOSUR.  Table 12 provides details of these agreements. 
 
Table 12: Details of Agreements 
CUSFTA: Canada US Free Trade 
Agreement 
This was signed in 1988 by the US and Canada 
to facilitate trade across borders between these 
two countries by reducing trade barriers.  After 
Mexico joined in in 1994, this agreement was 
replaced by NAFTA. 
NAFTA: North American Free Trade 
Agreement 
This was formed in 1994 by the US, Canada and 
Mexico to eliminate trade and investment 
barriers between members.   
MERCOSUR Southern common market comprising 
Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, 
Venezuela. 
(Source: www.wto.org) 
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B3. Description of variables and data source for the empirical model 
 
The data for the empirical model presented in section 2.4 has been sourced from various 
sources, as summarised in Table 13. 
 
Table 13: Description and data source of variables used in equation 1 in section 2.4. 
Variable Description Source 
Dependent Variable 
FDI* Foreign Direct Investment Stock of 
OECD country into ACP country, in 
millions of USD. 
International Direct 
Investment Statistics 
database: OECD  
Independent Variables 
Host GDP* 
(ACPGDP) 
ACP country GDP, PPP (constant 
2011 international $) 
WDI 
Source GDP* 
(OECDGDP) 
OECD country GDP, PPP (constant 
2011 international $) 
WDI 
Host Labor Force* 
(LF) 
Size of labor force of host country.   WDI 
Host Trade 
Openness 
(TO) 
Share of exports and imports of goods 
and services as a % of GDP of the 
ACP country 
WDI 
Host Natural 
resource rent* 
(NRR) 
Sum of the natural resource (oil, 
natural gas, coal, mineral, forest) rents 
received by ACP country as a % of 
GDP 
WDI 
Host Investment 
risk* 
(IR) 
A measure of economic freedom based 
on both quantitative and qualitative 
factors 
Heritage Foundation 
Bilateral PTA Preferential Trade Agreement  WTO 
Bilateral BIT Bilateral Investment Treaty UNCTAD 
Bilateral DTT Double Taxation Treaty UNCTAD 
Bilateral Distance* 
(Dist) 
Bilateral Great circle distance (in 
kilometres) 
CEPII 
Bilateral Time 
difference (OH) 
Overlap in office hours  www.timeanddate.com 
Host Surrounding 
Market Potential* 
(SMP) 
The sum of inverse-distance weighted 
GDPs of nearby markets.     
GDP Data from WDI 
Distance from CEPII 
Host number of 
PTAs (NPTA) 
The total number of PTAs of which the 
host is a member  
WTO 
Note: * indicates variables transformed by logs. 
 
B4. A summary of the country pairs used in the empirical model 
 
This study used a bilateral econometric specification.  Hence, the data set has parent 
countries (OECD countries from where FDI originates) and host countries (ACP FDI 
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recipients).  In total, there are 305 country pairs in our sample, as reported in Table 14.  
Furthermore, Table 15 provides a summary of the number of ACP partners for each OECD 
parent country, while Table 16 is a summary of the number of OECD parents that each 
ACP host country has. 
 
Table 14: Country Pair by host ACP and origin OECD country. 
Country Pair 
No. 
Host (ACP) Parent 
(OECD) 
Country Pair 
No. 
Host (ACP) Parent 
(OECD) 
1 Angola Belgium 153 Malawi Denmark 
2 Denmark 154 France 
3 France 155 Italy 
4 Germany 156 Netherlnds 
5 Italy 157 UK 
6 Korea 158 US 
7 Netherlands 159 Mali France 
8 Norway 160 Italy 
9 Portugal 161 Netherlnds 
10 US 162 Norway 
11 Bahamas Chile 163 Mauritania France 
12 Denmark 164 Italy 
13 France 165 Netherlnds 
14 Germany 166 Mauritius Belgium 
15 Greece 167 Denmark 
16 Italy 168 France 
17 Netherlands 169 Germany 
18 Norway 170 Italy 
19 Sweden 171 Korea 
20 UK 172 Netherlnds 
21 US 173 Norway 
22 Barbados Canada 174 UK 
23 France 175 US 
24 Germany 176 Mozambique Denmark 
25 Italy 177 France 
26 Netherlands 178 Italy 
27 Norway 179 Netherlnds 
28 UK 180 Norway 
29 US 181 Portugal 
30 Belize Canada 182 UK 
31 Hungary 183 US 
32 Italy 184 Niger France 
33 Netherlnds 185 Greece 
34 Norway 186 Italy 
35 UK 187 Netherlnds 
36 US 188 Nigeria Belgium 
37 Benin France 189 Denmark 
38 Italy 190 France 
39 Korea 191 Germany 
40 Netherlnds 192 Greece 
41 Norway 193 Italy 
42 US 194 Korea 
43 Burkina Faso France 195 Netherlnds 
44 Italy 196 Norway 
45 Netherlands 197 Portugal 
46 Norway  198 Switzerland 
47 Burundi Italy 199 UK 
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Country Pair 
No. 
Host (ACP) Parent 
(OECD) 
Country Pair 
No. 
Host (ACP) Parent 
(OECD) 
48 Netherlands 200 US 
49 Cameroon Denmark 201 Papua New 
Guinea 
Australia 
50 France 202 Canada 
51 Italy 203 Italy 
52 Korea 204 Korea 
53 Netherlands 205 Netherlnds 
54 Norway 206 NZ 
55 UK 207 UK 
56 US 208 US 
57 Central African 
Republic 
France 209 Rwanda France 
58 Italy 210 Italy 
59 Korea 211 Netherlnds 
60 Chad France 212 Samoa Italy 
61 Italy 213 Korea 
62 Netherlnds 214 NZ 
63 Congo France 215 Senegal France 
64 Italy 216 Italy 
65 Korea 217 Korea 
66 Netherlnds 218 Netherlnds 
67 US 219 US 
68 Cuba France 220 Sierra Leone Denmark 
69 Italy 221 Hungary 
70 Netherlnds 222 Italy 
71 Spain 223 Korea 
72 Dominican 
Republic 
Canada 224 Netherlnds 
73 Chile 225 Norway 
74 Denmark 226 Solomons Italy 
75 Estonia 227 Korea 
76 France 228 South Africa Australia 
77 Germany 229 Austria 
78 Italy 230 Belgium 
79 Korea 231 Canada 
80 Mexico 232 Denmark 
81 Netherlnds 233 Estonia 
82 Norway 234 Finland 
83 Slovenia 235 France 
84 Spain 236 Germany 
85 UK 237 Greece 
86 US 238 Hungary 
87 Equatorial 
Guinea 
France 239 Iceland 
88 Italy 240 Italy 
89 Korea 241 Japan 
90 Norway 242 Korea 
91 US 243 Netherlnds 
92 Ethiopia France 244 Norway 
93 Italy 245 Portugal 
94 Korea 246 Slovenia 
95 Netherlnds 247 Spain 
96 Norway 248 Sweden 
97 SR 249 Switzerland 
98 US 250 UK 
99 Fiji AU 251 US 
100 France 252 St Lucia France 
101 Korea 253 Italy 
102 Netherlnds 254 Netherlnds 
103 NZ 255 US 
104 UK 256 St Vincent & France 
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Country Pair 
No. 
Host (ACP) Parent 
(OECD) 
Country Pair 
No. 
Host (ACP) Parent 
(OECD) 
105 US 257 Grenadines Italy 
106 Gabon France 258 Norway 
107 Italy 259 Tanzania Denmark 
108 Netherlnds 260 France 
109 Norway 261 Germany 
110 Slovenia 262 Italy 
111 US 263 Korea 
112 Gambia France 264 Netherlnds 
113 Italy 265 Norway 
114 Netherlnds 266 Sweden 
115 Ghana Canada 267 UK 
116 Denmark 268 Togo France 
117 France 269 Germany 
118 Germany 270 Italy 
119 Italy 271 Netherlnds 
120 Korea 272 Norway 
121 Netherlnds 273 US 
122 Norway 274 Tonga Australia 
123 Sweden 275 Italy 
124 UK 276 Korea 
125 US 277 Trinidad & 
Tobago 
Canada 
126 Kenya Denmark 278 France 
127 Estonia 279 Italy 
128 France 280 Korea 
129 Germany 281 Netherlnds 
130 Greece 282 Norway 
131 Italy 283 UK 
132 Korea 284 US 
133 Netherlnds 285 Uganda Denmark 
134 Norway 286 France 
135 Sweden 287 Germany 
136 Switzerland 288 Italy 
137 UK 289 Korea 
138 US 290 Netherlnds 
139 Liberia Denmark 291 Norway 
140 France 292 UK 
141 Germany 293 US 
142 Greece 294 Vanuatu France 
143 Italy 295 Italy 
144 Korea 296 Korea 
145 Netherlnds 297 US 
146 Norway 298 Zimbabwe Canada 
147 Slovenia 299 France 
148 US 300 Italy 
149 Madagascar France 301 Korea 
150 Italy 302 Netherlnds 
151 Korea 303 Norway 
152 Netherlands 304 UK 
305 US 
(Source: Compiled using data obtained from the International Direct Investment Statistics database of the OECD available at 
www.oecd.org) 
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Table 15: Number of ACP partners for each OECD country 
OECD Country No of ACP partners OECD Country No of ACP partners 
Australia 4 Japan 1 
Austria 1 Korea 27 
Belgium 4 Mexico 1 
Canada 8 Netherlands 38 
Chile 2 Norway 26 
Denmark 15 NZ 3 
Estonia 3 Portugal 4 
Finland 1 Slovenia 4 
France 38 Spain 3 
Germany 13 SR 1 
Greece 6 Sweden 5 
Hungary 3 Switzerland 3 
Iceland 1 UK 18 
Italy 43 US 28 
(Source: Compiled using data obtained from the International Direct Investment Statistics database of the OECD available at 
www.oecd.org) 
 
 
Table 16: Number of OECD partners for each ACP country 
ACP country No of OECD 
partners 
ACP country No of OECD Partners 
Angola 10 Mali 4 
Bahamas 11 Mauritania 3 
Barbados 8 Mauritius 10 
Belize 7 Mozambique 8 
Benin 6 Niger 4 
Burkina Faso 4 Nigeria 13 
Burundi 2 Papua New Guinea 8 
Cameroon 8 Rwanda 3 
Central African 
Republic 
3 Samoa 3 
Chad 3 Senegal 5 
Congo 5 Sierra Leone 6 
Cuba 4 Solomons 2 
Dominican Republic 15 South Africa 24 
Equatorial Guinea 5 St Lucia 4 
Ethiopia 7 St Vincent & Grenadines 3 
Fiji 7 Tanzania 9 
Gabon 6 Togo 6 
Gambia 3 Tonga 3 
Ghana 11 Trinidad & Tobago 8 
Kenya 13 Uganda 9 
Liberia 10 Vanuatu 4 
Madagascar 4 Zimbabwe 8 
Malawi 6   
(Source: Compiled using data obtained from the International Direct Investment Statistics database of the OECD available at 
www.oecd.org) 
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B4. UNCTAD’s list of determinants of FDI  
 
The UNCTAD provides a list of determinants of FDI and the proxy indicators that can be 
used for these determinants.  As summarised in Table 17, the determinants are broadly 
grouped into market, resources (human and natural) and infrastructure. 
 
 
Table 17: UNCTAD FDI determinants and proxy indicators. 
Market attractiveness  Size of the market (GDP-PPP) 
 Spending power (per capita GDP-PPP) 
 Growth potential of the market (real GDP growth rate) 
Availability of low-cost 
labor and skills 
 Unit labor cost 
 Size of manufacturing workforce 
Presence of natural 
resources 
 Exploitation of resources (values of fuels and ores 
exports) 
 Agricultural potential  
Enabling infrastructure  Transport infrastructure 
 Energy infrastructure 
 Telecom infrastructure 
(Source: UNCTAD World Investment Report 2012) 
 
 
B5. Calculation of selected explanatory variables 
 
Two of the explanatory variables used in our empirical specification are Trade Weighted 
PTA and Surrounding Market Potential (SMP).  Tables 18 and 19 explain how these 
variables were calculated. 
 
Table 18: Calculation of surrounding market potential 
Surrounding market potential is calculated as the inverse distance weighted GDP of 
surrounding markets. Our approach is similar in spirit to the Blonigen et al. (2007) measure 
of surrounding market potential except that while Blonigen et al. adopts a broader 
definition by including all other countries in the world as the surrounding market of a 
particular country, we only include all other countries within a specific sub-region.  The 
sub-region is defined as the five economic groupings of the African countries (West Africa, 
Central Africa, Eastern & Southern Africa, Eastern African Countries), Caribbean and the 
Pacific.  The weights are calculated as a simple inverse function where the shortest bilateral 
distance within the sample is assigned weight of 1, and all other bilateral distances receive a 
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weight that declines as per the equation below: 
 
distanceij = shortest bilateral distance kj/bilateral distanceij 
 
where distanceij is the distance between country i and j.  Hence the weight for country i in 
calculation of the surrounding market potential of country j is obtained by dividing the 
shortest bilateral distance that country j has in that sample (which is with country k) with 
the bilateral distance between i and j.  This weight is then multiplied with the GDP (PPP) of 
country i.  Hence, the inverse distance weighted GDP of all other countries (does not 
include country j) in the sub-region of country j are summed to give the surrounding market 
potential of country j.  We include GDP of country j as a separate regressor.   
 
 
 
B5. Estimation results and diagnostic tests 
 
 
Table 19: Re-estimation of base model (first-differenced). 
Dependent variable Log (FDI) 
Regressors Base model 
 
Base model: re-estimated 
 
ACP GDP ⱹ 0.391** 
(0.154) 
0.197 
(0.148) 
OECD GDP ⱹ 0.159 
 (0.276) 
-0.541* 
(0.222) 
Trade Openness  -0.004*** 
(0.001) 
-0.004*** 
(0.001) 
Investment Risk ⱹ 0.872*** 
(0.192) 
1.446*** 
(0.189) 
Natural Resource Rent ⱹ 0.024 
(0.022) 
0.064*** 
(0.023) 
Labor Force ⱹ 0.591 
(0.365) 
0.467*** 
(0.217) 
SMP ⱹ 1.223*** 
(0.168) 
0.585*** 
(0.190) 
Distance ⱹ -1.105*** 
(0.241) 
-0.945*** 
(0.264) 
Overlap in office hours 0.028 
(0.037) 
0.038 
(0.037) 
BIT -0.031 
(0.065) 
-0.069 
(0.073) 
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DTT 1.129*** 
(0.092) 
0.968*** 
(0.097) 
PTA -0.141 
(0.139) 
-0.089 
(0.136) 
NPTA -0.086*** 
(0.026) 
0.037 
(0.031) 
Constant -23.939*** 
(5.07) 
-51.583*** 
(4.323) 
Significance levels: *10%  **5%  ***1%t.  ⱹ Control variables that are expressed in natural logarithms. ACP GDP. Surrounding market 
potential (SMP) and OECD GDP are in first differenced forms. 
 
 
Table 20: Pedroni Residual Cointegration Test (ACP GDP and surrounding market 
potential). 
 Panel Statistic Group Statistic 
variance-Statistic 3.241***  
rho-Statistic -1.531* 1.924 
PP-Statistic -3.342*** -2.189** 
ADF Statistic -5.581*** -6.589*** 
The Pedroni (1999) Residual Cointegration test employs 4 panel statistics and 3 group statistics, reported in table above.  It tests the null 
hypothesis of no cointegration against the alternative hypothesis of cointegration.  * denotes the significance level - * 10%, **5%, ***1%.  
The null of no cointegration is rejected in all the 4 panel statistics and two of the group statistics, providing evidence of cointegration 
between ACP GDP and surrounding market potential which are both host country variables.  Because our dataset has country pair 
variables, we have treated these host country variables as host variables and not country pair variables.   
 
 
Table 21: Unit root test on residuals of base model (model 1). 
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -51.6103  0.0000  242  1624 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -18.3825  0.0000 207  1519 
 
 
Table 22: Endogeneity test results. 
Variable Results 
Host GDP χ2 =0.90936  p=0.3402 
F=0.889379  p=0.3458 
Trade Openness χ2 =0.556148  p=0.4558 
F=0.556148  p=0.4687 
 
 
Table 23: Instrumental Variable Regression. 
Regressors (a) IV 
FE estimates 
(b) Base model 
ACP GDP ⱹ 0.840** 
(0.384) 
0.391** 
(0.154) 
OECD GDP ⱹ 0.983* 
(0.578) 
0.159 
 (0.276) 
Trade Openness  -0.007* 
(0.006) 
-0.004*** 
(0.001) 
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Investment Risk ⱹ 1.686** 
(0.575) 
0.872*** 
(0.192) 
Natural Resource Rent ⱹ 0.066 
(0.078) 
0.024 
(0.022) 
Labor Force ⱹ -0.659 
(0.677) 
0.591 
(0.365) 
SMP ⱹ 0.966*** 
(0.334) 
1.223*** 
(0.168) 
Distance ⱹ -0.771 
(0.683) 
-1.105*** 
(0.241) 
Overlap in office hours 0.088 
(1.02) 
0.028 
(0.037) 
BIT -0.098 
(0.167) 
-0.031 
(0.065) 
DTT 0.983*** 
(0.251) 
1.129*** 
(0.092) 
PTA 0.084 
(0.398) 
-0.141 
(0.139) 
NPTA 0.014 
(0.075) 
-0.086*** 
(0.026) 
Constant -19.943* 
(11.227) 
-23.939*** 
(5.07) 
Assuming that host GDP and trade openness are endogenous, we re-estimated this fixed effect model using IV regression (column a), 
with the use of one year lags as instruments for both these variables.  While the coefficient of ACP GDP has increased in size, it’s 
significance and sign are unchanged.  A similar observation can be made for the trade openness variable.  All other variables show 
marginal changes. 
 
 
Table 24: Including Lagged effect (ACP GDP, OECD GDP) 
Regressors (a) Model a 
(lagged) 
(b) Model b 
(base) 
ACP GDP ⱹ 0.367** 
(0.158) 
0.391** 
(0.154) 
OECD GDP ⱹ 0.248 
(0.276) 
0.159 
 (0.276) 
Trade Openness  -0.004*** 
(0.001) 
-0.004*** 
(0.001) 
Investment Risk ⱹ 0.935*** 
(0.195) 
0.872*** 
(0.192) 
Natural Resource Rent ⱹ 0.020 
(0.023) 
0.024 
(0.022) 
Labor Force ⱹ 0.721* 
(0.371) 
0.591 
(0.365) 
SMP ⱹ 1.072*** 
(0.167) 
1.223*** 
(0.168) 
Distance ⱹ -1.149*** 
(0.242) 
-1.105*** 
(0.241) 
Overlap in office hours 0.019 
(0.037) 
0.028 
(0.037) 
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BIT -0.021 
(0.669) 
-0.031 
(0.065) 
DTT 1.130*** 
(0.092) 
1.129*** 
(0.092) 
PTA -0.132 
(0.139) 
-0.141 
(0.139) 
NPTA -0.061** 
(0.028) 
-0.086*** 
(0.026) 
ACP GDP_L1 -0.0136 
(0.057) 
 
OECD GDP_L1 -0.031 
(0.247) 
 
Constant -23.951 
(5.183) 
-23.939*** 
(5.07) 
In model a, we incorporated one-year lagged ACP GDP and OECD GDP to examine if previous years host and origin economy  
size stimulated more FDI in current year.  The coefficients for both lagged ACP GDP and OECD GDP are insignificant, while all other 
estimates remain intact.   
 
 
 
C: Appendices to Chapter 3 
 
 
C1. Labor source and origin countries. 
 
This table provides a list of all country pairs used in our estimation.  The origin country 
refers to the country from where the labor originates (i.e. the home country of foreign 
workers), while the host country refers to the foreign country where these workers seek 
employment.  Each combination of origin, host form a country pair. 
 
 
Table 25: Country Pairs by Origin and Host. 
 Origin Host  Origin Host  Origin Host 
1 Bangladesh Bahrain 131 Philippines Cambodia 261 Sri Lanka Bangladesh 
2 Bangladesh Brunei 
Darussalam 
132 Philippines Cameroon 262 Sri Lanka Cyprus 
3 Bangladesh Egypt 133 Philippines Canada 263 Sri Lanka Egypt 
4 Bangladesh Iraq 134 Philippines Central African 
Republic 
264 Sri Lanka Greece 
5 Bangladesh Ireland 135 Philippines Chad 265 Sri Lanka HK 
6 Bangladesh Italy 136 Philippines Chile 266 Sri Lanka India 
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7 Bangladesh Japan 137 Philippines China 267 Sri Lanka Israel 
8 Bangladesh Jordon 138 Philippines Colombia 268 Sri Lanka Italy 
9 Bangladesh Kuwait 139 Philippines Congo 269 Sri Lanka Japan 
10 Bangladesh Lebanon 140 Philippines Cook Islands 270 Sri Lanka Jordan 
11 Bangladesh Libya 141 Philippines Costa Rica 271 Sri Lanka Kenya 
12 Bangladesh Malaysia 142 Philippines Croatia 272 Sri Lanka Kuwait 
13 Bangladesh Mauritius 143 Philippines Cuba 273 Sri Lanka Libya 
14 Bangladesh Oman 144 Philippines Cyprus 274 Sri Lanka Malaysia 
15 Bangladesh Qatar 145 Philippines Czech Republic 275 Sri Lanka Maldives 
16 Bangladesh Rep of Korea 146 Philippines Denmark 276 Sri Lanka Mauritius 
17 Bangladesh Saudi Arabia 147 Philippines Djibouti 277 Sri Lanka Oman 
18 Bangladesh Singapore 148 Philippines Dominican 
Republic 
278 Sri Lanka Pakistan 
19 Bangladesh Sudan 149 Philippines Egypt 279 Sri Lanka Qatar 
20 Bangladesh United Arab 
Emirates 
150 Philippines Equatorial 
Guinea 
280 Sri Lanka Korea 
21 Bangladesh UK 151 Philippines Eriteria 281 Sri Lanka Saudi Arabia 
22 Bangladesh Yemen 152 Philippines Ethiopia 282 Sri Lanka Seychelles 
23 Cambodia Malaysia 153 Philippines Fiji 283 Sri Lanka Singapore 
24 Cambodia Korea 154 Philippines Finland 284 Sri Lanka South Africa 
25 Cambodia Thailand 155 Philippines France 285 Sri Lanka Thailand 
26 India Afghanistan 156 Philippines Gabon 286 Sri Lanka United Arab 
Emirates 
27 India Bahrain 157 Philippines Germany 287 Sri Lanka UK 
28 India Indonesia 158 Philippines Ghana 288 Sri Lanka US 
29 India Iraq 159 Philippines Greece 289 Thailand Afghanistan 
30 India Jordon 160 Philippines Grenada 290 Thailand Albania 
31 India Kuwait 161 Philippines Guam 291 Thailand Algeria 
32 India Lebanon 162 Philippines Guatemala 292 Thailand Angola 
33 India Libya 163 Philippines Guinea 293 Thailand Australia 
34 India Malaysia 164 Philippines Guyana 294 Thailand Austria 
35 India Oman 165 Philippines Haiti 295 Thailand Azerbaijan 
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36 India Qatar 166 Philippines Honduras 296 Thailand Bahrain 
37 India Saudi Arabia 167 Philippines HK 297 Thailand Bangladesh 
38 India Sudan 168 Philippines Hungary 298 Thailand Belgium 
39 India Thailand 169 Philippines Iceland 299 Thailand Botswana 
40 India United Arab 
Emirates 
170 Philippines India 300 Thailand Brazil 
41 Indonesia Australia 171 Philippines Indonesia 301 Thailand Brunei 
Darussalam 
42 Indonesia Bahrain 172 Philippines Iran 302 Thailand Cambodia 
43 Indonesia Brunei 
Darussalam 
173 Philippines Iraq 303 Thailand Canada 
44 Indonesia Germany 174 Philippines Ireland 304 Thailand Cape Verde 
45 Indonesia HK 175 Philippines Israel 305 Thailand China 
46 Indonesia Italy 176 Philippines Italy 306 Thailand Congo 
47 Indonesia Japan 177 Philippines Jamaica 307 Thailand Croatia 
48 Indonesia Jordon 178 Philippines Japan 308 Thailand Cuba 
49 Indonesia Kuwait 179 Philippines Jordan 309 Thailand Cyprus 
50 Indonesia Malaysia 180 Philippines Kazakhstan 310 Thailand Czech 
Republic 
51 Indonesia Mauritius 181 Philippines Kenya 311 Thailand Denmark 
52 Indonesia Netherlands 182 Philippines Kuwait 312 Thailand Djibouti 
53 Indonesia Oman 183 Philippines Laos PDR 313 Thailand Egypt 
54 Indonesia Qatar 184 Philippines Lebanon 314 Thailand Ethiopia 
55 Indonesia Korea 185 Philippines Lesotho 315 Thailand Fiji 
56 Indonesia Saudi Arabia 186 Philippines Liberia 316 Thailand Finland 
57 Indonesia Singapore 187 Philippines Libya 317 Thailand France 
58 Indonesia South Africa 188 Philippines Luxembourg 318 Thailand Gabon 
59 Indonesia Spain 189 Philippines Macau China 319 Thailand Germany 
60 Indonesia Taiwan 190 Philippines Madagascar 320 Thailand Ghana 
61 Indonesia Thailand 191 Philippines Malawi 321 Thailand Greece 
62 Indonesia Turkey 192 Philippines Malaysia 322 Thailand Guinea 
63 Indonesia United Arab 193 Philippines Maldives 323 Thailand HK 
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Emirates 
64 Indonesia US 194 Philippines Mali 324 Thailand Hungary 
65 Nepal Bahrain 195 Philippines Malta 325 Thailand Iceland 
66 Nepal HK 196 Philippines Marshall Islands 326 Thailand India 
67 Nepal Kuwait 197 Philippines Mauritania 327 Thailand Indonesia 
68 Nepal Malaysia 198 Philippines Mauritius 328 Thailand Iran 
69 Nepal Oman 199 Philippines Mauritius 329 Thailand Ireland 
70 Nepal Qatar 200 Philippines Mexico 330 Thailand Israel 
71 Nepal Korea 201 Philippines Micronesia 
Federated States 
of 
331 Thailand Italy 
72 Nepal Saudi Arabia 202 Philippines Monaco 332 Thailand Japan 
73 Nepal United Arab 
Emirates 
203 Philippines Mongolia 333 Thailand Jordan 
74 Pakistan Algeria 204 Philippines Morocco 334 Thailand Kazakhstan 
75 Pakistan Angola 205 Philippines Mozambique 335 Thailand Kenya 
76 Pakistan Azerbaijan 206 Philippines Myanmar 336 Thailand Kuwait 
77 Pakistan Bahrain 207 Philippines Namibia 337 Thailand Laos PDR 
78 Pakistan Brunei 
Darussalam 
208 Philippines Nauru 338 Thailand Lebanon 
79 Pakistan China 209 Philippines Nepal 339 Thailand Libya 
80 Pakistan Cyprus 210 Philippines Netherlands 340 Thailand Macau 
China 
81 Pakistan Germany 211 Philippines New Caledonia 341 Thailand Madagascar 
82 Pakistan Greece 212 Philippines New Zealand 342 Thailand Malaysia 
83 Pakistan Guinea 213 Philippines Nigeria 343 Thailand Maldives 
84 Pakistan HK 214 Philippines Norway 344 Thailand Mauritius 
85 Pakistan Iran 215 Philippines Oman 345 Thailand Mexico 
86 Pakistan Italy 216 Philippines Pakistan 346 Thailand Mongolia 
87 Pakistan Japan 217 Philippines Palau 347 Thailand Morocco 
88 Pakistan Jordon 218 Philippines Panama 348 Thailand Mozambiqu
e 
89 Pakistan Kenya 219 Philippines PNG 349 Thailand Myanmar 
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90 Pakistan Kuwait 220 Philippines Peru 350 Thailand Netherlands 
91 Pakistan Lebanon 221 Philippines Poland 351 Thailand New 
Zealand 
92 Pakistan Libya 222 Philippines Portugal 352 Thailand Nigeria 
93 Pakistan Malaysia 223 Philippines Qatar 353 Thailand Norway 
94 Pakistan Nigeria 224 Philippines Korea 354 Thailand Oman 
95 Pakistan Oman 225 Philippines Romania 355 Thailand Pakistan 
96 Pakistan Qatar 226 Philippines Russian 
Federation 
356 Thailand PNG 
97 Pakistan Korea 227 Philippines St Kit & Nevis 357 Thailand Philippines 
98 Pakistan Saudi Arabia 228 Philippines St Vincent & the 
Grenadines 
358 Thailand Poland 
99 Pakistan Singapore 229 Philippines Samoa 359 Thailand Portugal 
100 Pakistan South Africa 230 Philippines Saudi Arabia 360 Thailand Qatar 
101 Pakistan Spain 231 Philippines Seychelles 361 Thailand Korea 
102 Pakistan Sudan 232 Philippines Singapore 362 Thailand Romania 
103 Pakistan Sweden 233 Philippines Solomon Islands 363 Thailand Russian 
Federation 
104 Pakistan Switzerland 234 Philippines South Africa 364 Thailand Saudi Arabia 
105 Pakistan Tanzania 235 Philippines Spain 365 Thailand Seychelles 
106 Pakistan Turkey 236 Philippines Sri Lanka 366 Thailand Singapore 
107 Pakistan United Arab 
Emirates 
237 Philippines Sudan 367 Thailand Slovakia 
108 Pakistan UK 238 Philippines Swaziland 368 Thailand Slovenia 
109 Pakistan US 239 Philippines Sweden 369 Thailand South Africa 
110 Pakistan Yemen 240 Philippines Switzerland 370 Thailand Spain 
111 Pakistan Zambia 241 Philippines Taiwan 371 Thailand Sri Lanka 
112 Philippines Afghanistan 242 Philippines Tanzania 372 Thailand Sudan 
113 Philippines Albania 243 Philippines Thailand 373 Thailand Sweden 
114 Philippines Algeria 244 Philippines Timor Leste 374 Thailand Switzerland 
115 Philippines Andorra 245 Philippines Tonga 375 Thailand Taiwan 
116 Philippines Angola 246 Philippines Trinidad & 
Tobago 
376 Thailand Tanzania 
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117 Philippines Antiq & Barbuda 247 Philippines Tunisia 377 Thailand Turkey 
118 Philippines Argentina 248 Philippines Turkey 378 Thailand Uganda 
119 Philippines Australia 249 Philippines Uganda 379 Thailand Ukraine 
120 Philippines Austria 250 Philippines United Arab 
Emirates 
380 Thailand United Arab 
Emirates 
121 Philippines Azerbaijan 251 Philippines UK 381 Thailand UK 
122 Philippines Bahamas 252 Philippines US 382 Thailand US 
123 Philippines Bahrain 253 Philippines Vietnam 383 Thailand Vietnam 
124 Philippines Bangladesh 254 Philippines Yemen 384 Thailand Yemen 
125 Philippines Barbados 255 Philippines Zambia 385 Vietnam Japan 
126 Philippines Belgium 256 Philippines Zimbabwe 386 Vietnam Malaysia 
127 Philippines Botswana 257 Sri Lanka Afghanistan 387 Vietnam Korea 
128 Philippines Brazil 258 Sri Lanka Algeria 388 Vietnam Taiwan 
129 Philippines Brunei 
Darussalam 
259 Sri Lanka Australia       
130 Philippines Bulgaria 260 Sri Lanka Bahrain       
 
 
C2. Estimation and diagnostic test results. 
 
Table 26: Unit root test on residuals of base model (model 1). 
Method Statistic Prob.** Cross sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  28.6094  0.0000 366  3669 
 
 
Table 27: Re-estimation of base model (first-differenced). 
Dependent variable: log(bilateral Labor Flow) 
Explanatory variable Equation 1 
 
Log Relative GDP per capita* 2.977*** 
(1.082) 
Log Population (host) 0.497*** 
(0.060) 
Log Population (origin) 5.819*** 
(0.449) 
Log Distance 0.087 
(2.245) 
Common language -7.158** 
(3.156) 
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Common Border 0.497 
(1.806) 
Colonial relationship -1.228 
(1.058) 
PTA 0.277*** 
(0.057) 
Constant -62.684*** 
(18.347) 
N 4054 
*Log Relative GDP per capita is in first differenced form.  Significance levels: *10%  **5% ***1% 
 
 
Table 28: Estimation by adding distance and common border one at a time 
Dependent variable: log(bilateral Labor Flow) 
Explanatory variable Column 1 
 
Column 2 Column 3 
Log Relative GDP per 
capita 
6.032*** 
(0.692) 
6.032*** 
(0.692) 
 
6.032*** 
(0.692) 
Log Population (host) 0.754*** 
(0.091) 
0.754*** 
(0.091) 
 
0.754*** 
(0.091) 
Log Population (origin) 4.466*** 
(0.465) 
4.466*** 
(0.465) 
4.466*** 
(0.465) 
Log Distance -0.823 
(2.225) 
-0.823 
(2.225) 
(2.164) 
 
Common language -3.644 
(3.149) 
-3.64  
(3.149) 
-4.750 
(3.062) 
Common Border 0.439 
(1.795) 
 1.127** 
(0.472) 
Colonial relationship 0.004 
(1.060) 
0.004 
(1.060) 
0.316 
(0.468) 
PTA 0.143* 
(0.076) 
0.143* 
(0.076) 
0.143* 
(0.077) 
Unemployment (host) -0.033*** 
(0.005) 
-0.033*** 
(0.005) 
-0.033*** 
(0.005) 
Unemployment (origin) 0.033*** 
(0.009) 
0.033*** 
(0.009) 
0.033*** 
(0.009) 
Constant -44.154*** 
(18.288) 
-44.154** 
(18.288) 
-50.669*** 
(5.226) 
N 4090 4090 4090 
Specification 1 (column 1) includes both distance and border variable; specification 2 includes distance only while specification 3 
includes common border only.  Significance levels: *10%t **5% ***1% 
 
 
Table 29: Test for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  chi2(1)      =    41.92 
Prob > chi2  =   0.0000 
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data F(  1,     372) =    129.845 
 Prob > F =      0.0000 
Notes: The null hypothesis of no heteroscedasticity in the residuals from OLS estimation of equation 1 is rejected in the BP test while the 
null hypothesis of no first-order autocorrelation is rejected in the Wooldridge test for autocorrelation. 
 
